




The Rhodesian Front WAR

Counter-insurgency
and guerrilla
warfare
1962-1980

H. Ellert



THE RHODESIAN FRONT WAR

ZAMBEZIANA: Vol XIX

A SERIES ON CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN
CENTRAL AFRICA

General Editor: Professor R.S. Roberts

This book, the nineteenth in the series, is in a different category from that of its predecessors. It is not an academic work but rather an exercise in reminiscence — and reminiscence of a subject that many might prefer to forget.

The events described may bring pain to some readers or shame to others; but the details are factual and accurate, and not sensationalized as in other books on the war published both in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It does, therefore, add to our knowledge and understanding of those years of war.

Tout comprendre is not necessarily tout pardonner but only out of understanding can come tolerance and reconciliation.

R.S. Roberts

THE RHODESIAN FRONT WAR

Counter-insurgency and guerrilla war in
Rhodesia 1962 – 1980

by

H. Ellert



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Foreword

In the history of arms there is no more bitter form of war than civil war. Indeed C.V. Wedgwood once noted that the English Civil War even after 300 years could never be researched with complete scientific indifference or academic detachment simply because of the continuous cross-currents of passionate controversy that ran through the subject.

The Rhodesia-Zimbabwe War was of course not only a civil war, it was also a race war, a revolutionary war, a counter-revolutionary war, a war of Black liberation and a war of White survival. It was, in short, a struggle of fire and blood. After a mere six years few can approach such a subject without trepidation and, therefore, Henry Ellert's book represents a bold, direct charge into the most compulsive and emotive historical event in the modern national psyche. His is not a professional academic history and, therefore, lays no claim to be a definitive analysis of the totality of the greatest bush war in modern Africa since Algeria.

Mr Ellert in fact writes as a former participant and as a personal observer. He spent sixteen years in the British South Africa Police and rose to the key position of Head of Section of the Special Branch European Desk. This book thus reflects the professional perspectives and trained intellect of a Special Branch officer who in turn presents a view of the Rhodesian side of the war in episodic fashion and with the style of a skilled *raconteur*.

Above all, perhaps, this book is very much a 'Police' view of the Rhodesian war effort and seen from this angle its quality stands in interesting contrast to the 'Army histories' of Peter Stiff and Colonel Ron Reid Daly and of Barbara Cole which deal respectively with the Selous Scouts and the Special Air Service. Whereas Ellert's work is intelligently conceived and competently executed, the books of Stiff and Reid Daly and of Cole are the very antithesis of scholarship and represent a banal fantasy of slaughter and daring-do.

Where Ellert attempts to place his study in serious historical context, Stiff and Reid Daly and Cole have in fact unconsciously created a new genre — the Southern — which like the Western devotes itself to eulogizing the frontier legend, reducing complex political conflicts and racial confrontations to the barest hagiographical simplicities and aimed presumably at an even simpler audience. It is impossible to accept this as credible military history. This is war portrayed as a blood sport rather than as a tragic and bitter human drama in which great political causes collide and are resolved in the crucible of battle. In fact it is deeply saddening to see such a fine regiment as the Special Air Service so poorly served and in general terms even more depressing to see such a wealth of operational data so utterly unrelated to any coherent politico-strategic

framework which might help us to understand the dynamics of the Rhodesian war effort.

Again in contrast, Ellert's useful miscellany ranging from the early 1960s to Independence does attempt interpretative analyses. We have, for instance, for the first time, a detailed appraisal of Rhodesian - Portuguese security relations. In addition there are stimulating and critical chapters dealing with the vital South African role with the controversial Selous Scouts, with Operation Favour and with the ultra-secret counter-sanctions war.

The Rhodesia-Zimbabwe War, of course, still awaits its Alistair Horne but Ellert has made a strong bid to fulfil Macaulay's famous ambition: that of replacing the latest novel with a good history book. That he has done this without sacrificing the essentials of accuracy, literary integrity and balanced judgement make this a military study which is a welcome addition to the literature on the bush war and which should be required reading for every informed Zimbabwean.

M. Evans
Lecturer in War Studies
University of Zimbabwe
November 1986

Preface

Strictly speaking this book is not a pure historical narrative and should rather be seen as an attempt to focus on specific episodes and events which the author believes are important milestones in Zimbabwe's historical journey. The events related will contribute to a more effective telling of how the Whites struggled to preserve what they perceived as being the Rhodesian way of life. Many Whites committed themselves to support a *de facto* one-party state which plunged the country into two decades of war.

From 1972, the guerrilla war intensified and the White population was drawn ever deeper into the conflict; it became a situation of us against them as the Rhodesians fought to maintain 'civilized Christian standards' in the face of African nationalism. There was a deep rooted and institutionalized reluctance to accept any legitimacy whatsoever for the African point of view. The majority of the White community was content to believe in the official Rhodesian Front propaganda and effectively joined the 'mushroom club' (a situation where they were kept in the dark and fed on manure). It was not surprising that most Whites were absolutely astounded at the image of a moderate, articulate and conciliatory 'terrorist leader' who addressed them on national television in April 1980. This historic occasion was to herald what has become a miracle of reconciliation.

There may be some who will argue that the war years should be forgiven and forgotten but this can never really be so. However, this study is not designed to open old wounds by dredging up the past. It is a serious endeavour to document important aspects of Zimbabwe's history so that future generations may be able to read and understand what really happened during the Rhodesian Front war. More immediately, the narrative may prove of importance in understanding the changing pattern of military intervention and destabilization in the sub-continent. Many events in South Africa since 1980 have direct links with our story.

H. Ellert

Acknowledgements


I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to P.G. Locke for permission to quote from his paper "Pistol carbines and sub-machine guns manufactured in Zimbabwe 1975-80" in *Heritage* No. 8, 1989. To the Curator of the Zimbabwe Military Museum in Gweru for permission to publish photographs of weapons and vehicles and for access to research material. To Major Michael Evans, former lecturer in War Studies at the University of Zimbabwe for his Foreword.

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CHAPTER 1

Overview of the Political and Military Struggle 1960-1980

ZIMBABWE



Although African nationalism in colonial Zimbabwe can be said to have started with the African Voice Movement of Benjamin Burombo in the early 1950s, and the re-formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1957, the colonial administration did not seriously rate African aspirations until the formation of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1960 when Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe and Dr T Parirenyatwa emerged as the nationalist leaders. In 1960, Southern Rhodesia experienced a wave of urban and rural violence, which, apart from the risings of the 1890s, was quite unprecedented in the country's history. In December 1961 the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, banned the NDP on the grounds that the organization was largely responsible for the civil unrest in the colony.

The nationalists responded by forming the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo on 18 December 1961. The formation of ZAPU marked a watershed in Zimbabwean nationalism because for the first time the name of Zimbabwe predominated and there was a clear break with the old guard nationalists who had tended to work within the confines of the existing colonial system. It was as if the very name 'Zimbabwe' bespoke what was to come. If the civil unrest of 1960 had been considered serious by the authorities, then the surge of violence which was to characterize Rhodesian politics in 1962-3 was infinitely worse.

The police was hard pressed to contain the escalating urban violence which threatened to engulf the whole country. Petrol bombings, stonings and mass violence erupted in most of the major African townships of Salisbury (Harare), Bulawayo, Gwelo (Gweru), Fort Victoria (Masvingo) and Shabani (Zvishavane). Much of the violence was internecine in character and manifested itself in attacks by ZAPU thugs against anyone who stood in their way. ZAPU was extremely active touring the rural areas of Rhodesia holding political rallies by day and carrying out acts of political violence against opposition members by night. The political meetings were attended by members of the XB, the early Special Branch of the police, who dutifully tape-recorded what the speakers had to say. In September 1962 the Southern Rhodesian government published a *White Paper Report on the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union* listing instances of politically inspired violence, murder, intimidation and arson.

On 17 September 1962, Sir Edgar Whitehead issued a statement that ZAPU were clearly to blame for the unrest and during that month members of 'C' Squadron Special Air Services (SAS), based at Ndola

in Northern Rhodesia since their return from the Malayan campaign of the 1950s, were flown to Salisbury to assist the civil power. These times became known as the days of *Zhii*. This Shona word was translated by Francis Nehwati, veteran trade unionist and nationalist, as meaning a devastating action which completely destroys or reduces to rubble; and this is what happened as municipal beerhalls and government property were destroyed by mob violence. On 27 November 1962, a White farmer came across the badly burned body of police reservist Kaitano Kambadza.² He had been petrol bombed by a mob. Regular and reserve policemen were the target of many such attacks as they were accused of being Sell Outs. In the jargon of the nationalists these people were also called Tshombes or Capricorns, words which had their roots in the secessionist movement of Katangese leader, Moise Tshombe and the formation of the Central African Capricorn Society of the 1950s which strove for multiracialism. The Southern Rhodesia government later banned the use of such words describing them as opprobrious epithets.

It was on 18 August 1962 that the deputy president of ZAPU, Dr T.S. Parirenyatwa³ was reported to have been killed when his car collided with a train at a crossing 22 km from Bulawayo. Parirenyatwa was being followed by the police XB who were driving in an Austin Westminster. Parirenyatwa ordered his driver Edward Sibanda to go faster and they struck the train. Sibanda subsequently failed to appear at the inquest and was never heard of again.

For Sir Edgar, 1962 was an extremely tough year and he used to dread receiving the weekly security and intelligence briefing from members of the XB. During one particular weekend the duty detective called at the prime minister's residence to deliver an urgent report on growing mob violence and this apparently so upset the ageing politician that he wet his trousers. The XB later learned that Sir Edgar suffered from a bladder condition which was aggravated by tension. On 16 December 1962 Sir Edgar Whitehead resigned following his electoral defeat by the Rhodesian Front party formed only nine months earlier.

The leader of the Rhodesian Front and new prime minister was Winston Field, a tobacco farmer from Marandellas (Marondera) who swept to power on a platform of no forced integration, retention of segregatory measures such as the Land Apportionment Act, and independence from Britain. On 8 August 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed by Ndabaningi Sithole as president, Leopold Takawira as vice president and Herbert Chitepo, Robert Mugabe and Nathan Shamuyarira among others. At the launching, Sithole declared that the formation came in response to a need to create a new political party and leave behind a closed chapter of evasive, short-sighted and elusive politics. The break came after the Organization for

African Unity (OAU) Cairo summit when the question of the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia had been discussed. It also came when the break-away faction felt that ZAPU was beginning to lose direction. The rift effectively polarized the nationalists and the spectre of the 1963 schism was to haunt the movement from then on. From 1963 until 1980 when independence was finally achieved the only unifying thread came from the common goal of liberation for Zimbabwe.

Prior to the formation of ZANU, ZAPU had been banned by the government but within a short time it emerged as the People's Caretaker Council (PCC). Before long the PCC was proscribed only to re-emerge as the Zimbabwe Church of Orphans. ZAPU also attracted criticism from Shona intellectuals who charged that the old party sought to perpetuate an ethnocentric leadership clique, which, even then as later, was prepared to seek accommodation with the White government to the exclusion of other parties in the nationalist movement.

Then on 13 April 1964, Ian Smith, supported by D.C. 'Boss' Lilford who had agreed to finance the RF, succeeded in wresting power from Winston Field who was thought to be irresolute in negotiations with Britain on independence. Smith went ahead to form his UDI cabinet and on 17 April the RF leader declared that there would be no African nationalist rule in his lifetime.

On 26 August 1964, the RF Government acted and declared a state of emergency in the Highfields African township in Salisbury (Harare). It also banned ZANU and the PCC and placed leading members into restriction camps. The ZANU hierarchy were sent to the Sikombela camp in the Zhombe district of Que Que (Kwekwe) while the ZAPU leaders went to the remote Gonakudzingwa camp in the south-east. The Rhodesian police para-military Support Unit was posted to guard the nationalists. Not all the leaders were arrested and James Chikerema of ZAPU and Herbert Chitepo of ZANU went into exile in Zambia. Through a network of couriers and agents who smuggled communications between Rhodesia and Zambia contact was maintained with the detainees. Chitepo went on to become the major architect of the Rhodesian nationalist armed struggle and chief proponent of Chimurenga — the Zimbabwean war of liberation.

The bannings and restrictions did nothing to solve urban unrest and throughout 1964 and much of 1965 violence in the townships continued until the Government finally declared a national state of emergency on 6 November 1965; five days later it declared UDI. Policemen at stations across the country were brought before their commanders and asked to swear loyalty to the new UDI Government; the few who refused were arrested and detained. Police recruits from the training depot were sent to stations to reinforce the regulars. Reservists were called up to help guard

prisons and restriction centres because the government suspected a mass break-out. The Army assisted the Police to patrol the townships and armed policemen moving with dogs through the darkened streets became a common sight. There were many cases of stonings and attacks on government property in both Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo. Urban police Riot Squads were soon deployed against rioters who were dispersed with tear gas and shot-gun fire. A regular tactic was for the police landrover to drive into a mob and hold still while officers armed with Greener 12-bore shot-guns opened the roof hatches and fired into the crowd. The vehicles were protected with wire-mesh screens and policemen carried wickerwork and metal shields and wore protective helmets and gas masks.

Meanwhile, nationalists in Lusaka were preparing the groundwork for a campaign of rural sabotage. In radio broadcasts from Lusaka, where the Zambian government offered these facilities, Zimbabweans were exhorted to form Zhanda groups and attack White-owned farms and property. In 1965 and 1966 Zhanda groups sprang up in many parts of the country. Groups of young men organized themselves in party political cells in the Tribal Trust Lands and by night moved into neighbouring White-owned farms, hacking down crops of maize and tobacco, hamstringing cattle and sheep and chopping down telephone poles. In the beginning the Zhanda campaign proved extremely effective and it might have had greater impact on the RF government if it had been supported by large-scale guerrilla incursions.

The guerrilla movement was still disorganized and the Criminal Investigation Department and the Special Branch were able to rapidly contain the unrest. The campaign was brought to an end by 1966. Teams of detectives were sent into the Tribal Trust Lands and African policemen attended local beer-drinks to ferret out information and cultivate informers. Villagers suspected of belonging to a Zhanda group were interrogated and once they confessed would be taken to indicate the scene of the crime. Axes and wire-cutters used were examined by the police forensic scientist who were then able to lead evidence linking the accused persons with a particular scene of crime.

Written confessions were recorded from the Zhanda men and in all but a few cases these were extracted only after considerable physical influence had been applied. Such violence, although never legally condoned, was acknowledged as a necessary evil in combating the unrest. The credo of the 'ends justifying the means' was considered enough when the arrested men subsequently broke down and implicated fellow Zhanda-group members and led the police to hidden weapons and tools used in the attacks. As the campaign was brought to a close, many Zhanda men fled Rhodesia for neighbouring Zambia to join the ranks of men and

women who had already formed to undergo military training in Ghana, Algeria, the Soviet Union, China and Tanzania in preparation for the early infiltrations of saboteurs and guerrilla fighters


In 1963 Tobias Bobylock Manyonga⁴ was arrested at a police road-block near Shabanie Mine (Zvishavane). The astonished police constable who examined Manyonga's vehicle found a number of vintage Thompson and Lancaster sub-machine guns together with a supply of .45 calibre ammunition and grenades. This discovery was followed by isolated attacks on the railway line in the Victoria (Masvingo) province and involved saboteurs, such as Emmerson Mnangagwa,⁵ Mathias Maloba and Jimmy Munyavanhu. The group blew up a goods train before being captured by the police Sabotage Squad. Other early incidents included the killing of P.J. Oberholtzer by the ZANU Crocodile Gang under the leadership of William Ndongana. Other group members, Victor Dhlamini and Mlambo were arrested by the Portuguese secret police, PIDE, inside Mozambique and handed over to the Rhodesians. A third man, Felix Santana was arrested inside Rhodesia and detained at Concession police camp but he managed to escape and fled to Zambia. Dhlamini and Mlambo were executed shortly after UDI in 1965 despite a royal pardon.

Guerrillas responsible for these early missions had been trained in Ghana during 1964 in a special course run by Ghanaian and Chinese instructors. The first group of eleven men included William Ndongana, Bernard Mutuma, Noel Mukono, Felix 'Rice' Santana and Edwin Mandizha. Members of this group later went to China, forming the first squad of Zimbabweans to be trained at the Nanking Military Academy. Of this group of eleven, Edwin Mandizha was dropped and replaced by Silas Mushonga immediately before the group's departure from Dar es Salaam

In early 1965, the ZANU leadership now detained at Sikombela issued a number of policy directives relative to future military operations. Under the terms of the Sikombela Declaration of 1965 Herbert Chitepo was invested with full powers to form the Revolutionary Council which included Chitepo as Chairman, Noel Mukono, Henry 'the hammer' Hamadziripi, Washington Malianga, Simpson Mutambanengwe, Percy Ntini, Steve Parirehwa, M. Chiota, Don Muvuti, Alfred Mutasa, Silas Mushonga, William Ndongana, Felix Santana and Bernard Mutuma.

Towards the end of 1965 Herbert Chitepo, who had earlier served as Tanzania's Attorney-General, requested President Julius Nyerere to grant training facilities and in November-December of that year Felix Santana and William Ndongana started instructing a course at the Intumbi Reefs gold-mine near Mbeya. From these primitive beginnings Chitepo was able to muster a force of some 24 well-armed and trained

→ Sabotage: guerrilla action of the early 1960s



guerrillas and in April 1966 they were sent across the Zambezi river with orders to march inland to Karoi-Sinoia (Chinhoyi) and divide into four squads of six men. The first group commanded by Comrade Chigwada headed for Umtali (Mutare) where they intended blowing up the Feruka oil refinery and the crude oil pipeline from Beira in Mozambique. While resting near the Old Umtali Mission on the Penhalonga road they were detected and arrested. The second group under Mudukuti went to the Victoria (Masvingo) province but were also arrested. The third gang which included Edward Nyandoro, Everisto Africa, Gumbochuma and Shenjere moved into the Zvimba Tribal Trust Land and finally made camp in the nearby Zowa African Purchase Area. As this group moved stealthily around the district politicizing the local African peasants, the fourth group consisting of Simon Chingoza Nyandoro, Godwin Manyerenyere, Christopher Chatambudza, Arthur Maramba, Chubby Sawana, Godfrey Dube and David Guzuzu made camp on a large commercial farm owned by Noel Mathews of the Sinoia (Chinhoyi) District. Two of these guerrillas went into the Sinoia (Chinhoyi) village to contact a ZANU party official. The guerrillas made several such visits but in the end their presence was betrayed by an undercover policeman⁶ and a large force of police commanded by Chief Superintendent John Cannon and Detective Inspector Dusty Binns and Bill Freeman⁷ moved in to attack. As the uniformed policemen encircled the guerrilla position, Binns and Freeman and a team of Criminal Investigation Department detectives of the Sabotage Squad initiated the attack with a heliborne assault from above. The detectives fired on the guerrillas using automatic shotguns and 9mm Stirling sub-machine guns. Hopelessly outnumbered the ZANU guerrillas fought to the last. This incident, which took place on 29 April 1966, is now commemorated as the Battle of Chinhoyi by the ZANU Government of Zimbabwe, which came to power on 18 April 1980, because it marked the effective beginning of the nationalist armed struggle. In the aftermath of the engagement the detectives examined the belongings of the dead. They had a difficult time preventing trophy hunters from looting Chinese made wrist-watches, compasses, sheath knives. The police congratulated themselves on the successful action but within a few weeks their high spirits evaporated when news of the killing of J.H. Viljoen in the Hartley (Chegutu) District came through.

The third group, which was later known by the Rhodesians as the Viljoen Gang, had orders to move into the Zhombe Tribal Trust Land and free the ZANU leaders from the Sikombela restriction camp. Contrary to orders they attacked the Nevada farm on the evening of 18 May 1966, and killed Viljoen and his wife. The choice of target intrigued investigating policemen until they learned that Viljoen had a bad reputation among local African labourers who accused him of assaults with a

sjambok made from hippopotamus hide. During the manhunt for the guerrillas the police were obliged to face, for the first time, the realities of modern guerrilla war. The limited counter-insurgency or COIN operations of the early 1960s had not prepared them for the rigours of the hunt for these new, highly motivated and well-armed infiltrators. Regular policemen were ill-equipped and armed only with vintage .303 Lee Enfield single-action rifles and dressed in riot-drill blue-coloured fatigues. Attempts by some policemen to wear their own camouflage uniforms were vetoed by police general headquarters who claimed that blue was the ideal camouflage in thick bush. But this made no sense in reality as the policemen were quickly spotted by guerrillas who were able to escape successfully. After several months the police and the army established joint operations but succeeded in capturing only a few of the guerrillas responsible.

As a counter-measure the Criminal Investigation independently of the Special Branch, maintained its own elaborate filing system where guerrillas were classified as either Trained Saboteur (e.g. TS 4569 Joseph Maruleke) or Trained Terrorist (e.g. TT 3789 Fidelis Moyo). Special booklets were printed together with photographs and brief historical and operational biographies of the wanted men. Copies were sent to police stations throughout the country. In later years the Sabotage Squad was disbanded and many of its staff were transferred to the Special Branch to work with the Nationalist Desk or the Terrorist Desk.

The failure of the 1966 missions did not deter ZANU and during May 1967 a section of four guerrillas was hidden inside a removal van travelling from Lusaka to Salisbury (Harare). ZANU did not know it, but their plans had been leaked by an informer and 30 km outside Karoi the driver was waved down and taken into custody. A combined force of Special Branch and Rhodesian army Special Air Services positioned themselves around the vehicle while a detective inspector called upon the guerrillas to surrender.

The guerrillas feigned co-operation but as they emerged from the rear of the vehicle, opened fire with their AK-47 rifles. The Rhodesians were ready for them and after fifteen minutes the guerrillas were dead. Special Branch intelligence reports later suggested that the ZANU guerrillas had orders to drop off in Salisbury (Harare) on the evening of Friday, 27 May 1967, until Saturday morning when they were to open fire on shoppers in the city centre in an attempt to lower White morale. After this incident, special government regulations were introduced to padlock all incoming heavy vehicle traffic from Zambia. Long-distance haulage trucks were driven into special depots in Salisbury (Harare) or Bulawayo and opened under armed police guard. Not long after the introduction of the scheme a Clan transport pantechicon was sealed at Victoria Falls. As

the vehicle moved away a customs officer heard unusual sounds from within the vehicle and radioed ahead to the Bulawayo police who were able to capture a gang of four guerrillas.

ZANU then tried another plan which now involved the assassination of the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Smith. A Rhodesian Coloured family then living in Lusaka was known to be sympathetic to ZANU and a son named Charles was approached by Bernard Mutuma, Noel Mukono and Herbert Chitepo who recruited him for the dangerous mission. Charles agreed and was given a brief training course in explosives and the throwing of grenades. For the assassination Charles was given a powerful grenade which was carefully sealed inside a tin labelled 'Baked Beans'. The tin was included with various general items of luggage and Charles travelled to Rhodesia on the weekly Express Motorways bus service from the Ridgeway Hotel in Lusaka to Salisbury (Harare). Although he was searched at the Chirundu border post, Charles was not discovered because his travel documents were in order and he had a legitimate reason for the journey. In Salisbury (Harare), Charles made contact with friends in the Coloured community and under the influence of alcohol disclosed he was on a secret mission for ZANU. An informer reported the conversation to the Special Branch and Charles was quickly arrested and under questioning admitted his purpose had been to loiter outside Milton Building and wait the arrival of the prime minister in Jameson (Samora Machel) Avenue. As Ian Smith arrived, he was to approach the vehicle and throw the grenade as he stepped out of his Mercedes and walked to the Third Street entrance of his offices. After the explosion Charles was to escape in the confusion. The plan could have worked for Smith was extremely sensitive about excessive security and had only one Close Security Officer who usually opened the prime minister's door as he alighted. Charles agreed to return to Zambia as a double agent but before long the Zambian Intelligence Service intercepted one of his written communications to the Rhodesian Special Branch and tipped off the nationalists. Charles was later reported to have been shot and buried in a shallow grave in a bush camp outside Lusaka. After this incident Smith reluctantly agreed to an increase in security.

During 1969, ZANU recruited a number of men and women to be trained in basic intelligence work. Their mission was to cross into Rhodesia, via Chirundu and Victoria Falls, as legitimate travellers and report back on the mood of the rural population. They also had orders to contact the detained ZANU leadership. Although many of these women were arrested, some did slip through and were able to bring back important reports to Zambia.

One of the final ZANU missions, before a change in tactics occurred in 1970, involved an employee of the Stuttafords, the transport firm, nam-

ed Dennis Mangwana. Both he and his brother Cephas Mangwana smuggled into Rhodesia a consignment of arms and ammunition and arranged for it to be stored at the Stuttards warehouse in Salisbury concealed inside packing cases. Meanwhile the Special Branch penetrated the ZANU cell which Mangwana had set up for this purpose and they received regular reports on the arrival of the weapons from Zambia. Just before unarmed guerrillas were to be infiltrated into Rhodesia to rendezvous with Mangwana the police swooped and arrested the network. If ever ZANU needed an object lesson in how not to operate then this disaster was to prove an important argument for a change of tactic. The Stuttards case had all the ingredients for failure: it had made use of people vulnerable to recruitment by the Rhodesians. By 1970 ZANU was convinced of the need to consolidate political support of the people before initiating operations in a particular area and from 1971 to the end of 1972 it seemed to the Rhodesians that ZANU had completely withdrawn from the arena. For the time being the centre stage was occupied by ZAPU and to a lesser extent FROLIZI.

ZAPU operations had their origins in the early 1960s when in 1962-3 small groups of men were trained in the Soviet Union, Cuba and Algeria. A number of single courses were also held in Bulgaria, North Korea, Zaire and in Israel where a group underwent medical training. However, the most enduring training locations were in Russia and Cuba which at that time were also receiving trainees from FRELIMO, the Mozambique guerrilla movement, and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

ZAPU and ANC guerrillas trained in Cuba usually travelled by sea from Dar es Salaam, and during 1965 a vessel transporting several hundred guerrillas from Cuba back to Tanzania was followed by a South African submarine as it passed the Cape of Good Hope.

On 13 August 1968 a ZAPU guerrilla on trial before the High Court in Rhodesia described how he and a group of eleven men had flown to Moscow via Dar es Salaam and Cairo before being taken to a centre 40 km from the Soviet capital. During the next four months they were schooled in a wide range of subjects. Political science lectures were given by an elderly Russian who spoke excellent English and these normally took place whilst the group sat in a disused orchard near the barracks. The men were taught how to copy documents, to blackmail, to carry out surveillance and to open letters with steam. The use of codes and cyphers for relaying clandestine messages was included in the curriculum together with a basic outline on the workings of the major Western intelligence services. The trainees were also drilled in the use of explosives for demolitions, grenades, and weapons.

Although the guerrillas were not aware of it, they were continually be-

ing monitored by their Soviet instructors who were on the look-out for suitable recruits by the KGB Soviet Intelligence Service. The Rhodesians received confirmation of this through liaison with Western intelligence services. In exchange for this type of information the Rhodesians provided foreign intelligence officers with captured Soviet radio transmitters, code-books and other trappings of the intelligence game. The Rhodesians had information that Alfred 'Nikita' Mangena (who was also known as the Black Russian and was married to a Russian woman who lived with him in Lusaka) was a Soviet agent within ZAPU until his death in the late 1970s during an SAS ambush in south-western Zambia. The early ZAPU courses were extremely comprehensive but the emphasis should have been on purely military training rather than the more esoteric sciences of intelligence work. In the post-detente era after 1974 ZAPU was to concentrate on guerrilla training alone and most of this was done in Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.

In 1966 four groups of ZAPU guerrillas crossed the Zambezi river near the Chiwore hills and moved down the Mozambique border and into the Mount Darwin District. The infiltrators were not successful and the Special Branch were soon able to arrest the men after they had made contact with local informers. During July 1966 yet another ZAPU group moved into the Sipolilo (Gurube) hills but they fared no better and under interrogation some of the captured men told the Special Branch that they had orders to recruit able-bodied men and take them back to Zambia for training. This information highlighted the desperate shortage, at that time, of guerrilla recruits. Towards the end of 1967 and during 1968 both ZAPU and ZANU were accused of kidnapping men and sending them to Tanzania for training. The Special Branch had evidence that some Zambians were mistakenly abducted and their Government reacted by expelling to Tanzania some of the officials responsible.

In August 1966, three ZAPU guerrillas were apprehended in the Tjolo-tjo (Tsholotsho) District of western Zimbabwe after reports that strangers wearing green camouflage jackets had been observed in the area. These men were part of a group driven to the Botswana border from Lusaka by a ZAPU sympathizer named Peter Donald Sutherland Mackay, a former British Guards officer then living in Lusaka.

All of these early ZAPU infiltrations ended in failure as groups were swiftly accounted for by the Rhodesians. ZAPU then tried a different tactic and, with the aid of a group of European and Asian university lecturers at both the University College of Rhodesia and the University of Zambia in Lusaka, they conspired to smuggle explosives and hand-grenades into Rhodesia. The Rhodesian ring was controlled by Giovanni Arrighi and included John Conradie, John Reed and Ivan Dixon. An African member, Phineas Shava, conveyed the munitions from Lusaka

to Salisbury (Harare) concealed with a consignment of dried fish, whence they were delivered to Conradie who sent a coded message by courier to Lusaka confirming safe arrival.

Hand-grenades were then issued to ZAPU militants in Salisbury and in the following weeks there were explosions in city centre cafes and night clubs in an attempt to panic the White community. Some time prior to the formation of the ZAPU cell, the Special Branch had infiltrated an informer into the student fraternity and he was able to report back information which led to the arrest of Conradie and Dixon and the recovery of a weapons cache at their Monovale home in the Salisbury (Harare) suburbs. Some days prior to this arrest Arrighi and Reed, who had been held for questioning about their suspected membership of the Communist party, were released and left the country just ahead of the police swoop.

ZAPU followed up their early low-key infiltrations by introducing a force of nearly 200 men during July 1967. This incursion took advantage of a recently forged military alliance of the South African ANC and ZAPU. The South Africans had orders to march with the Zimbabweans who would guide them to the South African border. This mission proved yet another failure as the Rhodesians were able to detect the presence of the infiltrators and neutralize them. During this operation, code-named Nickel, the Rhodesian met with determined resistance as they battled against a large body of men in the Wankie (Hwange) area.

Soon a second force of ZAPU guerrillas crossed into the north-east of Rhodesia under the command of Moffat Hadebe. For six months the guerrillas trekked back and forth from the Zambezi valley with supplies. Crossing the Zambezi river the ZAPU guerrillas used inflatable rubber craft to ferry heavy supplies and equipment. They kept in touch with Lusaka using powerful single Side Band and Very High Frequency radio transmitters. This operation was co-ordinated by James Chikerema who often practised bizarre rituals invoking the guidance and blessing of ancestral spirits at ceremonies attended by the guerrillas prior to their infiltration. By early 1968, the bush path between the Sipolilo (Guruve) hills ZAPU camp and the Zambezi river crossing point was a well-worn track and a roving game-ranger David Scammel was able to report his suspicions to police inspector Erik Saul of the Chirundu border post. Flying to the scene, Saul found tell-tale evidence of spoor pattern, Russian matchboxes and other signs which pointed to a foreign presence. Saul and Scammel followed the trail for several kilometres and at one stage fell under the gaze of a ZAPU scout who, fortunately for the Rhodesians, had orders not to compromise their presence by firing.

Having confirmed the presence of a large guerrilla force, the immediate response was to order the formation of a Joint Operations Com-

mand (JOC) code-named Op Cauldron with headquarters at the Karoi police station. All available police and army personnel were recalled from leave in the largest exercise of its kind in Rhodesian history. Messages were broadcast over the radio and notices were flashed on cinema screens across the country. In the ensuing months of bush warfare ZAPU fighters engaged in a series of running battles with the Rhodesians in a defiant yet futile show of force. The chief superintendent in charge of the Special Branch later summed up the ZAPU failure when he explained that the guerrillas had not secured the support of the local African population and had chosen to base themselves in remote and mountainous country which made them extremely vulnerable.

The Rhodesians considered 1967 and 1968 as happy hunting days and the adventures of the Security Forces in the Zambezi valley and the escarpment districts inspired works of fiction like *Days of Madness*, the story of counter-insurgency operations in the Zambezi valley which was written by a former policeman, Robert Early. Members of the Security Forces reckoned that it was a jolly good war and patrols regularly netted a good bag of Ters (the Rhodesian abbreviation for terrorists). It was common, during those years, to see groups of soldiers and policemen gathered at the popular Makuti Motel overlooking the Zambezi valley drinking cold beers and boasting of their exploits as their vehicles with the dead bodies of guerrillas stood waiting outside.

For this operation, too, ZAPU had once again formed an alliance with the ANC who infiltrated guerrillas alongside their Zimbabwean counterparts. One ANC guerrilla managed to escape from Rhodesia but was finally arrested twelve months later near Durban. Another South African, a Xhosa, unable to speak the vernacular was arrested near Kariba where he sought work as a labourer. To his interrogators he tried to explain in broken English that he had washed down the Zambezi river from the Caprivi Strip where he had been working as a domestic servant.

It was the open involvement of the ANC which led to the arrival of the South African Police in Rhodesia during 1967 and 1968. In September of 1968, the SAP lost Constable Daniel Du Toit who was shot during an operation code-named Griffin. One hundred combined ZAPU and ANC guerrillas crossed the Zambezi river near Chirundu wearing East German combat fatigues, Warsaw Pact type steel helmets and carrying an assortment of infantry weapons. Within hours of their crossing, one man deserted and headed to the Chirundu police post where he reported to the police inspector that he was an undercover Special Branch agent. He indicated where he had hidden his AK-47 rifle and kitbag before guiding the Rhodesians to the river crossing place. With the assistance of two legendary trackers the trail was soon located and followed. The pursuit forces consisted of South African police from Chirundu and this was to

prove their first major action. With the trackers leading the way their path wound into thickly wooded country of the Zambezi valley escarpment. As the spooring team sensed the imminent presence of the guerrillas they fell back and motioned the policemen forward. In the battle the guerrillas had a position of superiority, both in numbers and firepower. They were concealed in rocky clefts and were able to pin down their adversaries with withering machine-gun fire. During the exchange, the ANC hurled insults at the SAP calling them Boers and for Daniel Du Toit this was too much. Standing up from behind a protective outcrop he opened fire with his FN rifle shouting 'come and get me, kaffirs'. They did just that and within seconds he was dead, shot through the head by an RPD gunner.

The Rhodesian airforce were summoned and Provost T-52s of the 6 Squadron dropped napalm and white phosphorus bombs to even the odds. As dusk fell, helicopters of 7 Squadron moved in to evacuate wounded members of the South African Police. The guerrillas used the same respite to abandon their rocky hideouts and move into the hills beyond the escarpment. But in the hinterland the country was extremely dry and inhospitable and the Rhodesians had little difficulty tracing most of the ZAPU guerrillas. Some of those captured could not speak Shona or Sindebele and claimed they had been press ganged by ZAPU abductors in Zambia. This confirmed contemporary Special Branch information that the nationalists were short of recruits and had resorted to kidnapping young men born and bred in Zambia but of Zimbabwean parentage.

The ZAPU leadership of the early 1970s was characterized by internecine squabbles which culminated in the formation of a break-away nationalist faction commanded by James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. This group formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) with some members of ZANU. This organization had apparently been formed to unify and co-ordinate the armed struggle which, up until the 1970s, had not been particularly successful. It did not achieve these objectives; on the contrary, it now represented a third guerrilla army which was to face the problems of recruiting and training. Between 1972 and 1973, two FROLIZI bands crossed the Zambezi river using the traditional infiltration routes and made their way into the Lomagundi farming district. So desperate had FROLIZI been to find manpower that they had resorted to men with criminal records and dubious political motivation. The FROLIZI mission was interesting for another reason because for the first time members of the Rhodesian Coloured community had come forward to fight; for two of the most notable were members of the well-known families of Zerf and Murtagh.

The FROLIZI operations were ineffectual and nearly all their guerrillas were captured by the Rhodesian security forces. After the failure of these operations, FROLIZI, which did not have the support of the Organization of African Unity liberation committee, lingered on in suspended animation until the Lusaka Declaration of Unity in December 1974 when James Chikerema became a signatory to that document during the detente exercise.


Undaunted by the formation of the FROLIZI movement, ZAPU decided to embark on a series of hit-and-run attacks against South African Police camps dotted along the Zambezi river between Kazungula, Victoria Falls, Chirundu and Kanyemba. During 1970 and 1971, ZAPU sent heavily armed men across the river to attack these camps and plant land-mines on the approach roads. In January 1970, the SAP near Victoria Falls were attacked by fifteen ZAPU guerrillas who succeeded in wounding six policemen. The same night guerrillas attacked Victoria Falls airport with mortar and rocket fire. During related incidents SAP vehicles using the Mana Pools game reserve roads detonated mines. These trans-border strikes became so serious that Ian Smith told Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda that until he curtailed ZAPU he would close the border and deny Zambia export routes for her copper.

Smith's ill-conceived action was ignored by Kaunda and shortly afterwards Smith announced to a press conference that he had agreed to re-open the border after receiving certain assurances, that the Zambians would stop 'terrorists' through an honest broker who was not named. So the border was re-opened on 9 February 1973, but Kaunda refused to re-open the Chirundu and Kariba posts. He agreed to allow traffic to cross at Victoria Falls by arguing that he did not wish to penalize Zaire-bound trains and in this regard he had the backing of the South Africans who had in any event criticized Smith's blunder.


During 1971, Ian Smith engaged in talks with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, which led to the Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Agreement and the subsequent Pearce Commission with its test of acceptability which resulted in a massive rejection by the African people. Smith had disregarded the gloomy predictions of the Special Branch in favour of more positive advice from the Ministry of Internal Affairs which claimed to know the thinking of the African people. Smith generally distrusted the Special Branch and preferred the counsel of the District Commissioners many of whom came from Rhodesian pioneer stock whereas most Special Branch officers came from Britain. In May 1972, Lord Pearce announced his findings and Smith was crestfallen. His utter dismay was apparent during an embittered address on radio and television the evening after the British announcement.

The preceding year, 1971, had witnessed the return of large-scale ur-

1967-68-69
Operation Nickel, Cauldron and Griffin



← ZAPU RAIDS 1970-71
 ← FROLIZI RAIDS 1972-73 □ SAP camps



ban violence reminiscent of the early 1960s. Thousands of people rampaged along township and city streets destroying shops and property. In Salisbury (Harare) a mob of several thousands surged down Charter Road and threatened to spill into nearby European suburbs until they were halted by armed police patrols. Dozens of men were shot dead in nights of violence and in Umtali (Mutare), where the local police commander declared open season after curfew hour, the number of those slain by police far exceeded casualty figures elsewhere in the country.

The British test of acceptability brought a hitherto relatively obscure bishop, Abel Tendekayi Muzorewa of the United Methodist Church, into the public eye. Muzorewa formed the African National Council and succeeded in uniting African opposition throughout the country. On the strength of this success the ANC was transformed into a political party and in the years ahead Muzorewa was to become a political force internally. But he proved too weak and ineffectual and was easily manipulated by Ian Smith who in later years lured him into the internal settlement talks, first with Joshua Nkomo and later with Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau.

Recognizing the need to improve the flow of information from the rural areas, the British South Africa Police formed a low-grade intelligence wing which was known as the Ground Coverage Unit. From 1965 onwards, policemen with responsibility for the collection of grassroots information were appointed to stations throughout Rhodesia and usually the incumbent was the member-in-charge of the station. The Ground Coverage Officers channelled their reports to the local Special Branch and to their own District and Provincial police commanders who forwarded them to the Officer Commanding Ground Coverage at Special Branch headquarters. The essential work of ground coverage, which was largely funded and directed by the Special Branch, was to spread the intelligence network across the country and deep into the rural areas in the hope of gleaning snippets of information about strangers moving through remote parts of the country. The unit's first commanding officer was chief superintendent, D.H. 'Sandy' Sanderson, whose great love was deep-sea game fishing in the Mozambique Channel. During these early days the unit did produce some worthwhile information but in later years its real worth was measured in terms of the extra manpower it provided for the Special Branch. When Operation Hurricane started in late 1972, ground coverage men were posted to rural base camps in the north-east, code-named Team Alpha, Charlie, Delta and Foxtrot. Before long the unit was re-named Ground Coverage Special Scheme (GCSS) and to commemorate its formation members of the enlarged unit commissioned a beer tankard featuring the jolly roger skull and crossbones with the initials GCSS beneath. It was a member of this

unit, section officer Paul Kruger, who, on the evening of 13 September 1975, told the parents of Erasmus Chiutsi, whom Kruger had earlier arrested as a suspected guerrilla collaborator, that their son had hanged himself while in police custody. The Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace later produced an authoritative dossier alleging extensive use of torture by Kruger and other policemen at the Nyamahoboko camp in the Chesa area of north-eastern Rhodesia. Details of the case were brought before the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum who warned against using oppressive authority. Before long, Allum's warning was countermanded by the Secretary for Law and Order, Peter Claypole, who at the pass-out parade of young policemen on 29 July 1976 urged the officers not to be squeamish in departing from the niceties of established procedure which were appropriate for more normal times.

In response to a growing need to be informed on the activities of the external nationalist movements the Rhodesians formed the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). The creation of this service was supported by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Winston Field, who considered that an independent security and intelligence organization would be in the best interests of Southern Rhodesia. On 12 September 1963 the Deputy Commissioner responsible for Crime and Security in the British South Africa Police, Kenneth Flower, was seconded to head the new department under the Prime Minister's Office. Kenneth Flower relinquished all his normal police duties and became the Director-General of the CIO which by January 1964 was a fully constituted intelligence service. Until the formation of the CIO, security and intelligence had been the preserve of, firstly, the XB and later the Special Branch of the British South Africa Police, and, secondly, the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISBY) which provided for the joint needs of the Central African territories between 1953 and 1963.

Kenneth Flower was extremely well qualified for the job having served on secondment outside Rhodesia in 1941 working in Ethiopia and Somalia where his many duties brought him into contact with what he himself termed 'the grey twilight world of intelligence'. In July 1969 the official magazine of the British South Africa Police, *Outpost*, announced the retirement of Kenneth Flower from the police and his transfer to a 'senior position in Government in which the links of friendship would be maintained'.⁸

The CIO later became the overall umbrella organization for the entire Rhodesian intelligence and security community. It was first divided into two major departments, namely the internal division commanded by the officer commanding Special Branch who was known as the director internal (DIN); this division was also known as Branch I. The second division dealt with external matters and was commanded by the director ex-

ternal (DEX) and was commonly known as Branch II. Both directors were responsible in the chain of command to the deputy director general (DDG) and in turn to the director general (DG). Both these major directorates were served by supportive infrastructure each with specific responsibilities. In later years, the Rhodesian air force and army intelligence directorates were brought under the wing of the CIO. By the late 1970s the CIO embraced the Rhodesian Intelligence Corps (RIC) which were responsible for topographical intelligence, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Air Intelligence and liaison with the Rhodesian Special Air Services regiment, and the Selous Scouts who were later amalgamated into the CIO proper as Department Z.

The officer commanding Special Branch (DIN), who was responsible to both the Director-General of the CIO and to the Commissioner of Police for all matters relating to internal security, was kept informed by his provincial special branch commands (PSBOs) and district Special Branch offices located in the provinces. The most important commands were those of Salisbury and Mashonaland and Matabeleland with their headquarters in Salisbury (Harare) and Bulawayo. These commands were divided into various sections known as Desks, each headed by a detective inspector, one for Terrorism, for European Affairs, for Trade Unionism and for African Nationalism: T Desk, E Desk, T U Desk and N Desk in the jargon of the Special Branch. The Special Branch had a general brief to report on everything and anything falling into the category of internal security and often the definition was very broad indeed. Although external operations were the chief responsibility of Branch II of CIO, the Special Branch Terrorist Desk in Bulawayo and Salisbury (Harare) maintained important links with externally based agents and informers who had been infiltrated into both ZAPU and ZANU during the 1960s. The Special Branch also ran sources in Botswana and Zambia who provided information on external nationalists and the workings of those foreign governments and their police and army establishments.

Branch II with its general headquarters in Salisbury (Harare) serving as a clearing house for all incoming intelligence and Desk officers laboured to convert security reports into intelligence and briefing papers for government. Branch II also stationed officers in Pretoria, Athens, Paris, Lisbon, London and Washington. Their job was to barter information with host services such as the British SIS, the French SDECE, (later re-named *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure* DGSE), the South African BSS (later re-named DNS and NIS), the Portuguese PIDE/DGS and the American CIA. Periodic visits were also undertaken by CIO section heads to African countries such as Malawi, Gabon and Sudan where intelligence service chiefs traded information with the Rhodesians.

Liaison with Brazilian and Taiwanese intelligence service officers was also undertaken and in addition agents operating abroad were controlled by visiting Rhodesian CIO officers.

During 1977 suspicion started to creep into the minds of some Special Branch officers of the Salisbury (Harare) command who mistrusted their colleagues in Branch II. One particular chief superintendent⁹ in the Special Branch suspected Branch II officers of double dealing with foreign intelligence services. He ordered that visiting British intelligence officers be subjected to surveillance during routine trips to Salisbury in the late 1970s. No firm evidence to support these suspicions was ever turned up during this episode of classic inter-service rivalry and suspicion.

One of the most important tasks in the weekly diary of the Director-General of the CIO was the presentation of the internal and external intelligence briefing to the Rhodesian prime minister and some of his closest cabinet colleagues. These reports contained a synopsis of the internal and external threat to Rhodesia from all quarters. They also included various likely scenarios with recommendations for certain courses of action. In many cases, and notably so when Smith was being influenced by the persuasive and hard-line cabinet secretary, Jack Gaylard, it became evident that the Rhodesian prime minister was reluctant to believe some of these reports which he termed alarmist. A clear example of Smith's folly came over the issue of the ZANU military preparations in north-eastern Rhodesia and the neighbouring Tete province of Mozambique. The Special Branch T Desk had obtained accurate information and made certain predictions and Smith was urged to take immediate and meaningful steps towards a political solution and grant concessions to the nationalists. Smith simply did not believe that the Korekore people of the north-east were disaffected. The outbreak of violence in late 1972 came as no surprise to the CIO for they knew that ZANU had made excellent and timely use of FRELIMO successes in Tete. Isolated trans-border operations by the Rhodesians had conclusively proved that ZANU was in Mozambique and were busy training and bringing in supplies from Zamiba. ZANU relied on the ethnic and cultural affinity of the Korekore people who predominate in the north-east and in the Tete Province of Mozambique. In early 1972 Special Branch sources reported that large quantities of food and clothes were being purchased from shops near the St Albert's Mission in the Mvuradona mountains overlooking the Zambezi valley floor where guerrillas had been secretly operating for months. The Special Branch had received regular reports about the disappearance of men from villages and sightings of armed men. Operations by the SAS and the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) under Special Branch guidance against FRELIMO bases at Daque and Deveteve in Mozambique produced documentary evidence of ZANU's

presence and added to the overwhelming dossier of information that ZANU was extremely busy in the north-east. Still, Smith had decided that, because of the beguiling lull which the country had experienced for almost two years, the intelligence briefings were exaggerated. Furthermore the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with which Smith had a much greater affinity, reported that the Korekore people of the Zambezi valley were a docile lot and more interested in drinking the intoxicating *kachasu* spirit than being party to any insurrection nonsense as propounded by the security people.

The truth would have frightened most Whites. Large-scale portage groups numbering 100 or more were marching from the Zambezi river through Mozambique's Tete Province using the Msengezi river route and into the Dande and Mzarabani Tribal Trust Lands where they cached supplies in the foothills of the Mvuradona mountains. Men and women marched in single file, often covering the distance from the Zambezi to the Rhodesian border in under twenty-four hours. They carried hundreds of kilograms of ammunition, land-mines and weapons. One thousand rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for the AK-47 rifles were carried in a large container resembling a giant sardine tin and these were borne by women.¹⁰ Donkeys were also used to carry supplies and in November 1972 a police patrol stumbled across a supply column of 80 heavily laden men and women in the Mzarabani Tribal Trust Land.

Special Branch reports also indicated that this phase of the ZANU operations had been given the official blessing of important spirit mediums. These mediums, known in Shona as *svikiro* (or *mhondoro*), occupy an extremely important function in traditional society bridging the void between the living and the all important ancestral spirits. The Korekore and the Shona people in general believe in the importance of the ancestral spirits and often seek their guidance and assistance in troubled times. Notable amongst these mediums was an individual named Chipfeni who lived in the Mzarabani Tribal Trust Land. Yet another was a medium who claimed to be the chosen host of the spirit of Mbuya Nehanda, a woman who had championed the cause of the Shona risings in 1896 before being captured and hanged at Salisbury (Harare) prison. A third important medium, the guardian of an important shrine where prayers were offered for rain near the Chigango village also disappeared.¹¹ All three moved into Mozambique to lend spiritual support to ZANU in their campaigns. Significantly ZANU later named operational sectors after several important spirit mediums such as Nehanda and Chaminuka.¹²

The ZANU build-up was achieved after the failures of the late 1960s and an exchange of secret communications between Robert Mugabe, then in detention, and Herbert Chitepo in Lusaka. Mugabe urged

Chitepo to temporarily suspend military operations until a strategic and political review had been undertaken. For this purpose Noel Mukono, Josiah Tongogara, William Ndangana and Cletus Chigowe visited Mozambique in 1969 to study FRELIMO tactics and gain permission to commence operations in territory by now largely controlled by FRELIMO. FRELIMO agreed to this proposition and a further delegation comprising Meya (Mayor) Urimbo, Justin Chauke, Cornelius Mpfu and Shumba went to Tete province for three months during which time they realized that the decision to follow FRELIMO was little short of a masterstroke.

ZANU now proceeded to make up for lost time and Chitepo embarked on the second phase of the Liberation War — a struggle originally commenced in 1896 when what was referred to by the colonists as the Mashona Rebellion erupted. Chitepo divided the country into three military zones: MMZ for Mozambique-Malawi-Zimbabwe, BBZ for Botswana-Border-Zimbabwe and ZZ for Zambia-Zimbabwe. The MMZ province was sub-divided into a number of sectors named after important spirit mediums. The ZANU guerrilla leader Rex Nhongo commanded the Nehanda sector while Kenneth Gwindingwi commanded the Chaminuka sector.

By 21 December 1972 guerrillas of ZANU's Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) attacked isolated European-owned farms in the Zambezi valley escarpment on the edge of the Centenary farming district of north-eastern Rhodesia. The Rhodesians responded by forming a Joint Operations Command (JOC) code-named Operation Hurricane. During the early stages of this operation the Rhodesians believed that they would be able to contain this fresh outbreak of guerrilla activity just as they had done in the past; but after three months it became evidence that ZANU guerrillas were extremely well established and enjoyed wide support in the Tribal Trust Lands. The Rhodesians also realized that their internal counter-insurgency operations were being negated by ZANU rearguard support from bases inside Mozambique. Through the CIO liaison in Tete, the Rhodesians sought authority from Portuguese army commander, General Kaulza de Arriaga, to attack the ZANU command base located near the Zambian border in northern Tete Province. De Arriaga refused saying that his own elite paracommandos would carry out the assault. The Portuguese raid was not successful and the Rhodesians believed they had lost a golden opportunity to eliminate the ZANLA military command.

As part of the Rhodesian formula for dealing with the guerrilla threat internally, a series of base camps was established in north-eastern Rhodesia. Members of the Special Branch were deployed to these centres to co-ordinate the collection of intelligence on guerrilla movements and

support. By early 1973 they reported that ZANU guerrillas were receiving the active support of villagers who provided them with food and information on the activities of the Rhodesian security forces. In other cases villagers helped guerrillas by planting land-mines. The most successful of these militant villagers was an inoffensive-looking tailor at the Karoyi township in the Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. The Special Branch discovered that the man had a cache of mines at his home and had been planting them on the township approach roads at night. Single-handed he was responsible for blowing up several military vehicles before being caught.

As it became evident that the guerrillas were enjoying the full cooperation of villagers and had by 1973 carried the war beyond the escarpment which separated the Zambezi valley from the rich farm lands of Mount Darwin and Centenary and into the Chiweshe and Bindura districts, the Rhodesians undertook a radical reappraisal of their strategy. They contrasted Op Hurricane with the much more successful Operations Cauldron and Nickel of the late 1960s when the guerrillas had failed to muster the support of the local people. The Rhodesians thought that if they could isolate the enemy from the local population they might be able to regain lost ground.

Operation Overload 1 and 2 was conceived in early 1973 in direct response to guerrilla successes. It provided for the creation of a series of collective villages and later protected villages (PVs) similar in concept to those established in Malaya, Vietnam and Mozambique. Overload had its beginnings in a preliminary exercise where policemen were ordered to carry out a population census in the Dande and Mzarabani Tribal Trust Lands. The researchers arrived at highly conflicting figures and consequently the authorities were unable to adequately plan the extent of the holding centres and calculate feeding requirements for the large numbers ultimately rounded up. By the middle of 1973 thousands of villagers had been forcibly driven into detention centres at Msengezi mission, Gutsa, Hoya and Mukumbura. It was Gutsa that first attracted the hostile glare of publicity after a journalist, Reginald Shay, had sent an African freelance journalist into the Gutsa camp seeking evidence of the horrifying conditions said to prevail. Shay's man emerged with photographs and information confirming that children were dying of measles in the overcrowded and insanitary conditions. The exposure provoked a furore but the reality was that thousands of people were being held without adequate food and medical attention. By 1974, the Mukumbura PV experienced a number of mysterious deaths which medical experts believed could have been caused by the victims eating vegetables tainted by chemical defoliants used to clear bush from the border mine-field and *cordon sanitaire* running along Rhodesia's border with Mozambique.¹³

As part of the scheme to bring villagers into line, District Commissioners were empowered to impose collective punishments on villages suspected of assisting guerrillas. Inability to raise cash to pay the fines led to confiscation of livestock as the only alternative. If anything this move had exactly the opposite effect and strengthened ties with the guerrillas. In traditional Shona society the possession of cattle was a crucial issue but the 'African experts' were not sensitive to these cultural traditions. Even more authoritarian powers permitted District Commissioners to destroy huts and exile entire communities.

The dispossessed communities were often re-settled under conditions tantamount to banishment in their own land. The most graphic account of such official action in recent times can be found in the history of the Huchu people who in 1969 were moved from ancestral lands near Chilimanzi to the tsetse-ridden dry lands of north Gokwe and Charama. Not surprisingly, in 1975, the Huchu people were discovered by the police to be helping a guerrilla group operating in their area.

The second phase of Operation Overload involved the people of the Madziva and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands who were all re-located inside protected villages. Similar villages were soon built in the Kandeya, Musoro and Chesa districts. The initial task of administering the protected villages fell upon the Ministry of Internal Affairs but it soon became evident that the ministry simply could not cope. An independent force was raised under the command of a retired army Brigadier, W Godwin. The new organization was known as the Guard Force and at the height of its infamy numbered some 7,000 men divided into roughly seven battalions spread right across the country guarding protected villages and carrying out routine static guard duties on key points. The first battalion (1 Bat) was commanded by JOC Mtoko and comprised six companies. The second battalion (2 Bat) was stationed under the command of JOC Tangent in Bulawayo but consisted of only five companies. The remaining battalions were deployed at various centres in Rhodesia. The training and administrative centre of the Guard Force was at Chikurubi barracks just outside Salisbury.

The majority of the Rhodesian conscripts to the Guard Force were disparagingly referred to by the other units as being the dregs of society. White recruits to the force consisted of persons deemed medically unfit by reason of physical or mental condition for normal military duty. Such persons were classified as 'D Categories'. The officer structure of the force was entirely White and consisted, in the field, of a Keep Commander and a Deputy Keep Commander. The inequality of this bizarre rank structure was proven when even African veterans of Rhodesian contingents to Malaya and with many years service with the Rhodesian African Rifles were considered subservient to a young European Keep

Commander (KD) who was considered the lowest of the low and generally referred to in Guard Force jargon as the 'Kaffir Dog' after his initials.

The ranks of the force were stiffened during the late 1970s by the influx of several hundred men whose antecedents were never effectively investigated before attestation. Such men included the likes of an American named Robert Carrife who in 1980, during the British-monitored cease-fire, refused to donate blood arguing that he had come to kill and not to save lives. He kept a map of the world in his office where he marked, with red crayon, countries he believed had gone communist. Suspect countries were coloured with a pink pencil. Another strange individual was a former night-berth attendant on the Cologne-Milan express named Jurgen Winkler.

The task of effectively controlling the protected villages was impossible. The average village measured four kilometres square and contained approximately 5,000 people. The inner keep was protected by an earth-work wall with a concrete bunker inside. The average command was twenty men but with routine sick and other leave this was reduced to an effective twelve men. It was, therefore, not surprising that a state of near paranoia occasionally developed in the minds of men confined to the keeps. For one keep commander named Freign Corbett life became a living hell when he had to live out six weeks in a keep which was often subjected to small-arms and mortar attack by night.

As an adjunct to the policy of protected villages the Rhodesians imposed Operation Turkey in the commercial farm lands of north-eastern Rhodesia. The living quarters of African farm employees, known as compounds, were security-fenced in a further bid to deny the guerrillas access to food. The fencing programme was linked to the fencing of all European-owned homesteads in a government-financed scheme. Measures relating to the possession of maize meal and other foodstuffs were imposed to cut supplies to the guerrillas and for a while these new tactics were successful; but it was not long before farm labourers and inmates of the protected villages began passing out part of their meagre food rations to guerrillas who approached them at night. Because the calibre of the village guards was low and their morale poor they did not carry out night-time duties with much enthusiasm. The guards, known as district assistants (DAs) and district security assistants (DSAs) rapidly earned a reputation for brutality and lechery which was often emboldened by the consumption of home-brewed beer and the use of marijuana known in Rhodesia as *mbanje* or *dagga*.


During periods of R & R, members of Guard Force, particularly the foreigners, gathered at 167 Jameson Avenue (now Samora Machel Avenue) and at 6 Montague Avenue in Salisbury (Harare). Both these houses were veritable dens of iniquity, serving as living quarters, *shebeen*

(illegal liquor outlet), brothel, foreign exchange entrepot and arms bazar. A visitor to 6 Montague Avenue noticed a barter deal where a Guard Force member exchanged a case of mortar bombs for an MAG heavy machine-gun. Other men were dealing in morphine ampules or selling Kruger Rands or AK-47 rifles. The traffic in arms and ammunition had become necessary because the Guard Force men were so ill-equipped that many men had to make their own arrangements for supplies. In late 1979, these two locations had become so notorious that a team of twenty-five detectives from the CID raided the houses and arrested the denizens.

By August 1977, more than half a million people were in the villages. The final irony of the Rhodesian policy was that in many of the villages guerrillas were able to move in and out freely and in many cases organize *pungwe* when the morale of the beleaguered people was raised singing revolutionary *chimurenga* songs. The official reason for the creation of the protected villages had been effectively neutralized but for the inhabitants life was very difficult indeed. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace claimed in 1977 that the village inhabitants were in greater need of protection from their keepers than from the guerrillas. It was alleged that the District Assistants carried out acts of brutality, torture and rape. During the wet months the villages were highly susceptible to malaria. The worst legacy of this ill-conceived programme was that it drove a hitherto rural and peaceful people out of their traditional patterns of life into an intolerable system of forced urbanization in which all of the twentieth-century social ills proliferated. In late 1977, there were a total of 203 villages with a combined population estimated at 580,832 persons. Far from ever achieving even a small measure of success, as the concept had done in Malaya during the early 1950s, the Rhodesian protected villages proved to be counter-productive.

As part of the Rhodesian counter-insurgency operations a *cordon sanitaire* was built along the border with Mozambique. The cordon consisted of a strip of land running parallel to the border, cleared of vegetation by the use of chemical defoliants, fenced on both sides and sown with anti-personnel mines. By 1974 the mine-field stretched from Kanyemba in the north to Baobab Beacon just north of Nyamapanda. By the end of the war in 1980 the mine-field had reached Vila Salazar in the south-east. The mine-field did prove a deadly hazard to guerrilla groups crossing the border and many died. Pieces of blasted human flesh were used as macabre decorations in the infamous 234 bar at Mukumbura base camp. Wild animals, especially elephants, blundered into the mine-field and were seriously injured. The guerrillas were later able to safely cross using small spades to scoop out safe footsteps through the danger zone. The most effective mechanism adopted by the Rhodesians to detect early guerrilla crossing came from the daily spooring patrol

1973: OP Hurricane



ZANLA OPERATIONAL AREAS

- 1 Rubatsiro sector
- 2 Nehanda sector
- 3 Chaminuka sector
- 4 Takawira sector

which traversed given sectors of the border dragging behind their vehicles a wooden framework with rubber tyres. The drag smoothed the surface of the dusty roads and the early morning patrol could easily detect any disturbances. Immediate follow-up forces used the leap-frog technique where heliborne trackers follow spoor in jumps of three or four kilometres thereby closing the time gap between them and the guerrillas. This strategy worked until the guerrillas 'bombshelled' immediately after crossing with orders to rendezvous at a given location some distance inside Rhodesia.

The *cordon sanitaire* never proved a serious obstacle to guerrilla infiltrations. It became extremely difficult to patrol adequately the drag-line and as this was a prerequisite for early detection the investment proved a costly failure. By the late 1970s breaches of the border mine-field became common as mass infiltrations of hundreds of men were reported days after the actual event. The *cordon* might have proved more effective than it did if it had been constructed during 1971 when the plan was first mooted by the Special Branch during border-control operations in the north-east. The Rhodesian government rejected the plans as being too costly but in later years millions of dollars were expended when it was already too late. By the time that work on the fence commenced the guerrilla presence was already established.

From early 1973 the guerrillas started to deploy land-mines and this weapon was to prove the single most devastating and effective device seriously impeding Rhodesian security-force mobility. It was only in 1974 that the first generation of mine-protected vehicle known as the Rhino made its appearance. This vehicle consisted of a landrover chassis and engine with a protective cab superimposed. The Rhino was followed by second and third-generation vehicles of the Hyena, Leopard, Crocodile and Hippo classes. Until the arrival of these vehicles the Rhodesians had improvised by sandbagging their trucks just as the Portuguese army had protected their Berlier vehicles during their colonial war. The Hyena proved the most versatile and it was developed in association with the South Africans who later utilized it in Namibian operations. Rhodesian experience in anti-land-mine warfare was to prove of great value to the South Africans who perfected state-of-the-art mine-protected vehicles. The Hyena was improved in later years by the addition of exterior panelling of canvass or wire mesh designed to detonate and render harmless RPG-7 anti-tank rockets fired against them by guerrillas. The strict use of safety belts further minimized the danger of post-blast injuries when vehicles tumbled through the air after detonating a mine.

Even as the use of TM and TMH-46 anti-tank land-mines were taking their toll of the lives and vehicles of the Rhodesian security forces, the

single most serious Rhodesian loss occurred during early 1974 in an ambush of an army convoy in the Mukumbura Tribal Trust Land. The vehicles, carrying fuel drums to a forward airfield, were attacked while negotiating a *donga* (narrow river crossing). The guerrillas, in a classic army-style *forlay*, had dug into both sides of the *donga* and opened fire once the convoy was in the middle of the killing zone. Exposed in the back of the open trucks five conscript territorial force soldiers were immediately killed by RPD machine-gun fire. Others died when the gasoline drums exploded. Shortly after this incident, a call-sign of Rhodesian Light Infantrymen were pinned down in a gully near the Ruya river in the Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. Guerrillas were positioned along the edge of a gully and held the troopers down for several hours. Three soldiers were shot as they attempted to storm out of the drift. Unable to use their radio, the soldiers had to wait until nightfall before they could escape.

Within days of these guerrilla successes the Rhodesian Light Infantry fire-force command at Mount Darwin had evened the odds by killing 34 ZANLA guerrillas who had been observed by an observation post in the central Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. The Rhodesians often employed the use of fixed observation posts (OPs) on high points and working with radio they were able to guide their forces. This occasion was classical in that the Rhodesians caught the guerrillas by complete surprise as they were moving through open vleis grassland country. The fire-force deployed five sticks of four men each while the helicopter gunships or K-cars circled above co-ordinating the action of the ground forces. The K-car commander could deploy his men by radio contact and on this occasion most of the guerrillas were killed in open country by ground and air fire. Several ZANLA managed to run into a nearby kopje but were surrounded and later killed.


Another similar tactic employed by the Rhodesians was the use of spotter aircraft which were constantly deployed over the operational areas. The droning of the engines lulled some guerrillas into a false sense of security. Having spotted suspicious ground movement the spotter, often a Cessna push-pull, would circle the area and drown out the sound of approaching helicopter G-cars carrying soldiers and the K-car gunship. The guerrillas soon realized the danger of these spotters and nicknamed them 'Mafour corner' after the four-cornered shape of the aircraft's tailshape. Yet others were termed 'capricorn' (sell-outs) because they betrayed guerrilla positions.

After any security force action when guerrillas had been killed or captured the Special Branch had first priority. Bodies of the dead were loaded into nets slung beneath the helicopters and flown to Special Branch

and CID headquarters attached to the various military JOCs in the operational areas. The bodies were dumped on a large concrete slab within the security complexes and here they were examined, photographed and fingerprinted. Items of personal belongings, note-books and documents were carefully examined and from these the Special Branch were able to build up accurate records of guerrilla names, identity of sectors and detachment personnel. Each guerrilla regularly carried a full list of his own section together with details of his immediate detachment and sectoral commander. In the early days, until the guerrillas realized the danger of recording this information, the note-books turned up extremely important information giving both the real name and *Chimurenga nom-de-guerre* and weapon serial numbers. Other note-books revealed the location of hidden arms caches and details of contact men in villages.

From this type of information the Special Branch was able to build up vast indices of guerrilla names, both real and assumed, weapon numbers and types. The interrogation of captured guerrillas supplemented the overall intelligence picture and at the height of the war the Special Branch Terrorist Section based in Salisbury (Harare) had established an incredible archive which listed thousands of guerrillas from section through detachment to sectoral command level. Quite often Special Branch interrogators were able to confound captured guerrillas by the depth of their knowledge which extended from training-camp recruit squads right through to the Mozambique deployment camps and the operational sectors in Rhodesia. But this type of information, interesting though it was, did not help the Rhodesians to improve their kill rate. Special Branch officers involved with the Terrorist Desk realized that their task was largely one of research and documentation. Similarly, members of the CID attached to the operational commands, whose task it was to prepare criminal dockets for each and every incident as an act of terrorism and a contravention of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, found themselves engaged in a mammoth job of typing out yet another history of the war — it was as if the hierarchy in the Rhodesian police still refused to accept that the country was at war — for many of the old-timers, the guerrilla activity was still being perceived in the context of the limited operations of the early 1960s. An example of the CID mania for obsessive documentation came during 1973 when the Inspector at Mount Darwin received orders to open a criminal docket of murder in a case which pertained to a human skull which had been found in the CID and Special Branch mess known as the 'Bag Inn'. The origin of the skull was never discovered and but for a neat bullet hole at the base of the cranium which was seen by a visiting senior officer from Salisbury (Harare) the skull would have remained as an interesting conversation piece on the bar-room shelves. Macabre mementoes of the war littered

security-force establishments right across the country and in the nature of war where human values are debased such matters were never considered of any importance by the rank and file.



Mount Darwin Police Camp, 1975; 'captures' were hooded to conceal their identity.

CHAPTER 2

Detente and Settlements: Heightening of the War

During the second half of 1974 the Zambian Government reacted positively to South African requests for top-level meetings on regional trade, food security and the likely impact that the guerrilla war in Rhodesia might have on the sub-continent. The initiative was supported by Mobutu of Zaire and a meeting was held in New York. A member of the Rhodesian CIO attended this meeting which set the state for a series of encounters involving the South Africans, the Zambians and the Rhodesians. At the subsequent meetings the Zambians were promised security of trade and food if they would support a settlement involving Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU and Bishop Muzorewa of the ANC. The Rhodesians believed that Sithole was still the effective leader of ZANU; and because he had given assurances of his good intentions to the then Officer Commanding of the Special Branch concerning the rejection of the armed struggle as the only means of achieving independence, he was counted upon to play his part. In reality, Sithole had been cleverly manipulated into a situation where he had been convicted before the High Court of Rhodesia for plotting to assassinate Ian Smith using paid criminals for the job. The Special Branch had discovered that Sithole, some years before Detente, had discussed his plans which leaked to paid informers. Sithole was given every opportunity to carry out his plans and when these were committed to paper in the form of written communications handed to prison warders and then to informers who delivered them to the Special Branch, Sithole was confronted and charged with the conspiracy. The evidence was handed to the Criminal Investigation Department who prepared an open-and-shut case and Sithole was duly convicted. Faced with the prospect of a further ten years in prison on a common law sentence Sithole went to pieces when he was faced by the Special Branch who were thereby able to secure his co-operation for the detente plan. Ironically, Sithole's renunciation of the armed struggle and his involvement in the detente plan was the last straw for the ZANU leadership in detention who then removed him from the office of president, so clearing the way for Mugabe, as secretary-general, to assume effective control of the party.

Nkomo was also considered a possible threat to the detente plans but the Zambians gave assurances of his co-operation. Muzorewa had already given his pledge during a series of meeting with the Special Branch and Ian Smith. As the detente exercise gained momentum the Special Branch team under Derek Robinson was expanded by the inclu-

sion of Superintendent Peter Moores and Chief Inspector Robin Harvey.

It was Peter Moores who first visited Que Que prison on 7 November 1974 to interview Sithole and inform him of developments. Moores told Sithole that he was expected to travel to Lusaka with a number of ZANU representatives for a secret meeting with President Kaunda at State House. Sithole informed the ZANU executive who rejected the invitation and told Sithole to advise the Special Branch accordingly. On 8 November 1974 Kaunda's advisor Mark Chona flew from Salisbury to Lusaka with Bishop Muzorewa, Dr Elliot Gabellah, Joshua Nkomo and Joseph Msika. Realizing that no progress could be made without the ZANU delegation, Peter Moores was sent back to Que Que prison and there succeeded in persuading the ZANU detainees to send a delegation consisting of Moton Malianga and Robert Mugabe. In Lusaka, Mugabe and Malianga were given a separate audience with the Zambian President when they were informed that the detente exercise presented an opportunity to achieve independence without further bloodshed.

This first encounter was followed by a visit to Que Que by a Zambian envoy, George Pampati, who requested that Sithole, who was still acknowledged as the ZANU leader, should journey to Lusaka and sign a unity document. Maurice Nyagumbo was nominated to accompany Sithole in the role of watchdog because Sithole was no longer trusted. On this occasion the ZANU delegation were allowed to meet Herbert Chitepo, Josiah Tongogara, John Mataure and Mukudzei Mudzi who all rejected the terms of the proposed unity plan. Yet another meeting took place in Lusaka in early December 1974 when the entire ZANU executive was flown to Zambia in the company of the Special Branch, Bishop Muzorewa, Dr Gordon Chavunduka, Revd Henry Kachidza, Joshua Nkomo and Josiah Chinamano. On 7 December 1974 the *Declaration of Unity* document was signed by Muzorewa for ANC, Nkomo for ZAPU, Sithole for ZANU and Chikerema for FROLIZI. It was significant that Sithole signed for ZANU although he no longer had any real authority to do so — the ZANU leadership, both in detention and in exile, having rejected the plans which they interpreted as a manoeuvre to hi-jack the revolution.

ZANU misgivings were not articulated openly and they seemingly went along with the other signatories agreeing to the formation of a united front under the banner of the ANC. All representatives agreed to prepare for a constitutional conference leading to the transfer of political power. They also agreed to merge their respective political and military organizations within a period of four months. The final clause of the document gave recognition to the inevitability of the armed struggle until total independence was achieved.

For the proposed constitutional conference to be convened it was

necessary for both sides to declare a cease-fire and ZANU issued a number of pre-conditions demanding the disbandment of the protected villages, the release of all political prisoners, the suspension of death penalties for security offences, the granting of a general amnesty and the lifting of the ban on ZAPU and ZANU imposed under the state of emergency. The Rhodesians refused to accept these demands and ZANU's response was to accelerate the guerrilla war.

During this period before ZANU's demands were completely rejected by the Rhodesian government there was a time of confusion in the operational areas, and contact between the Rhodesian security forces and the guerrillas took place in the north-east. In October and November 1974 members of the Special Branch were busy promoting communication with FRELIMO who had assumed control of former Portuguese colonial outposts in the Tete Province. The Special Branch based these contacts on the former high level of liaison which they had undertaken prior to the Portuguese *coup* in Lisbon on 25 April 1974. FRELIMO proved to be fairly amenable and at border establishments such as Vila Zumbo, Mukumbura and Nyamapanda there was a fairly consistent level of trans-border exchange. The only rule was that either side cross unarmed. FRELIMO came into Rhodesia to buy groceries and liquor and the Rhodesians went into Mozambique hoping to obtain information about ZANU. FRELIMO had no apparent quarrel with the Rhodesians and in many cases there was excellent border liaison and fraternization. At Mukumbura, the FRELIMO administration had retained the services of White and Coloured administrators and this proved a further boon to the Rhodesians. Before long members of the Special Branch travelled as far inland as Magoe near the Cabora Bassa lake. There they met senior FRELIMO commanders and in this manner the Special Branch were able to press for direct meeting with ZANLA commanders to discuss the detente exercise. This initiative was spearheaded by Detective Inspector Peter Stanton and Winston Hart who then headed the Terrorist Desk and were acknowledged experts on ZANLA operations.

That such encounters took place during late 1974 is possible but the author cannot confirm the exact substance of the exchanges. The likelihood that it provided the foundation for the subsequent Nhari rebellion at Chifombo is extremely high. Thomas Nhari, Dakarai Badza and Cephass Tichatonga were all ZANLA detachment commanders in the MMZ province during that time and could well have been involved in the series of meetings described in *The Chitepo Assassination* where the authors, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson claim that the Rhodesian CIO engineered the rebellion and set in train a series of events which culminated in Chitepo's killing by an agent, Chuck Hind, on 18 March 1975.

Other encounters took place and the most bizarre of these occurred in December 1974 when a ZANLA detachment commander named Herbert Shungu and a number of his men were walking along the Rusambo-Rushinga road when they spotted a police landrover driven by patrol officer Pitt. Shungu flagged down the vehicle and before Pitt could react he discovered to his utter horror that he was surrounded by armed guerrillas. Shungu told the astonished patrol officer that he wanted to learn about the cease-fire and agreed to accompany Pitt to see his commanding officer, Superintendent Gilly Potter of the Special Branch. At the Rushinga headquarters Potter and Shungu engaged in a general discourse on the war and it ended when Shungu agreed to return to the bush and bring his entire detachment to surrender in terms of the Rhodesian campaign which was being disseminated throughout the north-east by the distribution of leaflets and sky-shouts from low-flying aircraft.

However, nothing more was ever heard of Shungu until late December when he stopped a patrol of South African Police near the approach to the Mazoe low-level bridge. The South Africans were lured on to the middle of the bridge and induced to lay down their arms. Shungu and his men then opened fire on the policemen killing them instantly. An African constable of the British South Africa Police attached as an interpreter escaped the slaughter by jumping the flooded Mazoe river and several days later he staggered into Mount Darwin police camp and told his story. He was the sole survivor of a massacre which effectively marked the end of any further overt cease-fire discussions. Four weeks after the incident Herbert Shungu taunted members of the Rhodesian security forces in the Rushinga district by calling them on a captured radio transmitter. The batteries wore out and Shungu went off the air but the case was not forgotten and was referred to by the Rhodesians as 'Gilly's Folly'. The epithet was later applied to a much favoured tea-shop adjacent to the Mount Darwin Special Branch complex where the policemen gathered at the traditional English tea-time to discuss the trials and tribulations of the war.

When it became clear that the cease-fire was having no effect the Rhodesians and South Africans tried a final attempt to revive the moribund settlement initiative and in August 1975 a meeting was held at Victoria Falls. But this proved a complete fiasco and in retrospect was nothing more than a public relations exercise in which the South African prime minister John Vorster met President Kaunda of Zambia and caused a brief media event. The South Africans had provided the State President's luxury railway carriage as the venue for the talks. The coach was located mid-way over the Victoria Falls bridge but these exotic surroundings did nothing to revive the dying spirit of detente. In any event, the talks were boycotted by ZANU who were extremely busy organizing

internal recruits and channelling volunteers into Mozambique. The detente exercise was important for a number of reasons and the most important of these was that it enabled the ZANU leadership to be freed from detention and once again play an important role in the struggle for independence.

By late 1975, Robert Mugabe, convinced more than ever that the armed struggle was the only way to achieve his objectives, decided to leave Rhodesia and direct operations from Mozambique. His decision was hastened when the Rhodesian police were ordered to crack down on the underground recruiting agents. As pressure was applied and Maurice Nyagumbo was arrested on charges of organizing recruitment, Robert Mugabe knew that he had to leave urgently. Within days of Nyagumbo's arrest Mugabe and Edgar Tekere crossed into Mozambique through the eastern highlands of Manica Province. They were assisted by a Catholic nun, Sister Mary Aquina (Dr A.K. Weinrich) who drove the men as far as Inyanga where, with the aid of the late Chief Rekayi Tangwena, an old foe of the Rhodesian government, they were guided into Mozambique. Mugabe's crossing to Mozambique came at a crucial time for ZANU, which in the post-Chitepo assassination era was still troubled by weak external leadership and in urgent need of effective control and direction. Mugabe was able to take up this challenge and in so doing confirmed his position as undisputed leader of the party.

Internal Settlement plans of 1975-6

Nkomo did not follow Mugabe's footsteps deciding that it would be better for him to remain inside the country and co-ordinate the reorganization of ZAPU. This he sought to do through the creation of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (ANCZ) which was the old ZAPU reincarnate.

Muzorewa for his part entered into a number of meetings with Derek Robinson of the Special Branch, Jack Gaylard, Secretary to the Cabinet, and the Attorney-General, E.A.T. Smith. These talks were geared towards Muzorewa's participation in a broader settlement with Nkomo. Later in 1975 Muzorewa, Sithole and Nkomo visited the Mgagao training facility in Tanzania during a special trip sponsored by the OAU liberation committee and President Kenneth Kaunda. The plan was that the signatories to the *Lusaka Declaration of Unity* should have the opportunity to explain to the fighting cadres the reason behind the formation of the umbrella ANC and their plans for a constitutional conference. The guerrillas responded by issuing the *Mgagao Manifesto* signed by some fifty-seven appointed representatives. The document rejected unanimously the proposed sell-out by Muzorewa, Nkomo, Sithole and

Chikerema. Dismayed, the four proponents of the ANC returned to Rhodesia.

Although Muzorewa was still proving difficult, the Rhodesians believed that in the end he would prove amenable to the internal settlement plans. Sithole, on the other hand, was suddenly asserting his authority and reneging on some of his earlier pledges. It was necessary to teach Sithole a lesson and in March 1975 he was arrested and charged before the High Court, in his capacity as leader of ZANU, with responsibility for 202 acts of terrorism. The Rhodesians were well aware that Sithole had no real authority in ZANU so the move was clearly designed to punish him for proving difficult. The trial was too much for the South Africans who considered it a threat to the detente plans. Ian Smith was sharply rebuked by Hilgard Muller who flew into Salisbury on 3 April 1975 to warn that unless Sithole was immediately released the consequences for Rhodesia would be serious. The next day Sithole was released and he flew to Dar es Salaam and political obscurity, during which he alternated between Idi Amin's Uganda and Malawi. In 1977 he was brought back to Rhodesia at Ian Smith's behest to participate in what became the internal settlement process.

The Rhodesians then switched their attention to Nkomo who attended meetings with Ian Smith, Jack Gaylard, Derek Robinson and Robin Harvey of the Special Branch. These secret meetings took place at night at Smith's official residence. Nkomo was urged to canvass support for his own settlement plans which were to exclude ZANU. It was suggested that he provoke a breach in his alliance with Muzorewa and that he should demand an early party congress where the question of leadership would be determined. Instead of facing up to these problems Muzorewa decided to leave for a tour of the United States at the crucial hour. During his absence the secret talks continued and in September 1975, Muzorewa returned to Rhodesia and expelled Nkomo, Samuel Munodawafa and Killion Bhebe. This gave Nkomo the excuse to call his own congress. The Special Branch were instructed to assist Nkomo secretly and in this climate of covert protection the veteran nationalist was able to raise financial support from Asian and European businessmen. A congress was held on 28 September 1975 and some 4,000 delegates, most of whom were from Matabeleland having travelled on a special train provided by Rhodesian Railways, attended. Congress confirmed Nkomo as leader of the ANC which was henceforth known as ANC-Z to distinguish it from the ANC of Muzorewa. The ANC-Z marked the re-birth of the old ZAPU but Smith was content because through his network of official contact with the politicians and from secret sources available to the CIO and the Special Branch he was kept fully informed of exactly what Nkomo was doing. Nkomo's internal political

structure was riddled with informers and when their reports were not enough additional information came from tapped telephone lines. Nkomo assured Smith that ZAPU would safeguard political and economic rights for the Europeans and party officials addressed the private sector. Sizeable monetary donations appeared and concrete evidence of this emerged on 3 December 1975 when Lazarus Nkala, brother of Enos Nkala who had joined ZANU in 1963, died in a motor vehicle accident. His Mercedes Benz overturned 128 km from Bulawayo and police called to the scene found a suitcase containing R\$ 100,000. Nkala had just been to Salisbury to accept the money from a large multinational with established interests in Rhodesia. Finally on 1 December 1975 Smith and Nkomo signed a declaration of intent to hold a constitutional conference but talks eventually broke down when on 19 March 1976 Smith refused to budge on the question of a gradual hand-over of political power during a ten to fifteen year transitional period.

Reacting to external diplomatic pressure, the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU forged a military and political alliance on 9 October 1976 under the name of the Patriotic Front (PF). The formation of the PF had its beginnings in the post Declaration of Unity era of 1974 when the signatories agreed to the formation of the Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ZLC) and the subsequent formation of what became known as the Zimbabwe's People's Army (ZiPA) with a joint military high command of ten officers from ZANLA and ten from ZiPRA. The creation of ZiPA or the Third Force as it became known was not successful and by the end of 1976 it had virtually ceased to exist. Originally intended to co-ordinate the fighting forces of ZANLA and ZiPRA under a unified command the alliance broke down over the central issue of age-old ideological differences. Fighting erupted at a centralized camp in Mozambique and before long the CIO, through its external radio-monitoring division, received reports that elements of the ZiPRA or ZAPU forces had defected into the bush after a fierce fire-fight and were making their way to Zambia. After this ill-fated attempt at military unity ZAPU and ZANU agreed to wage independent wars against the Rhodesians, ZiPRA would operate in the western Matabeleland provinces with rear bases in Zambia, while ZANLA operated from Mozambique into the east and southern provinces. However, this division of territory also meant that ZANLA no longer received their full share of military aid being channelled into Zambia by the Soviet Union and East Germany. ZANLA was forced to seek assistance elsewhere and found it in Yugoslavia, Romania and China. They also appealed successfully for medical and financial assistance from Western European donors where support groups such as the Zimbabwe Medical Aid (ZIMA) offered assistance.

In the second half of 1976 renewed impetus for the Rhodesian settle-

ment issue came from the Americans and in September 1976 Ian Smith announced his decision to attend the Geneva Conference with the nationalist leaders. Smith's decision had not come willingly and only followed his historic meeting with Dr Henry Kissinger in Pretoria during early September. Kissinger, with the support of the South Africans, had forced Smith to accept the inevitability of majority African rule within two years. Kissinger had secured South African support by packaging the proposals with the CIA-funded plans for Angola. This interested the South Africans because of the situation in Namibia and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrilla operations in that territory.

The Geneva talks finally opened on 28 October 1976 when the participants were brought together by the conference chairman, Ivor Richards. The talks eventually broke down on 4 November 1976 after the Rhodesians had attacked a major ZANLA forward base in Mozambique at the Nura Aldeamento a short distance from the Rhodesian border. The Rhodesians claimed that ZANLA were massing for an important offensive to coincide with the oncoming rains and during the raid destroyed nearly 100 tonnes of war material which was later displayed to journalists at the Mount Darwin army camp. The Geneva Conference was not a complete failure for ZANU because it enabled them to solidify their political base. In Geneva, Mugabe's Mozambique delegation met Rhodesian-based nationalists such as Nelson Mawema, Robert Marere and James Bassopo-Moyo who were to return home and form an internal ZANU structure under the guise of the People's Movement, an organization which assisted in the recruitment of guerrilla manpower and acted in an intelligence role. Mugabe also met ZANLA guerrillas, who had been detained by the Zambian government in the wake of the Chitepo assassination of 1975, and others: Henry Hamadziripi, Josiah Tongogara, Rugare Gumbo, Edgar Tekere, Meya (Mayor) Urimbo, Eddison Zvobgo and Herbert Ushewokunze. The final element which came to Geneva was that led by Rex Nhongo and Dzinashé Machingura who were representative of the fighting forces. Up until Geneva Mugabe had been living in Quelimane somewhat isolated from the mainstream of the war. Geneva therefore gave ZANU the chance to consolidate but again in early 1977 the spectre of ZiPA or the Third Force returned to plague ZANU nationalists once again.

Mugabe decided that urgent action was necessary and on 19 January 1977 a meeting was held in Beira of the ZANU central committee which resolved, with the support of the Mozambique government, to arrest and detain a group of dissidents led by Dzinashé Machingura and Elias Hondo. The two dissidents had been challenging the existing leadership arguing that they represented the fighting forces and, as the *Vashandi*


(Shona for the workers), had more right to the leadership than the *Zvigananda* (the bourgeois or ruling class) who had merely been sitting around as armchair guerrilla.¹

The final ZiPA challenge to the ZANU leadership came on 30 January 1978 when a group under Henry Hamadziripi and Webster Gwauya staged an attempted coup. The insurrection was put down by loyalist forces under Rex Nhongo who arrested 133 conspirators and freed Herbert Ushewokunze and Edgar Tekere who had been kidnapped earlier. The conspirators were then kept detained until early in 1980 when they were released and returned to Zimbabwe.

The destruction of ZANU's Nura camp in Mozambique did not prevent the planned 1976-7 rainy season offensive and by the end of 1977 ZANLA had recovered from their losses of 1974-5. The field of conflict was extended from the north-east as far as the south-east of the country. Sectoral boundaries within the three major guerrilla operational zones of Tete, Manica and Gaza had been pushed into the centre of the country. Guerrilla recruits were pouring into Mozambique on such a scale that the high command of ZANLA experienced difficulty in providing facilities for them. The Mozambique government offered to fly the trainees from Beira and Chigombedzi field at Tete to Mtwara in southern Tanzania.² Others were ferried to Tanzania on board the SS Mpanduzi. Vast holding camps were established at Dondo, 40 km outside Beira, Chimoio in the Manica province and at Tembue in the northern Tete province. In the months ahead, all these locations were to be regularly attacked by the Rhodesians in an endeavour to stem the tide.


As the war escalated during 1977 the British and Americans embarked on another diplomatic initiative. On 10 April 1977 the British Foreign Secretary, Dr David Owen, arrived in Cape Town for talks with the South African prime minister, John Vorster, and Ian Smith. These preliminaries cleared the way for a further round of discussions in Salisbury on 15 April 1977. In the midst of these diplomatic manoeuvres, Ian Smith decided to press ahead with his own internal settlement plans including Ndabaningi Sithole who was then in Malawi. A senior representative of the CIO flew to Blantyre inviting Sithole to return if he would publicly renounce the use of violence as the sole means for achieving majority rule. Having done so, Sithole flew into Salisbury on a South African DC4. His homecoming was a terrible anti-climax. Arriving at Salisbury airport on 10 July 1977, he went directly to Highfield township and addressed a crowd of 2,000 supporters who had gathered. The Special Branch officers who supervised Sithole's return expected no more — they knew only too well that Sithole was a spent force but that Smith had nevertheless wanted him back to figure in the internal settlement scenario of 1977-8.

1976: OP Hurricane, OP Thrasher, OP Repulse



ZANLA OPERATIONAL AREAS

Tete Province	Manica Province	Gaza Province
1 Rubatsiro	6 Tangwena	9 Sector I
2 Nehanda	7 Monomotapa	10 Sector II
3 Chaminuka	8 Musikavanhu	11 Sector III
4 Takawira		12 Sector IV
5 Chitepo		



Six weeks later, on 1 September 1977, David Owen and the American Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, flew into Salisbury on board a VCIO of the Royal Air Force. The Anglo-American team held talks with all the internal nationalist leaders and groups of private individuals. Muzorewa, with the tacit approval of the Special Branch, organized a demonstration of several thousand women outside the British residency at Marimba House in the Highlands suburb of Salisbury. In talks with the Rhodesian Government the Anglo-American team tried to persuade Smith to accept a demobilization of the security forces which was the Patriotic Front's condition for a cease-fire. The Rhodesians rejected this demand outright but did agree to allow the proposed Military Governor for the envisaged transitional period, Field Marshal Lord Carver, to visit Salisbury later in the year.

In the interim, Smith accompanied by Jack Gaylard and a member of the Rhodesian CIO flew to Lusaka for talks with President Kaunda. Kaunda expounded on the merits of a possible settlement with Nkomo which would involve safeguards for the European population. Smith noted details of the proposals before returning to Salisbury where he placed them in front of his cabinet colleagues who rejected them in favour of the evolving internal settlement arrangements.

As promised, Lord Carver and General Prem Chand, who were scheduled to head the transitional military government in a settlement and cease-fire between the Rhodesians and the Patriotic Front, arrived in Salisbury on 31 October 1977 from Dar es Salaam where they had held discussions with Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Lord Carver and General Prem Chand stepped off the RAF Hercules wearing military uniform; this greatly upset Ian Smith and senior Rhodesian army officers who considered it a breach of protocol and a token of defiance. As the British delegation moved to their waiting vehicles the Special Branch were busy photographing them using long-range telephoto lenses. This operation was standard procedure on the part of the Special Branch who utilized such occasions to update their files. Photographs of security suspects were useful when the Special Branch carried out surveillance duties and needed to identify their subjects. The Special Branch carefully monitored the movements of British diplomats and dutifully recorded in their personal files any picaresques and in some cases such information was put to effective use.

An example of Special Branch use of such detail came during the late 1960s when a member of the British Residual Mission was discovered to be having an affair with a Salisbury woman while his own wife was safely back in London. Because the British diplomat was believed to be hostile to the Rhodesian government the Special Branch conspired to forge an anonymous letter, known in the jargon of the security world as a

'spoiler', giving full details of the illicit sexual relationship to the unsuspecting British official's wife in London. Soon after receiving the 'spoiler' the distraught wife created a furore and the official was recalled, much to the glee of the Special Branch who congratulated themselves on a job well done.

Once again in 1973, the Special Branch showed their hand in the game of dirty tricks. During a visit to Salisbury by a British delegation led by the permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office, Sir Denis Greenhill, a member of his staff was reported to have had sex with a prostitute at the Mutanga night club in the Highfields township. The information was supplied by a Special Branch source and subsequently confirmed when the woman concerned was interviewed and forced to give a statement in which she admitted giving sex for money. The information was held in the diplomat's personal file pending some future use.

The Special Branch also needed accurate personal history data on their British visitors so they could be readily identified during surveillance operations. It was standard procedure that the British were placed under constant observation for the entire duration of their stay in Salisbury. On the occasion of Lord Carver's visit a senior British official left his briefcase in the hotel room and once the Special Branch surveillance team had confirmed that he was attending a meeting at Marimba House another team was sent to the hotel to search rooms belonging to the British. Locating the briefcase the Special Branch were soon able to pick the lock and photograph a number of secret British Government documents relating to talks with the Patriotic Front. The documents provided an important insight into British government thinking and the following day they were delivered to Ian Smith prior to his talks with Lord Carver.

During October 1977 the Special Branch obtained a copy of an anonymous document which was circulating among the Zimbabwean emigré community in London. The document suggested that senior ZiPRA commanders had come to London for secret talks with Lord Carver. Both Daniel Madzimbamuto and Josiah Chinamano were in London around 22 October 1977 but it was not established if they attended these alleged talks. The document claimed that the main objective of the talks had been to formulate the military relationship between Lord Carver's team and the ZiPRA forces during the transitional period. ZiPRA would provoke a deliberate confrontation between the opposing nationalist forces and in the ensuing conflict the British were to adopt a neutral posture thereby allowing ZAPU to gain the upper hand and take effective control of the country. Under this scenario, ZAPU would declare independence under the name of the Zimbabwe People's Republic and the Soviets would urge recognition from Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. The authenticity of this anonymous document may be

difficult to determine but examination of ZAPU's ambitions during 1977 tends to support the overall thesis. ZAPU was extremely well established in Zambia and had the strong backing of the Soviets who co-ordinated their support through the KGB directorate responsible for liberation movements in Africa. Rhodesian intelligence had been appraised of KGB work through their external liaison and knew that a key man in these operations was the Soviet Ambassador to Zambia and Botswana, Dr Vasili Solodovnikov, and a KGB official known as Comrade Maxim stationed at Lusaka.³

When the 1977 round of talks failed Nkomo decided to re-locate in Zambia and take up effective control of the ZiPRA military campaign. Significantly, Nkomo did not sever his links with the Rhodesian government and kept the lines of communication open by meeting with Rhodesian CIO operatives who met him or his chief lieutenants on a regular basis in England or Switzerland. Later in 1977, Smith was more determined than ever to go it alone and proceed with his plans for an internal settlement with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau. At this point the British and Americans made a further attempt to secure a broadly based agreement. Vice President Cyrus Vance together with David Owen tried to dissuade Smith from any deal that excluded Nkomo or other external partners.

The Anglo-American mission failed and Cyrus Vance and David Owen flew out of the Rhodesian capital on the night of 17 April 1978 amidst reports that Nkomo might yet return to Rhodesia and become involved in the internal settlement plans.

Smith's next step was to solemnize his internal settlement by bringing Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau to the official signing ceremony. At the last minute Muzorewa began to prove obstinate and accused Smith, correctly, of going behind his back, and contrary to the proposed agreement, talking to Nkomo. Dr Ahrn Palley, an old foe of the Rhodesian government, suddenly popped up in Special Branch telephone-tapping transcripts urging Muzorewa to press for greater constitutional reforms than those Smith was presently prepared to concede. Eventually Muzorewa was placated and agreed to the original plan. On 3 March 1978, Muzorewa wearing his favoured West African style robes appeared at the Civil Service Training Centre for the official signing ceremony alongside Sithole and Chirau. There were many strange people present that day including influential and wealthy businessmen each with a keen eye on their respective investments. Both Sithole and Muzorewa had their backers whilst the Rhodesians were bank-rolling Chief Chirau's Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) in the absence of any interested investors.

Soon after signing the agreement Smith and Jack Gaylard flew to

Lusaka for yet another meeting with Nkomo. The flight was arranged under conditions of the utmost secrecy and Smith travelled on an Air Rhodesian Viscount with a flight plan ostensibly filed for Johannesburg. A meeting had been arranged at the behest of the Anglo-American team who sought a final attempt to involve Nkomo. The meeting did not go well and Smith returned to Salisbury and when the news leaked Muzorewa was understandably furious.

While Nkomo maintained his diplomatic offensive he was simultaneously occupied in building his military strength. His rallying conscription call of one man from every kraal in Matabeleland had been answered by thousands of Ndebele who were under training in Zambia and Angola. ZiPRA forces were by late 1977 operational throughout the Matabeleland province and were sending reconnaissance patrols into the Midlands and Victoria provinces in the centre of the country and here they came into periodic conflict with ZANLA units.

ZiPRA opened a new front by crossing the Zambezi river near Kanyemba and moving into the Sipolilo and Magondi district of Mashonaland. The ZiPRA forward base for these fresh incursions was located at Kavalamanja, some eight kilometres outside the Zambian town of Luangwa at the confluence of the Zambezi and Luangwa rivers. This important base was the target of a combined Special Air Service regiment and Rhodesian Light Infantry attack which followed after weeks of careful reconnaissance work by captain Chris Schulenberg of the Selous Scouts.⁴ Having surrounded the base by night a dawn bombing run by the Hawker Hunters of the Rhodesian air force started the attack. Fleeing guerrillas were shot as they fled from the bombed camp. As regular units of the Zambian army rushed to the scene the Rhodesians were forced to call for emergency evacuation by helicopter under a system known as 'hot-extraction' reserved for cases of the utmost urgency.

As ZiPRA strengths multiplied pre-emptive strikes against training camps in Zambia and Angola were ordered. The Rhodesian Special Air Service regiment were successfully deployed in Zambia. They operated secretly planting TMH-46 land-mines along border roads used by the Zambian army and ZiPRA. The most spectacular of these clandestine missions involved the death of the ZiPRA military commander, Alfred Mangena, whose landrover struck a mine killing him instantly. Mangena was succeeded in the ZiPRA military command by Dumiso Dabengwa who up till then had been chief of intelligence.

The years 1977 and 1978 were extremely tough for the Rhodesians militarily. Recognizing the need to stem the massive inflow of ZANLA guerrillas, the Ministry of Combined Operations (COMOPS) war council agreed to military and intelligence recommendations to mount large-

scale assaults on ZANLA bases at Chimoio and Tembue in Mozambique. Although both these attacks, which are described in *The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service* by Barbara Cole, were considered successful by the Rhodesians, they did not prevent ZANLA operations for long. With a resilience that surprised the Special Branch the nationalist guerrillas were able to muster their forces and by the 1977-8 rains resume large-scale infiltrations of men and material into all three operational provinces.

In their nightly situation reports or SITREPS Rhodesian security force commands reported to COMOPS that groups, often several hundred strong, were able to cross the mine-fields. JOC Hurricane situated at the Cranborne military barracks in Salisbury, JOC Thrasher headquartered at Brown's Hotel in Umtali and JOC Repulse based at the old Fort Victoria Hotel all reported daily gains by the guerrillas and a corresponding lowering of morale among their own forces who were by now heavily outnumbered in terms of bayonets on the ground. In a secret memorandum the Special Branch reported that members of the security forces referred to the operational area commands as Op Thrashed and Op Repulsed revealing a Freudian acceptance of the inevitable. Vehicular convoys, particularly those in the Zaka, Ndanga and Ngundu Halt districts of Victoria province were by now subject to regular ambush and casualties. Security force reaction had in some cases sunk to the levels of the once despised Portuguese army who merely reacted to such events by firing into the bush and getting out of the killing zone as quickly as possible with little thought of any follow-up.

In the central region of Rhodesia the operational command JOC Grapple, based at the Thornhill air force base in Gwelo, reported that ZANLA forces were now intruding from the Sabi North and Victoria districts into Shabani, Selukwe and Mhondoro Tribal Trust Lands. Simultaneously ZiPRA were active in the western province of Matabeleland sending hundreds of guerrillas into Lupane, Nkai and Gokwe Tribal Trust Lands. JOC Tangent at Brady barracks in Bulawayo reported that ZiPRA was now effectively established throughout Matabeleland. During 1978 hundreds of ZiPRA cohorts or mujibas converged on, and literally pounded into a thousand pieces, the isolated stone memorial to the Shangani Patrol of 1893.

The war was not confined to the countryside and in August 1977 a suitcase bomb constructed from two TMH-46 land-mines exploded inside the Woolworths supermarket in Bank Street, Salisbury, killing 11 people outright and injuring more than 70. Days later the Criminal Investigation Department Law and Order squad found a similar bomb at the left-luggage counter at Salisbury's central railway station.

In the wake of the bombing incident the Rhodesian police introduced


rigid security checks on all shoppers who were required to undergo physical search before entering premises. Special search booths were erected in all major stores in Salisbury. Members of the British South Africa Police Swat Team carried out random searches by sealing off quadrants of the city. No guerrillas were ever arrested in this campaign but criminals with the drug *dagga* were frequently found.

By 1977-8 the Rhodesians could no longer afford to deploy regular units on static guard duties in the operational areas and this task was largely allocated to the Guard Force and the Rhodesian Defence Regiment. Because the Rhodesian Defence Regiment consisted only of members of the Coloured community, Whites disparagingly referred to the unit as the Rhodesia Dagga Regiment because of the popular notion that Coloureds were a useless bunch of layabouts who did nothing but smoke *dagga* (marijuana) and drink *dop* (brandy). These racist attitudes manifested themselves in the scant regard which some JOCs had for the welfare of RDR units under their command. An illustration of this contemporary attitude came during 1977 when 'E' Company 1RDR out of Mtoko were posted to guard a bridge and after six weeks they received their first re-supply of rations by air drop. After a further six weeks it was suddenly learned that nothing had been heard from the call-sign and a special operation was mounted to investigate. Arriving at the RDR encampment the relieving forces discovered that the unit had been attacked several times by ZANLA guerrillas but had been unable to call for help because radio batteries had long since expired. A similar incident occurred in the Mount Darwin district where a unit of RDR soldiers had been neglected for over eight weeks before being forced to flee their encampment at the Ruya river bridge. The first reaction was to court martial the Coloureds but this charge was quietly dropped when the true circumstances of their plight was revealed. The Coloureds had been repeatedly attacked before abandoning their position and walking through the bush to Rushinga. During the same year a popular Rhodesian army mess-room anecdote related how a call-sign of the Goffs, as some White Rhodesians called the Coloured people, travelling in-convoy to the Ruda base in the Honde valley had been ambushed by guerrillas who killed several RDR soldiers. Arriving at the base, one of the surviving Coloureds shouted to a White saying 'Hey Honkey, you'd better fuck some Nannies; us Ouns is getting extinct', and in reply the White soldier shouted, 'Coloureds aren't so good anymore since we stopped making them.'

In 1978 and 1979 COMOPS agreed to more external raids and these were targeted on Zambia. Aerial and ground reconnaissance had established that large ZIPRA concentrations were located at Chikamba or Westlands Farm some sixteen kilometres outside Lusaka and at

1977-78

OP Hurricane	Mashonaland	— north east
OP Thrasher	Manicaland	— eastern
OP Repulse	Fort Victoria	— south east
OP Tangent	Matabeleland	— western
OP Grapple	Midlands	— central
OP Splinter	Lake Kariba	— lake area



Mkushi near Kabwe. During October 1978, the Rhodesians attacked these two bases. The raids inspired a fictionalized account of the events predating the attack by writer Peter Armstrong entitled *Operation Zambezi: The Raid into Zambia*. It featured excerpts from the official account of the attack against Westlands farm describing how Assistant Commissioner Mike Edden of the Special Branch picked his way through the rubble of the ZiPRA command bunker to inspect bodies and examine documents.

But while the Rhodesians were apparently basking in the glory of their Zambian success a unit of six ZANLA guerrillas who had infiltrated into Salisbury from the north-east fired several RPG-7 rockets into the bulk fuel-storage tanks in the heavy industrial area adjacent to the main railway line. The attack was put in around 1800 hours on 11 December 1978 and as the tanks exploded a massive sheet of flame billowed into the night sky. For nearly a week the fire raged and Salisbury was covered by a fall-out of black ash from the burned fuel. The flames were finally extinguished with South African assistance. Police officers attached to the Special Branch close security section assigned to protect Ian Smith later remarked to colleagues during off-duty drinks at the police club that they had never seen Smith looking so haggard as he did after visiting the blazing inferno at the fuel farm. The Special Branch later managed to arrest a mujiba linked to the ZANLA guerrilla unit responsible for the attack thereby disproving later claims made in Nkomo's autobiography *Nkomo: The Story of My Life* that ZiPRA forces had done the work.

Rhodesian morale fell even further in February 1979 when news broke that ZiPRA had shot down another Air Rhodesian Viscount flying between Kariba and Harare, killing all persons on board. Air Rhodesia pilots flying into Kariba in subsequent days were to adopt evasive tactics when flying at low altitudes near Kariba. In addition the aircraft were painted a drab non-reflective colour and fitted with heat dispersal devices designed to minimize the infra-red heat emissions necessary for the gyro-locking mechanism of the SAM-7 Strela missiles.

The Rhodesian external raids were not confined to Zambia and on 26 February 1979 a long-range bombing mission into Angola was undertaken. Canberra jet bombers of 5 squadron with a maximum turn-around range of 2,500 nautical miles succeeded in carrying out a raid on a ZiPRA training facility near Luso in central Angola. During this attack some 147 guerrillas were killed and 570 injured when 1000 pound fragmentation bombs exploded out of the early morning sky.

On 13 April 1979 the Rhodesian Special Air Services embarked on a mission to assassinate Nkomo during a raid on the ZAPU headquarters complex in Lusaka which was known as State House. As usual, prior to

any external operation the SAS were fully briefed by the Rhodesian CIO ops section whose agents had obtained vital ground intelligence about the target. During this classic SAS operation the troopers parachuted to land on the outskirts of Lusaka before walking into town. During their attack the Rhodesians encountered stiff opposition from the ZiPRA guards. When they had been overwhelmed, the SAS raiders searched for Nkomo but failed and after sustaining several casualties decided to withdraw. Aborting the mission the SAS made their way out of Lusaka in two stolen heavy vehicles. One of the trucks was abandoned because of engine trouble. The SAS then transferred to the remaining vehicle carrying with them the body of a dead comrade. A helicopter landing-zone (LZ) was located on a cut-line and the Rhodesian air force flew in two Huey helicopters to evacuate the men. Members of the Zambian Intelligence Service examining the abandoned trucks later discovered documentary evidence suggesting that one of the raiders had been Danish. Indeed he had been — several months before the raid the man had resigned from the elite Danish paracommando service known as the Jagerkorps to seek adventure in foreign wars in much the same manner as many former British SAS men had done before him.

Much of the intelligence groundwork for this SAS raid into Lusaka had been carried out by Michael Borlace, a member of the Selous Scouts who had been recruited for the job by the commander of that unit, Colonel Ron Reid Daly. Based in Lusaka, Borlace was able to gather and communicate information which led to the joint SAS and Selous Scouts raid on the Mboroma camp during Operation Vodka in December 1978 which had as its major but unachieved objective the assassination of the ZiPRA military commander, Dumiso Dabengwa.

These highly spectacular external operations boosted flagging White morale for a short while but for the forces on the ground in the operational areas it did little to reassure them. By late 1978 and in 1979 nearly 95 per cent of Rhodesia fell under the jurisdiction of martial law — a measure which had been implemented as a last-ditch attempt to hold back the enemy. Military and police commanders were given sweeping judicial powers enabling them to try security offenders and pass sentence. These martial-law courts were also empowered to impose the death penalty but even though many such death warrants were signed none of the accused were ever executed. The commonest penalty consisted of property confiscation, closure of rural stores and detention in martial-law holding centres. Martial law also provided for the rigid application of dawn-to-dusk curfew regulations and this created a virtual licence to kill anyone found moving after the specified hours. The bodies of people killed during curfew hours were often brought back to the local security forces headquarters for examination by the

Special Branch before being soaked in petrol or diesel, burned and buried in pits adjacent to the encampments. But even these desperate measures proved ineffectual, and in terms of numbers the Rhodesians were by now grossly outnumbered and the war was threatening to assume conventional proportions. As a means of boosting security force numbers the Rhodesians formed the auxiliary units from supporters of Bishop Muzorewa's United African Council and Sithole's own ZANU remnants. Known as the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) or the *Pfumo reVanhu* these troops were deployed into the Tribal Trust Lands in support of regular Rhodesian soldiers. Poorly trained and lacking in morale these forces did little to retard guerrilla advances.


Units of both ZiPRA and ZANLA, in their respective operational sectors, were by now openly parading and showing military authority in rural areas which had long since fallen under their effective control. By the eve of the Lancaster House constitutional conference in 1979 the security forces were confined in mine-protected vehicles moving by day in heavily armed convoys. Rural base camps were often subjected to attack by night with mortar, rocket and small-arms fire.

Rhodesian intelligence reports established that both wings of the Patriotic Front alliance had large reserves of men and material outside the country and were now preparing for the final assault scheduled for the 1979-80 rains. There was also evidence that this phase would have included urban attacks in Salisbury itself.

Even more worrying to the British and the Rhodesians was the success of the Soviet-supported military airlift of tanks and conventional forces into western Somalia during 1977. Marshal Vasily Petrov, commander of the Soviet ground forces in Ethiopia, succeeded in rapidly turning the tide of battle in favour of the Ethiopians. Through their liaison the Rhodesian CIO had access to information which suggested that the Soviets were ready to offer considerable assistance to ZiPRA with the supply of T-54 tanks which would be air-lifted into northern Matabeleland by giant helicopter transports. This action would be supported by MIG jet fighters ostensibly flown by ZiPRA pilots who had been trained in Libya and the USSR.

ZANLA forces for their part were extended along the entire eastern border with Mozambique and right across the country and into the Midlands province bringing them into periodic contact with ZiPRA elements. On several occasions armed conflict occurred as rival groups fought to establish authority in certain areas of Belingwe Tribal Trust Land. One theory for the reason behind these clashes was that the opposing groups each suspected the other of being Selous Scouts but the Special Branch believed the clashes motivated by the need on the part of the local commanders to establish territorial supremacy.

It was against this fearful background of irrefutable evidence that Ian Smith was forced to accept the finality of a Rhodesia lost. His intelligence advisors, supported by the counsel of the COMOPS commander, recommended that Smith go along with the British proposals for ending the war. Smith was told that the latest proposals presented the only alternative to chaos and bloodshed on an unprecedented scale and so from their humble and thoroughly disorganized beginnings in the early 1960s the nationalist forces had won after nearly two decades of struggle.



The Msengezi 'Protected Village', 1973

The Portuguese Connection

Up until 25 April 1974 when the Armed Forces Movement of the Portuguese army overthrew the government of Marcelo Caetano in a virtually bloodless *coup d'état* in Lisbon, the Portuguese had proved good allies of the Rhodesians. In this chapter the story of the inter-relationship of the Portuguese, the South Africans and the Rhodesians is told. The ties go back twenty years and there is much in the complexity of that relationship which helps to explain the role of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) today.

Sharing a common border and the experience of world hostility, it was understandable that a good deal of co-operation should exist between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Two months before Rhodesia declared UDI on 11 November 1965, the then Portuguese colonial governor, Sr Jose Augusto da Costa Almeida, accompanied by his wife and Brigadier Antonio Augusto dos Santos, arrived in Salisbury on board a Fokker Friendship of the Mozambique airline DETA. The Portuguese governor paid a call on the Rhodesian governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, and held talks with Ian Smith and cabinet colleagues. Security for the visitors was provided by superintendent William Ratray of the Criminal Investigation Department and the official interpreter for the Rhodesians was Peter Burt, a Portuguese linguist in the British South Africa Police. The talks centred on Rhodesia's impending declaration of independence and the official Portuguese response was supportive particularly in so far as trade routes via Mozambique's ports were concerned. The visit concluded, the Portuguese returned to Lourenco Marques on Sunday, 22 August 1965.¹

On 14 February 1971² a top-level intelligence conference opened in Salisbury attended by General Hendrik Van den Bergh, Director-General of the South African Bureau of State Security, General A.F.R. Vervy, his deputy, Major Silva Pais, the director-general of the Portuguese Directorate General of Security (DGS), Antonio Vaz DGS, director for Mozambique, Dr Antonio Lopes, the DGS director for Angola, Gomes Lopes, the inspector of DGS in Beira, Mozambique, Ken Flower and Ken Lever, respectively director-general and deputy director of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization.

The agenda included matters of mutual co-operation in countering the common threat of 'terrorism and communism' which threatened Portuguese overseas provinces in Africa as well as Rhodesia and South Africa. The intelligence service chiefs agreed to establish a joint con-

sultative intelligence steering committee whose broad terms of reference provided for the exchange of intelligence and security information relative to the common threat and to permit clandestine executive operations on a trilateral basis. Under this agreement each service could run agents and informers in each other's territory, arrange kidnapping and repatriation of security suspects and take any other action considered necessary under the terms of this agreement. An exchange of intelligence officers for liaison purposes was agreed upon and one of the first Rhodesians to be posted to Lisbon was Peter Burt who after his return to Rhodesia in 1973 joined the special operations department of the CIO with responsibility for the formation of the MNR. Burt was immediately replaced in Lisbon by another CIO officer who remained in the Portuguese capital until 1975-6. The Lisbon CIO station was considered extremely important by the Rhodesians because of their liaison with the DGS and also because of the opportunity it provided for broader liaison with other intelligence services. Within 24 hours of a new posting to Lisbon, the local British intelligence service resident would telephone his Rhodesian counterpart making it quite clear that he knew everything about the man and his reason for being in Lisbon.

The formalization of this clandestine triple alliance, was preceded by a number of instances of much earlier co-operation once UDI had been decided upon. The first of these occurred when the Rhodesians assisted the Portuguese to blow up the Luangwa river bridge in Zambia and temporarily slow down anti-Portuguese nationalist activity. Later in 1965 a joint force of Rhodesian and Portuguese army units confronted a group of Pan-Africanist Congress guerrillas heading for South Africa with guides from the Comité Revolucionário de Mocambique (COREMO), an early rival to the Frente de Libertação de Mocambique (FRELIMO). The guerrillas were engaged in the Vila Pery district during Operation Flotilla and captured PAC guerrillas were later delivered to the South Africans.

Yet another instance of mutual co-operation occurred in 1970 when a ZAPU commander named Moffat Hadebe, a much-sought fugitive from Operation Cauldron of the 1968-9 infiltration, was arrested by the DGS at Vila Zumbo near the confluence of the Luangwa and the Zambezi rivers. Moffat Hadebe and another guerrilla were extremely badly beaten before being delivered to detective-inspector Geoffrey Price of the Special Branch who visited Vila Zumbo on a routine liaison visit. Price later discovered that Hadebe had been tortured by his captors to reveal the whereabouts of a rumoured cash hoard. The story was based on fact because when Hadebe originally crossed into Rhodesia he had with him several thousand Rhodesian dollars which ZAPU had collected in Zambia. Special Branch officers travelling to Vila Zumbo normally flew into Kanyemba and then completed their journey to the Portuguese outpost

Earlier still, Ken Flower who in 1968 was still deputy commissioner for crime and security in the police visited Mozambique just before his official retirement and formal appointment as director-general of the Rhodesian CIO. The liaison trip took him to Tete, Blantyre, Nampula, Quelimane and Beira before returning home via Umtali. In Mozambique he sought to assess the prevailing security situation and in Tete Colonel João Gonçalves and police commander Lieutenant Canhão explained how the guerrilla operations of the COREMO had been contained but now a much more serious threat was manifesting itself in the northern provinces in the form of FRELIMO. Canhão was later to die in an engagement with FRELIMO guerrillas during October that same year.³

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was to reveal itself on future occasions when Smith disregarded advice from his intelligence advisors.

By mid-1971, the Special Branch had received reports that ZANU was active in Mozambique, following in the footsteps of FRELIMO advances in Tete Province adjacent to the north-east of Rhodesia. Responsibility for security and intelligence for the north-eastern Mount Darwin and Bindura areas lay with detective inspector Winston Hart, who was later to join the Selous Scouts, and his colleague, Peter Stanton of the Terrorist Desk at the provincial Special Branch headquarters in Salisbury. Both these officers submitted reports under the reference of XYO 2500/100 (the CIO filing reference for ZANU followed by the country breakdown for Mozambique) which indicated that ZANLA guerrillas were active in Mozambique around the Mukumbura district. Reports of this nature lead the Special Branch to visit Mozambique on semi-official liaison trips where they conferred with their DGS counterparts at Mukumbura, Magoe, and Chicoo. During the early 1970s the principal DGS operative for this area was agent first class Trinidad.

In the early 1970s, before the war started in earnest, Mukumbura was little more than a border outpost for the British South Africa police and the District Commissioner from Mount Darwin. The District Commissioner or *Mudzviti*, as they were popularly known in the vernacular, kept a rest camp adjacent to the police camp. Both buildings faced the Mukumbura river which marked the border with what was known as Portuguese East Africa (PEA). For most of the year the river was a dry expanse of sand and relatively easy to cross with four wheel drive vehicles but during the months of November to March when torrential rains fell it became a swift flowing stretch of water which was often impassable to vehicles. Trucks attempting a crossing when waters had subsided were often struck by flash floods which came roaring down from the Mvuradona mountains raising the level of the river within minutes.

Rhodesian officials on duty at Mukumbura led an indolent life and nicknamed the tiny base camp 'The Mukumbura Surf Club'. In later years the establishment was re-named *Sid el Mukkers* and in typical Rhodesian style a special beer tankard was commissioned, with membership of this unique fraternity restricted to those who had served at Mukers. More generally, hunting trips were the order of the day interspersed with trips into *Porkos* (Rhodesian slang for Mozambique) where cold Manica and Lourentina beers could be had from the premises of a mulatto trader named Abu. For many years this obsequious trader made a good living providing supplies to his Rhodesian and Portuguese patrons. The *cantina* served as a bar, brothel and general store and for those who were interested leopard skins and ivory were also available.

Mount Darwin and Centenary tobacco farmers, some of the most af-

fluent in Rhodesia during those days,⁵ often patronized Abu's *cantina* during annual fishing trips to the Zambezi river where many had permanent camps dotted along the river near old Magoe. On north-bound trips, the farmers paused at Abu's place leaving him with their shopping lists for such items as sardines, olives, Portuguese wine and brandy. When he had received a worthwhile order Abu would send his truck to Tete, using the long route via Mount Darwin, Bindura and Nyamapanda and thence to Tete by way of the tar road at Changara. He could have used the much shorter route direct to Tete but this was inadvisable because of FRELIMO and the ninety per cent chance of hitting landmines.

On a routine liaison visit to Mukumbura in early 1971, inspector Winston Hart, driving a Landrover, detonated a TMH-46 land-mine which had been planted on the track leading across the Mukumbura river. Miraculously, Hart escaped unscathed but his vehicle was completely wrecked. Recalling the incident, Hart remarked on the unconcerned attitude of the Portuguese army and customs officials, who, seated playing cards a mere 200 metres away, had made little or no effort to discover what had caused the explosion. The customs post, run by a disreputable man named Andrade, was a popular venue for games of chance which provided one of the few *divertissements* in the sullen lives of the Portuguese luckless enough to be stationed at Mukumbura. Sudden explosions were nothing to be alarmed about in an environment where such happenings were commonplace.

Within days of this incident, another Special Branch officer visited Mukumbura where highly emotional Portuguese officials related the story of how the administrator at Chioco on the Ruya river had been captured by FRELIMO who spread-eagled him between two trees and then fired an RPG-7 bazooka rocket into his body blowing him to pieces. This incident came as apparent retribution for the activities of another notorious Portuguese administrator, at Chicoo on the Zambezi, who often threw suspected FRELIMO sympathisers into a pool infested with crocodiles — one of which was affectionately known as the 'Alfiate de Chicoo', a name derived from the sewing action of the reptile's teeth as it chewed up its unfortunate victims. Having recounted the tale, the DGS representative handed over to the Special Branch officer some captured documents which referred to Zimbabwean comrades. The documents, written in Portuguese by a FRELIMO detachment commander disclosed the names of several ZANLA *camarada* together with their weapon numbers. A further examination of the important papers proved conclusively that ZANLA elements were extremely active inside Mozambique.

During August 1971, a FRELIMO patrol entered Rhodesia with orders to kill a suspected 'sell-out' named Baureni residing at Chigango village

about fifteen kilometres from the border. The incident was accorded considerable publicity by the Rhodesian government and it provided an official excuse for follow-up operations in Mozambique. During the immediate pursuit and in subsequent operations the Special Branch were able to locate suspected FRELIMO base camps and these were then attacked by the Special Air Services and Rhodesian Light Infantry under Special Branch direction.

Suspected camps at villages near Deveteve, Daque, Nura and Serra do Comboio were raided and in some cases papers indicating the presence of Zimbabwean comrades were found. The Portuguese were urged to intensify their own operations against FRELIMO and before long the Mukumbura garrison was reinforced by Portuguese specialist forces known as the 'Grupos Especias' and 'Grupos Especias Paraquedistas'. These forces, supported by the normal conscripts, carried out a series of futile operations in the immediate vicinity of the border settlement. Because the Portuguese army often failed to make contact with the guerrilla enemy they often took out their frustrations on villagers encountered during village searches. Incidents of brutality became so serious that two Spanish Burgos priests at Mucumbura mission, five kilometres from the administrative centre, Fathers Valverde and Hernandez, prepared a dossier of atrocities said to have been committed by the Portuguese and the Rhodesians. In one incident, a village had been razed and the bodies of the slain villagers covered with brushwood and burned. Guided by survivors, the mission Fathers visited the scene soon afterwards and photographed the charred bodies. The priests wrote a lengthy report but word leaked to the DGS who informed their Rhodesian counterparts requesting that the priests be arrested as they were on their way through Rhodesia *en route* for Spain where they intended publishing the atrocity allegations. In 1971, the two Spaniards were arrested by the Special Branch at a road block in the Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. The missionaries were found in possession of the incriminating report and spools of film and were later handed over to agent Trinidad of the DGS at Mukumbura. Catholic nuns from the Mucumbura mission who came into the administrative centre enquiring what had become of their superiors were publicly insulted by some of the Portuguese troops and told to return to their mission post. The priests were sent to Lourenço Marques and detained in the infamous Machava prison before being released and deported to Spain in November 1973.⁶

The Spaniards' report was a veritable litany of atrocity allegations covering the years 1970 and 1971 and if anything was an understatement of what had happened in the area. The miserable villagers of this region were bearing the brunt of the Rhodesian and Portuguese operations.

In 1971, the Rhodesians mounted a fairly large-scale external opera-

tion under the name 'Op Sable'. The forward air-field and base camp was located at the Nyamasoto airstrip near the Ruya game reserve on the Mozambique border. Their mission was to attack a known FRELIMO base camp on the Ruya river near Chioco. As the first wave of heliborne troops dropped into the camp most of the FRELIMO guerrillas managed to escape into the thick bush. A number of guerrillas were killed and during the subsequent sweep of the camp detective inspector Peter Stanton of the Special Branch recovered further documents relating to ZANLA activities in Mozambique. As Stanton prepared his intelligence reports covering this operation it became clear to him that close family ties linked the Korekore people of north-eastern Rhodesia and those of the adjacent Tete province and that ZANLA were extremely active in politicizing these people and drawing recruits. Nearly two years later writing in an official report dated 1973, a Special Branch officer noted that contrary to popular opinions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Korekore tribesmen of the Mzarabani, Dande and Mukumbura Tribal Trust Lands, had not suddenly become disaffected because of intimidation by terrorists. They had never submitted to the authority of the Rhodesian government. They had seen little of the administration and had not experienced any development or improvement in their lives which might have won their affection.

An important facet of Portuguese response to guerrilla attacks was the establishment of protected villages which were known in Portuguese as 'aldeamentos'. These villages were located close to administrative centres in northern and central Mozambique. The *aldeamentos* were guarded by militiamen and the inhabitants normally consisted of local villagers who had been forced into them or the families of men serving in the army or police. Villagers beyond a given radius were generally ignored. As a general rule the *aldeamento* system contributed to a breakdown of traditional cultural and social values with prostitution becoming institutionalized by the voracious sexual demands of the soldiers. Illegal brewing of home distilled *kachasu* (an alcoholic spirit made from the ripe fruit of the *Zizythus Mauritiana* trees originally brought to Africa by the Portuguese from India during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) flourished; and, although the basic idea was to deny the guerrillas access to food, FRELIMO were able to enter the *aldeamentos* by night quite freely. Militiamen were not known for their vigilance and normally succumbed to the temptations of the *kachasu* by early evening.

As the scale of joint Portuguese-Rhodesian military action increased during 1972 and 1973, General de Arriaga, commander of Zona Operacional de Tete (ZOT) granted the Rhodesians exclusive military rights over the entire Tete region south of the Zambezi river as far as the

Mazowe. To improve communication between ZOT and the Rhodesian CIO headquarters, liaison officers were posted to Tete on four-week tours of duty. Most of these officers reported ill of the Portuguese who appeared to have little enthusiasm for the war and seemed preoccupied with the attractions of the local night club, Maxims. They also reported that the DGS were fully aware of the poor morale generally within the ranks of the conscripts but there was nothing they could do. Worse still, relations between the DGS and the army were not good. The DGS complained that the army distrusted them — certainly the DGS were despised by many of the young officer corps within the army. This attitude stemmed from the terrible reputation that the DGS and the predecessors, the *Policia Internacional do Defesa do Estado* (PIDE) enjoyed in Portugal itself where the secret police was feared as an instrument of repression.

Because the Portuguese air force was limited in its capacity, the Rhodesians stationed Hawker Hunters at Tete military joint ground operations. It was during this period, 1972-3, that the late Peter Niesewand, then a Salisbury-based correspondent for the British newspaper, *The Guardian*, filed reports alleging that the Rhodesians were operating inside Mozambique. These despatches proved embarrassing for the Rhodesians and certainly so for the Portuguese, who as members of NATO did not wish to be connected with the Rhodesians. The Portuguese complained and arrangements were made to silence Niesewand. The facts of Niesewand's subsequent arrest and trial in terms of the Official Secrets Acts are described in his own book entitled *In Camera*, published in 1973.

Although denied at the time, Rhodesian military operations inside Mozambique continued and, as the extent of guerrilla activity broadened during 1973, so the Rhodesians were forced to carry the war deep into Mozambique. An important forward base was located at Makombe on the Zambezi river and this became the operational headquarters for the Rhodesian army. Makombe was re-supplied weekly by a DC3 which landed on an improvised airstrip adjacent to the camp. The arrival of the ration run was always preceded by careful probing of the ground for possible landmines — the mining of airfields had become a FRELIMO speciality and the Rhodesians had no wish to experience the same sort of casualties that the Portuguese suffered.

FRELIMO developed a number of anti-aircraft weapons and one of these specialities was later encountered in Rhodesia. The technique called for the use of Chinese stick grenades which were carefully positioned on the ground surface of a likely landing zone. The grenades were arranged in a circular formation with the detonator cords drawn from inside the hollow stick handle and tied to a central fixture which was rivetted into the ground. A small explosive charge, provided by Cortex fuse, would

hurl the grenades into the air where they exploded around any landing fixed-wing or helicopter craft. The Rhodesians captured ZANLA notebooks which described this anti-aircraft weapon and during a test performance proved how deadly effective it could be.

During the military operations at Makombe a Special Branch officer was sent to the base to assist with interrogation of prisoners and to examine captured papers. He discovered that FRELIMO had effectively mobilized villagers in the region forming them into *destacamentos* (detachments) and arming them with SKS Simonov semi-automatic carbines. These units had orders to patrol given tracts of country, report enemy presence and hunt for food. At this stage the Cabora Bassa lake had not yet filled and an additional task for the FRELIMO militiamen was to ferry supplies and material for both FRELIMO and ZANLA across the Zambezi river. There were no roads in this region between the Angwa and Msengezi river. The Special Branch officer observed that Portuguese administration had not extended into this remote area and some villagers claimed that they had never seen White people before. Medical officers attached to the army at Makombe began treating some of the villagers and later commented that the area was plagued by tropical diseases where malaria, ilariasis or elephantiasis and trypanosomiasis or sleeping sickness were endemic.

In March 1974 ZOT agreed to joint military exercise against suspected FRELIMO bases in the rugged mountains north of the Cabora Bassa gorge. The Rhodesians established an ops-room at Estima airfield 25 kilometers from Songo, the Cabora Bassa dam site. The air force stationed helicopters and Aeromacchi AL-60 FS Trojans at Estima. During the operations, which involved a combined parachute drop of Special Air Services and Portuguese commandos, two Rhodesian Trojans were shot down by guerrillas using SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles.⁷

In a communique, Rhodesian security forces headquarters announced that the pilots had perished in unspecified operations in the north-east and avoided telling the truth. During this joint military operation, the Special Branch officer attached to the Rhodesian army noted a growing antipathy on the part of the Portuguese military towards the DGS but the significance of this attitude would not become apparent until the 25 April 1974. Another disturbing factor noted by the security man was the long catalogues of FRELIMO guerrilla incidents related by the Portuguese army intelligence officer during the nightly briefing sessions.

During the last liaison trip to Portuguese army encampments in the Tete province before the Lisbon revolution of April 1974 it was noted that the morale of the Portuguese army conscripts was very low indeed. Ill-discipline reigned in many of the camps at Vila Gouveia, Furancungo, Mukumbura and Vila Zumbo. The Rhodesians observed African

youngsters roaming through the tents fagging for their Portuguese *patroões*. Often fights broke out among the soldiers over African women. Portuguese preoccupations lay with managing a productive vegetable garden, an efficient bakery and ensuring that the fridges were stocked with cold 'Manica' beers.

Arriving at Mukumbura airstrip at the same time as the Portuguese re-supply plane from Tete, the amazed Rhodesians witnessed soldiers off-loading sacks of squeeling and wriggling pigs which the Portuguese received as live rations. Massive tins of dried cod fish (*bacalhau*) were also supplied as were cases of beers and spirits. Liquor bottles were clearly marked with the restriction 'para o consumo exclusivo das forcas armadas' but needless to say this prohibition did not prevent the liquor from being on sale in general stores throughout the Mozambique provinces. At Mukumbura, a DGS officer informed his Special Branch contact that some of the conscripts were dumping supplies of food with notes addressed to FRELIMO urging them to avoid contact because, as Portuguese conscripts, they had no interest in the colonial war. The major preoccupation of many of these conscripts who came to Africa for four years military service was staying alive and returning safely to Portugal. Many of the conscripts were illiterate peasants from the provinces while the officer corps comprised members of the upper classes or those with university education. Many of the young officers had copies of a very controversial book entitled *Portugal e O Futuro* recently published in Lisbon by general Antonio de Spínola.

Antonio de Spínola, the former military commander and governor of Guinea-Bissau, propounded his theory that Portugal should grant independence to the colonies within a framework of economic and cultural union with the metropole. Many Portuguese believed that publication of this book acted as a catalyst for the revolution which came in April 1974. It was, therefore, understandable that morale of the fighting men in the colonies would be undermined and by early April 1974 it was as if total inertia gripped the largely conscripted Portuguese army in Mozambique. The only viable units were those of volunteers such as the Grupos Especiais, the para-commandos or the Flecha pseudo-guerrilla forces controlled by the DGS.

When news of the coup reached Salisbury there was no immediate reaction from the Rhodesians. Even the CIO representative in Lisbon had managed to get word through only some twenty-four hours before that something was happening within the military in Lisbon. If the Rhodesians were not immediately aware of the grave significance of the news, then it was soon brought home to them as hundreds of Portuguese DGS officers, professional soldiers and Portuguese settlers poured into Rhodesia at Umtali. The DGS in Beira, Tete, Lourenço Marques and

other locations looted archives of valuable documents and burned others before heading out to the country. The DGS were well aware that the Armed Forces Movement, responsible for the revolution, was supported by men who were sympathetic to FRELIMO. Administration of Mozambique, as with all the other Portuguese colonies immediately after the coup, was entrusted to representatives of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) and its own security and intelligence apparatus known as Comando Operacional do Continente (COPCON) and headed by a Marxist, brigadier Otello da Saraiva de Carvalho. In the face of the MFA and COPCON there was an immediate exodus of Portuguese from Mozambique. Not the least of these was the Portuguese DGS officer heading the Flecha unit at Vila Pery, colonel Oscar Cardoso. Cardoso had commanded the Flechas, a force of African volunteers and FRELIMO defectors as a pseudo-guerrilla unit similar in function to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. The Flecha concept had been pioneered by the DGS in the Angolan province of Uíge before being tried with limited success in Mozambique. All Flecha operations, as with the later Rhodesian Selous Scouts, were controlled solely by the intelligence and security services and operated independently of the regular armed forces. Cardoso crossed into Rhodesia at Umtali with a force of about 50 men most of whom were taken to the Selous Scouts Fort at Bindura while Cardoso himself went to work for the CIO special operations division.

Despite the coup in Lisbon and the subsequent establishment of a transitional government in Mozambique under Joaquim Chissano, the Rhodesians endeavoured to keep open the lines of communication with, firstly the Portuguese army which was now administered by the MFA, and secondly the incoming FRELIMO guerrilla forces known as the Forças Populares de Libertação de Mozambique (FPLM). During 1974 and 1975 there was a fair amount of trans-border liaison involving the Special Branch as noted earlier. The Mozambicans were busy negotiating with the Portuguese government for the handover of political power and also had to face an attempted counter-coup by right-wing reactionary forces in Lourenço Marques. The Mozambique transitional government was not really in full control and to a certain extent the Rhodesians were able to exploit the naivety of FRELIMO during those days.

FRELIMO slowly emerged from the bush and when they were certain that the news of the revolution was true became more prominent. FRELIMO were content to go along with the established pattern of trans-border liaison. At first groups of Portuguese soldiers who were waiting repatriation to Portugal came across to Rhodesia buying groceries and beer. Then they started to bring FRELIMO guerrillas as well and before long both sides were moving to and fro. The Special Branch were quick to try and turn this situation to advantage and

wherever possible pressed for information about ZANLA comrades. Border relations remained cordial until early 1975 when escalating ZANLA activities and Rhodesian trans-border raids caused a rapid deterioration. In June 1975 the Mozambique government closed all border posts at Kanyemba, Mukumbura, Nyamapanda, Umtali, Espungabera and Vila Salazar.

Until the events of the attempted right-wing coup in Lourenço Marques in late 1974 the Mozambicans had followed a pragmatic policy towards the majority of the Portuguese settlers. But in the wake of that ill-conceived action, racial tensions flared and tens of thousands of Portuguese fled the territory to Rhodesia and South Africa leaving behind them economic ruin and deliberate destruction wrought in the ethos of 'if I can't have it then neither can you'. Thousands of these people, all of them with an axe to grind, settled in Rhodesia and in May 1975 the CIO had no difficulty in recruiting from their ranks volunteers for an incredible adventure in Angola.

The involvement of the Rhodesian CIO in this bizarre affair came about as a result of American CIA fears about the way events were shaping up in Angola. The CIA believed that the supreme MFA Portuguese army commander in Angola, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, was a Marxist and that he supported the installation of the openly pro-Soviet Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) led by Dr Agostinho Neto. Anxious to prevent the accession of the MPLA, the CIA enlisted the support of the South African intelligence service in formulating plans to back the rival Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) of Holden Roberto and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) of Jonas Savimbi. Both the South African intelligence and military proved sympathetic because an excuse for military operations inside Angola would enable them to neutralize SWAPO camps in southern Angola as well. The overall strategy would include the full mobilization of all available FNLA and UNITA manpower, which would be supported by the deployment of former Portuguese security forces under the collective name of the Angolan National Liberation Army (Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola). Financial and logistical support would be provided by the CIA from Zaire and the combined ELNA and FNLA force would commence operations from the north. In the meantime UNITA, with the support of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) would move up from the south and finally converge on Luanda to crush the MPLA.

As part of this plan the Rhodesian CIO was requested to recruit all available Portuguese volunteers. Using agents like Colonel Oscar Cardoso, Pires de Carvalho, Orlando Christina and Captain Valdemar, the Rhodesians quickly assembled several hundred disgruntled ex-

Portuguese soldiers and settlers all anxious for a chance to strike back. The volunteers were told their task was to install a moderate pro-Western government in Luanda and that the plans had the backing of the CIA who were financing the FNLA through their station in Kinshasa in Zaire. Each recruit was promised a monthly salary of US\$1 000 which would be paid to their families left behind but in most cases these pledges were never honoured and much of the cash was pocketed by corrupt recruiting agents who never went near the Angolan battlefields.

One of the recruiters had a criminal record for dishonesty and was well known to the Criminal Investigation Department. Another agent, Pires de Carvalho spent much of his time secluded in a bedroom at the discreet Selous Hotel. He explained that agents of the Portuguese armed forces movement COPCON had been sent from Lourenço Marques to eliminate him. Pires de Carvalho remained in Salisbury until the tide of battle turned against the FNLA-UNITA alliance after the MPLA's Cuban-supported counter-offensive succeeded in 1976. He disappeared soon afterwards in the southward drift of other Portuguese who sought to settle in South Africa.

Having assembled a force of nearly 300 men, the CIO informed the South Africans that the men were on stand-by. The first contingent of about 22 Portuguese left from Johannesburg on 29 July 1975 commanded by Colonel Oscar Alves Cardoso. A further group of 130 Portuguese were ordered to assemble, early one August morning in 1975, just outside Salisbury where they were picked up by a convoy of trucks and driven to Thornhill air base near Gwelo 265 kilometres from the capital. Later that day the force was uplifted by a chartered DC7 and flown to Kinshasa. The CIO did not want the men to leave from New Sarum, next to Salisbury airport, because there was a risk that someone might alert the press.

Having landed in Kinshasa, the men were taken to a seedy downtown establishment where they were accommodated for three nights waiting for uniforms, weapons and a briefing. On the fourth day the volunteers were addressed by an FNLA official, Jose Eduardo, who told them they were being sent to Ambriz, a small coastal town north of Luanda. Here the Portuguese started to train FNLA guerrillas. In their first operation the volunteers captured the settlement of Barra do Dande, 150 kilometres north of Luanda. This action was one of the very few successful achievements because Cuban reinforcements soon arrived to assist the MPLA and its military wing FAPLA. With the aid of the Cubans, Barra do Dande was retaken from the small FNLA garrison that had been left behind. After this rout, the leader of the FNLA, Holden Roberto, requested additional Portuguese volunteers who were soon forthcoming together with some regular units of the Zaire national army.

The Zairean soldiers were to prove worse than useless, being totally inept and ill-disciplined.

As the FAPLA and Cuban forces advanced north and captured first Ambriz and then Ambrizette, the Rhodesians decided to carry out their own on the spot assessment of the war. Visiting the war zone just north of Ambrizette, the CIO officers who had flown in from Kinshasa realized that the situation was hopeless. The FNLA and the Zairean soldiers had little stomach for the fight and the Portuguese volunteers were now low in morale. The CIO recommended that the volunteers be withdrawn. Reports from southern Angola were similarly discouraging. Simultaneously the CIA came under domestic American pressure to terminate the Angolan operation and George Bush, the Director of the CIA, ordered an end to covert funding. By the end of the operation the CIA had spent nearly US\$31.7 million on the Angolan mission. Of this figure US\$120,000 had been spent purchasing food supplies in Rhodesia and US\$96,000 on transportation from South Africa and Rhodesia to Zaire. As the operation was being terminated, the CIA station chief in Kinshasa was faced with the difficult task of disbursing nearly US\$4.8 million which remained in the kitty. A total of US\$2 million was given to UNITA and nearly US\$900,000 was handed over to Holden Roberto.⁸

The last visit of the CIO to Angola happened to coincide with the sudden disappearance of Lieutenant-Colonel Gilberto Santos e Castro who had been the nominal commander of the ELNA forces in northern Angola. It was rumoured among embittered Portuguese volunteers that he had absconded with the operation's money and was now living in Rio de Janeiro but other reports suggested that he had found his way to Spain where he was hiding among the Portuguese emigré community. This last report was confirmed when on 24 March 1976 a CIA source in Spain reported that Santos e Castro was complaining bitterly about the CIA which, he claimed, had never paid him his due. The CIA for its part believed that it had adequately discharged any debts owing when they paid him US\$243,600 on 25 February 1976 in full and final payment of services rendered. This severance payment was in addition to an earlier sum of US\$110,000 provided as advances during January 1976.⁹

But for the rank and file Portuguese there was no cash bonus and only an ignominious homecoming. Some found jobs with the Rhodesian Selous Scouts and others spent their time lamenting in Church Street in the Portuguese quarter of Johannesburg where they told anyone who would listen of how they had reached Quifandongo on the outskirts of Luanda and would have succeeded in capturing the city itself had it not been for the Cubans. This episode was followed by a second phase of mercenary activities when Holden Roberto enlisted the services of British

and Americans which culminated in the trial and execution of 'Colonel Callan' (Costas Geogiou) and his Dogs of War.

As the tempo of the war in Rhodesia quickened, the publicity and propaganda department of ZANLA started to broadcast a consciousness-raising radio programme, the Voice of Zimbabwe,¹⁰ every night at eight o'clock. Transmitting from the studios of Radio Mozambique in Maputo, announcers like Charles Ndlovu read news which was supportive of the nationalist guerrilla cause. Another announcer was Ian Christie, a Scottish journalist then living in Maputo. The Rhodesians referred to him as Lord Haw Haw in memory of the Briton who broadcast anti-British propaganda for the Nazis in the Second World War and reviled his name. It was around this time that the CIO conceived the idea of establishing a rival radio station, A Voz da Africa Livre (the Voice of Free Africa) which would transmit a Portuguese-language service beamed into Mozambique. The clandestine service was the direct brain child of section C in special operations of CIO. They recommissioned an extremely powerful radio transmitter, nicknamed Big Bertha by the Rhodesia Broadcast Corporation technicians who worked on the old fashioned equipment at Guinea Fowl near Gwelo in the Midlands. The nightly transmissions would be supportive of the MNR guerrillas then being deployed into Manica province of Mozambique.

The first MNR training camp was located at Rusape with Peter Burt, a former CIO liaison officer in Lisbon, placed in charge of operations. The base was later moved to a farm close to the Grand Reef airfield 16 kilometres from Umtali, Rhodesia's eastern gateway into Mozambique. The force drew its initial batch of operational men from the ranks of former Flechas under Colonel Oscar Cardoso, former soldiers of the Portuguese Special Groups and some professionals of the Selous Scouts. Although the CIO attempted to maintain strict secrecy about their MNR operations, news leaked and most residents of the border town knew or guessed at what was going on. A former FRELIMO detachment commander, Commandant Andre, was placed in command of the MNR forces in Mozambique and printed propaganda leaflets, issued in his name, were distributed to villagers in the Manica provinces where operations first began.

An acute shortage of manpower in the MNR prompted the CIO to order an attack on the Sacudzo re-education camp near Gorongosa in early 1977. A combined force of Selous Scouts and MNR attacked the camp and released nearly 250 anti-FRELIMO dissidents. Most of these former prisoners were taken back to Rhodesia for training and incorporation into the MNR. These reinforcements became the backbone of the MNR for several years and, as MNR activities inside Mozambique increased, the Mozambique government published claims that MNR were

committing atrocities against villagers. Anxious to counter these claims, the CIO facilitated the clandestine visit to Manica province of a South African journalist. He visited some areas allegedly controlled by the MNR and interviewed villagers who, not surprisingly, declared that they supported the MNR. Extracts from his reports were later transmitted over the Voice of Free Africa.

The day-to-day work of running the clandestine radio was entrusted to CIO agent Orlando Christina. He had previously operated as a CIO source in Mozambique and after the *coup d'état* settled in Salisbury where his employers set him up in an expensive house in the exclusive Avondale Ridge suburb of Salisbury. The house became the centre for Christina's Mozambique network and in addition he also kept a close eye on the local Portuguese community. Specifically for his work on the radio, the CIO provided Christina with an office, staff and a secret budget enabling him to prepare the daily programmes.

Before long the programmes degenerated into a diatribe of name-calling and mud-slinging. President Samora Machel of Mozambique was referred to as 'O Macaco' (the Monkey), and Radio Mozambique responded by dubbing the Rhodesian broadcasts as 'A Voz do Xicanhoca' (the Voice of the Hyena). The radio remained in service until early 1980 when it suddenly went off the air long enough to permit transfer from Rhodesia, to the north-eastern Transvaal. Little or no attention was paid to the important aspect of political orientation, and this anomaly was rectified only when propagandists in the South African Directorate of Military Intelligence, responsible for the MNR after 1980, put together a credible political manifesto for the bogus guerrilla force.

When the radio was transferred to South Africa, Orlando Christina went along, too. He was based at a camp outside Pretoria where he gave out that he was the commander-in-chief of the MNR. In South Africa, Christina found himself in the company of former friends and colleagues from Mozambique's colonial days. One of these men was a former DGS officer, Casimiro Monteiro, now living in exile from Portugal. Monteiro had been implicated in the assassination in 1965 of General Humberto Delgado, the opposition leader who had offered himself as a candidate in the presidential election of 1958 and thereby posed a political threat to Admiral Tomaz and the Salazarist leadership of the day. Monteiro was also implicated in the subsequent assassination of FRELIMO's founder, Eduardo Mondlane, who was killed by a letter-bomb in 1969 — an action that the DGS were later to regret when the far more militant Samora Machel assumed control of the party. Suddenly in April 1983 Christina was mysteriously killed at the MNR training facility outside Pretoria and the circumstances of his bizarre death were officially suppressed in the

South African press by the South African Defence force which issued D notices against publication.

Meanwhile it had become clear to the CIO that the operations of the MNR were proving successful and becoming a major irritant to the FRELIMO government and its rural development projects. By 1978 the MNR had extended into the Chimoio district and commenced limited operations in the Gaza and Inhambane provinces as well. European expatriate workers, known as 'co-operantes', working on aid projects were cited as legitimate targets by the MNR and several such aid workers were killed, effectively freezing projects in the Manica district.

By itself the MNR was generally incapable of major sabotage operations and where necessary the CIO co-opted the assistance of the SAS. Realizing the importance of upgrading the reputation and status of the MNR as a serious opposition force to the FRELIMO government, the CIO formulated plans for a covert operation in Mozambique known as 'Op Ingrid'. A force of SAS saboteurs parachuted into Mozambique using the high-altitude-low-opening (HALO) technique.¹² Landing in the bushlands near the Pungwe estuary opposite Beira the SAS men based themselves in the mangrove swamps. They had orders to sink a Tanzanian vessel, the SS Mpanduzi, which was being used to ferry ZANLA guerrillas from Tanzania before returning with a cargo of cement in exchange. Unfortunately for the SAS, CIO intelligence had been wrong and the ship was not in port. Instead of implementing the main mission, the SAS sank several dredgers and effectively blocked the main shipping lane into Beira harbour. Some months afterwards, the SAS undertook a similar raid into Mozambique and destroyed the Pungwe bridge near Dondo. These incidents were officially credited to the MNR but could have been carried out only by the specialist services of the SAS who kept in radio contact with their operational headquarters using ultra-high-frequency UHF transmitters operating via a relay on Mount Inyangani. On completion of the missions the SAS were uplifted by helicopter.

During a second phase of Op Ingrid, a force of SAS men parachuted into Gaza provided with orders to observe the movements of the ZANLA military high command who were known to frequent a base at Xai Xai, just north of the Limpopo mouth. If possible, the SAS were to attempt the assassination of ZANU's high command using long-range sniper rifles. The SAS withdrew after reporting considerable difficulty in approaching their target because the terrain was devoid of operational vantage points. After an initial reconnaissance they withdrew to a landing zone and called for helicopter transport back to Rhodesia.

The MNR continued with their activities during 1978 and 1979 and the final MNR operation of any note took place on 29 December 1979 when they attacked the Chibavava refugee centre in the Manica province and

killed six ZANLA guerrillas. By early 1980 a decision was reached by the CIO to dismantle the entire MNR infrastructure and transport it to South Africa. The operation was carried out with precise military discipline and in April 1980, just after the elections, a secret convoy moved from Umtali to Beitbridge via Fort Victoria. The border crossing took place at night after the Special Branch representative at the border town had ensured that the barriers were lifted.

The MNR convoy arrived at the Phalaborwa military encampment and were greeted on arrival by senior officers of the SADF military intelligence directorate. The supposed head of the MNR, Commandant Alfonso Jacomo Dhlakama, was welcomed alongside his men. It took the South Africans nearly twelve months to re-organize and re-equip the MNR and during this respite Mozambique was able, for the first time, to enjoy a measure of post-independence peace and economic recovery. But by 1981 MNR operations against Mozambique had resumed with incidents of anti-FRELIMO guerrilla activity reported from Gaza in the south and as far north as Zambezia province. By 1983 the MNR force was reported to number around 10,000 men and represented the single most serious threat to Mozambique's internal security. This success, on the part of the South Africans, would not have been possible but for the assistance of regular SADF officers and men sent into Mozambique in support of the MNR. Evidence of this fact emerged in October 1982 when Lieutenant Alan Gingles of the SADF at Phalaborwa was reported killed when he and three MNR saboteurs were laying explosives on the main Beira to Mutare railway line. The South Africans later issued a communique explaining that Gingles had died in the operational area and did not pin-point the place of his death.¹³

Again on 9 December 1982, saboteurs, believed to have been members of the SADF, including former Rhodesia Special Air Servicemen, blew up the Zimbabwean Government's bulk petroleum storage tanks at Beira. The explosions destroyed nearly two and a half months supply of vital petroleum needs valued at US\$10 million. The MNR claimed responsibility for the blast during a subsequent broadcast of the Voice of Free Africa but clearly they could not have undertaken such a specialist operation. The South Africans had struck at a strategic moment and successfully engineered the worst fuel crisis in Zimbabwe's history. Coming just before the Christmas rush period, the country was nearly crippled before alternative supplies could be routed via South Africa. Although officially denied by the Zimbabwean government, a cabinet minister flew to Botswana after the explosions to confer with the South Africans who agreed to ensure continuity of supply in exchange for a general reduction of anti-South African rhetoric.

In the immediate aftermath of the explosions the Mozambique security

and intelligence service, Servico Nacional de Seguranca Publica (SNASP), arrested Findlay Dion Hamilton, managing director of Manica Freight Services and the Honorary British Consul in Beira, accusing him of complicity with the raiders.

Early in 1982, Ruth First, a vociferous critic and hostile opponent of the South African government, was killed when a parcel bomb exploded in her office at the Centre for African Studies at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. A colleague, and fellow member of the African National Congress, Pallo Jordan was injured in the blast. It was not clear who was responsible but the South Africans certainly had every reason for wanting her dead. First was a member of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, the chairman of which, Moses Mabuda, was a close friend. Her own ties with Joe Slovo, her former husband, a man said by the South Africans to be a full colonel in the Soviet security and intelligence service, KGB, and responsible for ANC guerrilla operations in South Africa, would have further enhanced her status as a prime assassination target by the South Africans.

The use of a letter or parcel-bomb as a device for remote control assassination has proved effective against nationalist leaders in the past. Similar bombs have claimed the lives of Eduardo Mondlane in 1969 and Jason Z. Moyo in 1977, and in early 1979 the leader of the Malawi Socialist League, Dr Attati Mpakati, lost the fingers on his left hand and three from his right in an explosion in Maputo (Mpakati was later killed in Harare in April 1983 and his dumped body found near a busy city intersection; he had been professionally killed with a classic execution shot to the head). Close co-operation between the Rhodesian CIO and the Malawian Police Branch, originally forged during the 1970s, continued to flourish until the Rhodesian officers responsible for that liaison left Rhodesia in 1980. The clear implications are that the South Africans had simultaneously established their own close ties with the Malawians and in the interests of inter-service co-operation the removal of a worrisome political thorn can rapidly and efficiently be arranged.

At the beginning of 1984, the South Africans guessed that Mozambique, ravaged by successive years of drought and floods and with its own economic and administrative infrastructure considerably weakened by the MNR, would respond positively to an invitation for talks on mutual co-operation in the field of transportation, migrant mine labour, agriculture, fisheries, trade, tourism and energy supply.

The proposals were packaged under the label of a non-aggression treaty and for Mozambique the carrot would be the cessation of South African help for MNR's crippling hostilities. A series of top-level preliminary meetings was arranged with respective delegations headed by Jacinto Veloso, Colonel Oscar Monteiro and Colonel Sergio Vieira for

Mozambique, and General Johann Coetzee, the South African Commissioner of Police, and Van Dalssen of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The South Africans pledged that they would curtail the MNR and shut down rear-guard bases if the Maputo government expelled the ANC military structure from Mozambique. The South Africans were specific about Joe Slovo, who they claimed, masterminded ANC military strategy. The South Africans offered considerable financial aid and in this regard they had the backing of the United States and West Germany. They promised to stimulate the rail traffic on the Maputo to Komatipoort grid; by 1984 approximately 17.5 per cent of South African trade flowed via that route and significantly has never been touched by MNR guerrillas. An agreement to buy Cabora Bassa power at preferential rates was proposed alongside plans for agricultural development of the Incomati and Limpopo valleys by South African farmers and multinational corporations. For the Mozambique government it all seemed too good to be true.

During the preliminary talks South Africa infiltrated approximately 1,500 heavily armed guerrillas into Mozambique and on 6 February 1984 the MNR destroyed a passenger train on the Komatipoort-Maputo-Chicualacuala spur. The locomotive was destroyed, carriages gutted and six passengers killed. This action did not, however, prevent the signing of the Nkomati Accord on 16 March 1984 with Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, and President Samora Machel officiating. Immediately after signing the agreement the Mozambique authorities moved against the ANC. Units of the uniformed police and SNASP arrested hundreds of ANC militants and deported them to Tanzania. Some ANC men were tortured by SNASP to reveal locations of arms and ammunition — the vehemence of the Mozambique attitude towards the ANC surprised many independent observers in Maputo. In Stockholm, a pro-ANC lobby group protested to the Mozambique embassy.

If the South Africans had given the MNR orders temporarily to suspend anti-Mozambique operations, they certainly did not intend these forces to be idle and in April and May 1984 the MNR started to attack Zimbabwean lorries *en route* for Malawi.¹⁴ In a single action the MNR destroyed vehicles and goods valued at nearly US\$2 million. The MNR had earlier attacked the vital oil pipeline between Beira and Mutare, necessitating the deployment of Zimbabwe National Army troops to guard against further attacks. Significantly, the MNR had timed their raids to coincide with imports of maize from Malawi at a time when Zimbabwe was suffering the effects of three years of drought and urgently needed to bring in food supplies. The attacks temporarily suspended use of the Tete road link in favour of the much longer and more costly Zambian route. Effective use of the Tete route was re-

established only after Zimbabwean soldiers were sent to escort convoys from Tete to Nyamapanda.

Later in 1984 there were signs that even though the South African government had promised to curtail the MNR it had been powerless to do so because of the growing ascendancy of the South African Military Intelligence within the State Security Council. Military Intelligence, who have long been responsible for the direction and control of the MNR, were reluctant to terminate what had become a tried and tested component of the destabilization programme. During 1984 a number of Portuguese, headed by Manuel Bulhosa, Mota Pinto and Evo Fernandes, emerged as leaders of the MNR political faction in Portugal. With covert encouragement from the SADF military intelligence directorate they assumed growing importance and even became involved in direct talks with Mozambique officials and the South African government, both anxious to prevent a breakdown in the Nkomati Accord.


Manuel Bulhosa, an extremely wealthy and influential Portuguese businessman and major shareholder in the now nationalized oil refineries in Maputo, travelled to Maputo in August 1984 for talks with Jacinto Veloso in order to reach some form of accommodation or modified Nkomati Accord which would involve the MNR in direct talks with the Mozambique government. Bulhosa represents a powerful Portuguese grouping, comprised mainly of Portuguese settlers who fled Mozambique after independence in 1974 and now seek to return to the former colony and reclaim businesses and property. Such initiatives have the apparent support of the Anglo American Corporation, the head of which, Harry Oppenheimer, met Samora Machel in London during October 1983, and the Lonrho organization which has already commenced agricultural and mining operations in Mozambique.

While the Mozambique-South African talks continued during late 1984, the scope of MNR activity was enlarged. Officially the blame was placed on the shoulders of Portuguese retornados (former colonists) now living in South Africa and Portugal and this was to prove a convenient excuse to mask the new strategy being mapped out by the South African military intelligence. Using old ties with the Malawi Special Branch the South Africans have established a number of camps in the mountains on the border of Niassa province and eastern Malawi. During October 1984 the Tanzanian police arrested four Portuguese nationals building an airstrip near the Mozambique border with the northern Cabo Delgado province. The airstrip was for secret use by aircraft ferrying in supplies from the Grand Comoros 400 kilometres off the northern coast of Mozambique. In late 1984 the level of MNR activity in northern Mozambique had increased and the Mozambique government claimed

that the Malawians were permitting Israeli instructors to help train MNR rebels inside that country.

As MNR operations in northern Mozambique increased in late 1984 and into 1985 there were very real fears that the MNR might attempt to revive plans, first formulated during colonial times, for an independent northern Mozambique state in which the predominantly Muslim Macuas would be prominent. With the central government effectively isolated in the extreme south of the country, government control in the north, already weakened by the MNR, would become increasingly tenuous. Leading Macuas such as Miguel Murapa may be enlisted by the MNR to solicit financial support from friendly sources such as West Germany, the Oman and South Africa.



Quite clearly the South Africans cannot afford to entirely abandon the MNR, a force which by latest estimates, is said to number 10,000 armed men inside Mozambique. Exactly what role this body will play in the future of the African sub-continent will be determined chiefly by South African military strategists who now appear to be assuming increasing control of that country's destiny.



Insignia of rank of RENAMO



Portuguese Army officers, Tete Province, Mozambique, 1973



If the intentions of Mugabe and Kaunda are to sink more those who are already in a mess, we of Renamo, shall know how to say, HO!

We have defeated Chissano and now we are going to fight directly to Mugabe here in his country.

Kaunda should not think that he is out of the plan. Today is with Mugabe and tomorrow the cock will crow in Zambia.

SHONA

Kana kuti pfungwa dza Mugabe na Kaunda dziri dzekuda kuwedzera izvo vari kuita, isu ve RENAMO, tinozo siva kuti tino davira sei kuti, kweke.

Pilgrim's Progress: The South African Connection¹

The account of South Africa's involvement in the Rhodesian war begins with the arrival of police contingents in early 1967 and does not end until their final withdrawal from the country in 1980 after Zimbabwe became independent. The official justification for the South African presence came in the wake of the combined ANC and ZAPU infiltrations into north-western Rhodesia between July and September 1967. Eighty heavily armed guerrillas crossed the Zambezi at the Gwaai gorge and on Sunday, 13 August 1967, they were sighted and engaged by a patrol of the Rhodesian African Rifles. On 19 August 1967 Oliver Tambo of the ANC and James Chikerema of ZAPU confirmed that their forces were joined in the field of battle.² Because of this statement, South African military advisers flew to Wankie. Soon after this statement was issued, a force of ANC and ZAPU moved into the Tjolotjo district from Botswana but before long ran into trouble after villagers alerted the police. Members of the Rhodesian police force sent to investigate were completely unprepared and in many cases grossly outnumbered. In one engagement the police were forced to flee leaving behind their firearms, ammunition and radio equipment. Seriously wounded in another contact was Inspector Frederick J.S. Phillips who sustained serious head injuries on 13 August 1967, when he ran into a hail of AK-47 fire from a ZAPU patrol near Tjolotjo.³ The abandoned radio was captured by ZAPU who attempted to talk down a circling helicopter.

Assisting the Rhodesians in the interrogation of captured ANC guerrillas was Major Swanie Swanepoel of the Terrorist Desk at the South African Police headquarters in Pretoria. During operation Nickel and Cauldron, Major Swanepoel was a regular visitor to Rhodesian military camps and could be found interviewing captured ANC men. Swanepoel was accompanied as always by a tall and malevolent looking Zulu detective-sergeant of whom Swanepoel often boasted 'that he would cut your throat at the click of my fingers'.

In terms of the Police Act, the Commissioner was empowered to call upon assistance of friendly governments in putting down internal insurrection.⁴ During the early 1960s, the Commissioner of the British South Africa Police sent contingents of policemen to Nyasaland to support the police of that former British protectorate during a state of emergency declared by the Governor. By invoking these same powers, the Rhodesian government were able to invite the South African government to send South African Police to assist patrolling the Zambezi river and prevent infiltrations of ZAPU guerrillas. In April 1968, the then Rhodesian minister of defence known as 'Gentleman' Jack

Howman greeted the offer of official South Africa support saying: 'I think it is absolutely splendid news. My immediate reaction is one of gratitude. It is comforting to think that one has such loyal neighbours who are always prepared to give help when needed.'⁵

For their part the South Africans were extremely keen to become involved knowing that it would permit them to gain experience in bush warfare. The South African government budgeted nearly US\$1 million for the first year of operations and the money was spent on daily rations, allowances, vehicles, arms, ammunition, motor boats and other equipment. The South African Air Force deployed three helicopters and two single-engined Cessna fixed-wing aircraft basing them at Kariba. To disguise the South African Air Force involvement the Rhodesians code-named the helicopters G-Cars and the fixed-wing aircraft were known as Kiviets.⁶ During 1969 additional helicopters and spotter aircraft were stationed at Victoria Falls Spray-View air-strip and in a routine flight to Thornhill near Gweru a Kiviet crashed killing the South African pilot.⁷

Because the primary task of the SAP in Rhodesia was to prevent infiltrations from Zambia it was logical they would be stationed along the Zambezi. The first force of SAP, commanded by Major van Eck,⁸ arrived at Chirundu in mid-1968. They wore Rhodesian army camouflage uniforms and their vehicles had been re-sprayed to resemble standard security force units. Every endeavour was made to disguise the South African identity. Unfortunately for the Rhodesians it was to prove impossible to suppress altogether the South Africans who brought with them their characteristic traits. With very few exceptions, the rank and file of the SAP were drawn from the uniformed divisions of the force where educational qualifications were minimal. Most of the constables came from the barefoot *Plaateland* class and spoke only Afrikaans. In nearly all cases they were totally unprepared for what was to confront them.

By the close of 1968, the SAP were established at base camps along the Zambezi river frontage with Zambia and their job was to patrol given sectors of the river bank searching for any sign of night crossing by guerrillas. It was not long before reports of the alleged ineptitude and scandalous behaviour of the SAP filtered back to the Rhodesian police general headquarters in Salisbury. The situation became so serious that the Special Branch were ordered to submit secret reports on the South Africans. In one instance, members of the SAP based at the Chiwore game reserve near the Mupato gorge on the Zambezi were convicted before the Magistrate's Court at Karoi for hunting and shooting rhinoceros for its precious horn for sale to Durban's Indian community. Official of the Parks and Wild Life Department became disenchanted with the South Africans when they started wrecking the hunting camp

facilities. Civilian residents of Chirundu and Kariba often reported finding boxes of hand-grenades which had fallen from passing SAP vehicles. The Rhodesians, operating with sparse and outmoded equipment, became jealous of the modern equipment which the SAP carelessly damaged or lost. The Rhodesians often cited the example of how an SAP patrol had abandoned a brand new landrover in a dry river bed after running out of fuel 25 kilometres from their base. Returning to recover their vehicle several days later they discovered that a flash flood had completely buried the truck in sand and river debris.

Rhodesian visitors to SAP camps along the Zambezi often noticed a holiday camp atmosphere prevailing. Near F Camp on the Zambezi, at a particularly inviting bend in the river, a rope had been rigged from a branch overhanging the river and here the SAP holiday-makers would swing out and drop into the refreshingly cool waters of the Zambezi. Approach roads to SAP camps were often marked with 'Hou Links' (Keep Left) signs reminding the Afrikaners to watch out for oncoming traffic on the dirt roads. A number of nasty accidents involving the SAP occurred when drivers smashed into Rhodesian vehicles after failing to obey the keep-left rule. Dedication to duty did not last long and for most of the time the SAP never saw any guerrillas. Neither did they come into contact with Africans because the entire valley as far as Kanyemba had been depopulated in years gone by. Under these circumstances of incredible boredom, the early morning spooring patrols became less regular and in one case guerrillas crossed from Zambia and planted two landmines on the approach road to a base camp. One of the mines was detonated by a police vehicle as it left camp on a re-supply run.

Bikini briefs or underpants became the most popular dress order for these policemen who spent much of the day resting in their canvas cots protected by mosquito nets to ward off tsetse flies. Hours of darkness, with the strange and unusual sounds of the Zambezi valley bush, turned into a living nightmare for several of these young men. Others succumbed to psychological ills and were sent home on the regular shuttle from New Sarum air base at Salisbury airport. Ill-discipline, boredom and lack of adequate training were the primary reasons for the poor performance of the South African policemen who had been posted direct from routine police duties in South Africa with only a modicum of preparation. The first contingent was relieved after three months and in successive cycles thereafter. It soon became evident to the Rhodesians that the South Africans were doing their homework and in realization of their own shortcomings were endeavouring to improve the pre-deployment training and briefings. The South Africans were slowly gaining valuable experience and these early mistakes would serve them well in the future.

The first real taste of action came in late 1968 when the South African police at Chirundu were called upon to assist in the follow-up of early 100 ZAPU and ANC guerrillas who crossed during an exercise known as Operation Griffin. The infiltration was detected after a Special Branch agent, who had undergone military training in Zambia and Tanzania, managed to slip away and report to the police at Chirundu. A force of 60 South Africans were sent out and in the following engagements Constable Daniel du Toit was killed.⁹

South African assistance was not restricted to the presence of the policemen and in August 1968 a detachment of the Corps of Signals of the South African Defence Forces Monitoring Division moved into the Chirundu village. The unit was known as V Troop and their mission was to intercept and de-cypher coded radio transmissions of the Zambian police, the Zambian army and the Zambian intelligence service. Much of this traffic yielded valuable information on guerrilla movements and the whereabouts of base camps. Working from two self-contained vehicles full of the latest electronic eavesdropping equipment the men of V Troop had soon cracked all Zambian government codes including the top secret communications of the intelligence commands.

South African and Rhodesian co-operation in this particular field of intelligence work was a closely guarded secret and the men engaged in the work for the South Africans were of a much higher calibre than the ordinary South African police. The Corps of Signals specialists were true professionals and highly skilled. So successful did this source of information become that the CIO later established its own special division to complement the work of the South Africans. V Troop men were able to intercept Zambian and Tanzanian telecommunications and listen-in on nationalist guerrilla telephone calls from Lusaka and Dar Es Salaam. In later years, another unit was located at Victoria Falls and inside the King George VI Barracks in Salisbury. During the 1970s the CIO employed former Portuguese DGS officers to transcribe FRELIMO signals intercepted from Mozambique. The work of the V Troop continued until early 1980 when the operation was terminated and withdrawn.

Rhodesian reciprocity for South African assistance was always forthcoming and in 1968 the Special Branch officer at Chirundu received orders to assist a team of South African security branch policemen who were returning from a kidnapping job in Lusaka. Arriving at Chirundu, the South Africans explained that, although they had managed to snatch their target, a member of the ANC then living in Lusaka, their presence had been detected and the Zambian police had been hot on their trail as far as Kafue. Within hours of their arriving at Chirundu, the Special Branch officer there received a telephone call from his Zambian counterpart, Don Bruce, demanding the return of the abducted nationalist. Up until

this incident, relationships between the Zambian police and the Rhodesians had been cordial. Certainly, relations at the station levels — Chirundu, Kariba and Victoria Falls — were excellent with the still predominantly White-officered Zambian police exchanging drinking visits with their Rhodesian friends. This incident soured relations and the Zambian police received orders to cease fraternization. This came as a blow, for the Rhodesians at Chirundu and Kariba had often enjoyed trips to the Lusaka nurses home. In 1970, detectives from the Special Branch provincial command in Bulawayo drove down to Francistown and kidnapped Benjamin Ramotse at the specific request of the South Africans. Ramotse was taken from his house, handcuffed, blindfolded and driven directly to Bulawayo and thence to Beit Bridge where he was handed over to the security branch from Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal.

South African police reinforcements were posted to Kazungula in north-western Rhodesia and Kanyemba in the northeast during 1969. As the number of South Africans in Rhodesia grew so did the level of criticism. Ordinary members of the Rhodesian security forces claimed that the South Africans were so inexperienced that they could do just as well without them. All the Rhodesians coveted was their vehicles and equipment. Cultural differences between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking Rhodesians resulted in misunderstandings over the radio network because the South Africans preferred to converse in their native tongue. The lingering memory of the Boer War flared up in the minds of some South African Police when the Rhodesians started to refer to them as Slopes, a highly derogatory epithet ascribed to a person who is extremely stupid or with a sloping cranium resembling that of Neanderthal man. Not satisfied with this adjective in their war-time vocabulary, the Rhodesians expanded their descriptive terminology with the addition of such expressions as Rock-Spiders or simply *Rocks*. The South Africans understandably resented this form of treatment which they knew was common currency behind their backs. The use of the expression 'Slope' was officially banned but it continued for much of the war and was generally used when describing the latest in a long series of foul-ups committed by the Slopes. This attitude on the part of the Rhodesians revealed a decided arrogance and obvious racism which had earlier found expression in the names applied by the Rhodesians to their Portuguese neighbours in Mozambique who were referred to as Pork and Beans but most often simply as Porks.

Because 1969 was a relatively quiet year it tended to lull both the South Africans and the Rhodesians into a false sense of security. The silence was broken when a South African Police convoy was ambushed on the Makuti to Kariba road on 5 January 1970 and three men were killed.

Then on the night of 17 January 1970 the South African police camp at Msuna, a fishing resort on the Zambezi, was attacked. Fearing that they were likely to be overrun, the South Africans fled after sustaining several casualties. These attacks were the work of ZIPRA who had now embarked on their trans-border raids. Between 1970 and 1972 ZIPRA guerrillas planted landmines on access roads to the South African positions and in the Mana Pools game reserve. The fact that many of these landmines were detonated, with fatal results, just outside the South African camps testified to the laxity of the morning spooring patrols.

On 8 January 1973, the South African police struck a landmine on the main road near their Victoria Falls base resulting in the death of two constables and injuries to five others including three Rhodesian soldiers of the territorial forces. In the aftermath of this blast, General G J Joubert,¹⁰ Commissioner of the South African Police visited the scene for a personal inspection and also to assess the need for further reinforcements in the light of this attack on his forces.

The South Africans made it very easy for the guerrillas to score successes against them. A classic example of dereliction of duty with fatal results occurred during 1971 when a number of young and inexperienced constables, overcome with fatigue during a mid-morning patrol along the banks of the Zambezi river upstream from the Victoria Falls, decided to have a swim. Stacking their rifles in a pile, the constables stripped off and dived into the cooling waters. Observing the South Africans was a ZIPRA patrol and the constables paid for their carelessness with their lives.

Recognizing the need for reinforcements in combatting the ZANLA incursions of late 1972 and early 1973 the Rhodesians turned to the South Africans for increased manpower and military hardware. Responding to this request in February 1973, a civilian registered twin-engined aircraft of the South African Air Force flew into Centenary. On board were five senior officers of the South African Security Branch who had come to assess the situation and report back. The South Africans spent two weeks at Centenary and during that time attached themselves to the Rhodesian Special Branch. They were given access to security reports and also became involved in the interrogation of villagers suspected of being guerrilla collaborators. Returning to South Africa, they made recommendations but the assistance was made contingent upon the presence in Rhodesia of Security Branch liaison officers who were to be posted to all operational centres in the north-east. The Rhodesians were not overly enthusiastic about this condition but they had no alternative.

By June 1973 Security Branch officers of the South Africa Police were stationed at Sipolilo, Centenary, Mount Darwin, Rushinga, Mukumbura, Victoria Falls, Kariba and Bindura. The Security Branch

officers were commanded in Rhodesia by a colonel who was based with the Joint Operations Command at Bindura. The South Africans explained to their hosts that they had come to listen and learn but before long they started complaining to their commanding officer at Bindura, Colonel Victor, that many Rhodesians distrusted them and referred to them as Slopes.

The Slope syndrome caused a number of the strongly accented Afrikaans-speaking South Africans to become sullen and introverted. One such man was Captain Swart of Mount Darwin whom the Rhodesians found extremely taciturn. As time progressed and the South Africans realized these shortcomings, they posted predominantly English-speaking officers to Rhodesia and men like Captain Guppy Van Tonder of the Cape Town Security Branch command, where he was used to dealing with English-speaking academics and liberals suspected of involvement in subversive activities, got on well with the Rhodesians. Officers with an extrovert nature and able to articulate in English started to break down the barrier and before long the Rhodesians found themselves up against some extremely efficient and capable officers whose professional ability was above average. The dour captains and majors were replaced by security policemen of quite a different class. Such an officer was Detective Sergeant Chris Knox who became known as the Banana Boy, a term commonly applied to English-speaking South Africans from Natal. Knox came to Rhodesia with experience of guerrilla activities in northern South West Africa (Namibia), having been stationed at the Runtu border post with Angola.

When the South African security men complained they were being fobbed-off with inconsequential and somewhat menial tasks, it was decided that they would be made responsible for the establishment of their own intelligence scheme which was to cover the European-owned commercial farms. They were given the job of patrolling these districts and recruiting informers. In 1973 and 1974 several Rhodesian Special Branch officers noticed that nothing of any value materialized from this scheme and that the South Africans appeared to be concentrating on cultivating long-term ties with European civilians and members of the security forces. They concentrated on Rhodesians who had family in South Africa and visited that country on holiday. Many personal relationships were forged and the South Africans arranged for their Rhodesian friends to stay at the official South African Police holiday resort of Port Edward near the Transkei border. The South Africans also devoted much of their time to the preparation and submission of reports on the general conduct of the war, the question of European morale under siege and other factors which pointed to a long-term interest in the future affairs of Zimbabwe.

On 14 December 1973, a ghastly incident occurred involving a patrol of the South African police in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land just north of Bindura. The South Africans came across an African woman gathering wood some distance from her village. One of the constables grabbed hold of the woman who was carrying her baby strapped behind her. The constable questioned the woman about the *magandanga* (a term then current among the Rhodesian security forces for nationalist guerrillas); and when she denied knowledge of their whereabouts, the angered constable roughly snatched away the baby and slit its throat with a Swiss army pen-knife. As he did so he issued a warning to the mother saying that this is what he did to people who assisted 'ters'. Despite the traumatic nature of this horrible experience the mother walked to Bindura and reported the incident to the police station. To their credit the uniformed officers took the report seriously and the officer commanding the Criminal Investigation Department at Bindura was informed. The body of the dead infant was taken to Bindura hospital mortuary for a medical examination by the government medical officer, Dr John Knottenbelt. An official investigation was then ordered by the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, who appointed Superintendent William Elser in charge. Elser located the scene of murder and was able to identify the constables.

Interrogation of the African constables of the British South Africa Police attached to the South African patrol as interpreters confirmed the substance of the complainant's allegations. After a reconstruction of the events the two South Africans were confronted with the evidence. Initially they simply refused to believe that such a fuss was being made about the death of a 'ter' sympathizer but when they realized that the matter was serious they refused to talk. The constables were then charged with murder and held in custody pending a court appearance on a preliminary examination for a charge of murder in the High Court.

News of these events reached the South African Police headquarters, known as the Wachthuis, in Pretoria and within twenty-four hours the Officer Commanding of the South African Criminal Investigation Department accompanied by legal advisers flew into Bindura. They interviewed their men and sought permission to peruse the Docket of Case against the accused.

Having completed their investigations, the top-level South African delegation returned to Pretoria and within days the Rhodesians were told, at the highest level, that charges against the accused constables should be withdrawn. The Rhodesians were informed, moreover, that murder charges against the constables would not be conducive to continued good relations between South Africa and Rhodesia. In the interests of political expediency the murderers were released and flown

home to South Africa where internal disciplinary proceedings were taken by their own authorities.

It was most embarrassing when on 27 March 1974 Ronny Sadomba, an African member of the Rhodesian Parliament and a known critic of the Rhodesian Front government, introduced a motion on alleged atrocities and urged that a commission of enquiry be established to investigate details of the infanticide incident. His motion was defeated by thirty-five votes and the Rhodesian Minister of Justice, Desmond Lardner-Burke, dismissed the allegation saying that, 'it was typical of the usual ploy of those who are indoctrinated by the communist code'. So details of the case were officially dead and buried in the interests of *entente cordiale* between South Africa and Rhodesia. The official police investigation and Docket of Case were filed by the Commissioner of Police under the highest possible security classification of Top Secret and Safe. All these documents were later destroyed in early 1980.¹¹

Not long after Sadomba's unsuccessful motion in the Rhodesian Parliament a convoy of South African policemen was travelling to the Bveke base-camp in the central Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. Just near the Bveke turn-off from the main Mukumbura to Mount Darwin road the convoy was attacked by guerrillas who fired on the vehicles. The engagement was ineffectual and the guerrillas melted away into the bush. Satisfied that the danger was passed the convoy continued for a short distance and as it passed through a kraal-line, an African village, one of the South African constables opened fire with a heavy MAG machine-gun. He fired into a group of villagers standing by the roadside staring at the passing vehicles. He continued firing as the trucks sped through. After firing off several hundred rounds the constable started gibbering to himself and his colleagues could see that he had lost his reason. An aircraft was called to Bveke and the sick man was 'cashevaced' to hospital where medics reported that he was suffering from a nervous breakdown and had recommended his repatriation to South Africa.

In May 1973 another South African suffered a total breakdown after being involved in three consecutive landmine incidents in a single day. Travelling in a convoy from Mukumbura to Mount Darwin he had thrice been unlucky when vehicles he was travelling in hit landmines.

By late 1975,¹² the South African Police units were withdrawn to South Africa in keeping with the detente exercise but before they left an incident occurred in the north-east Rhodesia which once again focused attention on their activities. A patrol of six constables was lured into an ambush by a ZANLA detachment under Herbert Shungu at the Mazowe low-level bridge and killed.

After the official withdrawal from Rhodesia another major incident took place on 23 December 1975 when a South African Air Force

helicopter crashed near Cashel killing Major General John Shaw, Colonel Dave Parker, known to his men as the King, Captain Lamb, Captain Robertson and the helicopter technician, sergeant Pieter Van Rensburg.¹³ The wrecked helicopter had been one of a fleet of nearly twenty-five such machines, on loan with pilots, to the Rhodesian Air Force No. 7 Squadron. One of the most memorable military funerals in Rhodesian history then followed. Major-General Shaw's funeral, conducted with full military honours, commenced with the religious service at the Anglican Cathedral after which the coffin was placed on a gun carriage and moved slowly into Second Street and then into Jameson (Samora Machel) Avenue. As the cortege moved slowly through the streets a sombre silence descended on the normally busy city centre. The event was watched by thousands of White bystanders who felt a sense of deep patriotism. Shaw's untimely death accelerated the promotion of John Hickman and Peter Walls, men both destined to play a significant role in the final death agony of White supremacy in Rhodesia.

After the much publicized withdrawal of the South African Police from Rhodesia had taken place in late 1975, the remaining South African forces adopted a very low profile. South African Air Force pilots and their aircraft were deployed to the Operation Repulse area and positioned at Buffalo Range airport. From here they flew regular missions in the Fort Victoria (Masvingo) and Beit Bridge district under command of JOC Chiredzi.

As part of the overall South African military aid package they allowed Rhodesian Air Force pilots to train in South Africa and Rhodesians were stationed during the 1970s at the Waterkloof and Durban bases. The Rhodesians were paid by officials of the Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission at 28 Church Square in Pretoria, and also through the Annexe in Waltonia buildings, Skinner Street. Some Rhodesian Special Air Service regiment courses were undertaken at the Outshoorn and Simonstown camps where the curriculum included aspects of underwater demolition and the finer arts of sabotage.

During the early 1970s the South African intelligence service then known as the Bureau for State Security posted a liaison officer named Bruce Campbell to Salisbury. Campbell was later replaced by Jannie Swart. During the 1978-9 Zimbabwe Rhodesia administration members of the South African intelligence service stepped up their agent and source recruitment drive. They were obviously interested in cultivating agents inside the internal nationalist groups and for some time the Special Branch were ordered to place the South African intelligence staff under surveillance so that their agents could be identified.

The Rhodesians were represented in Pretoria by senior Special Branch officers seconded from Branch I into Branch II which was responsible

for external operations within the CIO. The first such posting was on 10 January 1972 when Assistant Commissioner J.S.T. Fletcher was sent to Pretoria under the official cover of First Secretary; it was, however, obvious to all that next to Air Vice-Marshal Harold Hawkins, originally sent to Pretoria on 1 July 1969, Fletcher was the top man. In many respects his position superseded that of Hawkins when the real nature of the CIO man's clandestine work on behalf of Rhodesia was considered. Butch Fletcher, as he was known, proved extremely popular with the South Africans and during his tenure the Pretoria CIO station functioned as a major clearing-house for external operations of an intelligence nature. An air of cloak and dagger surrounded Fletcher's activities and ordinary Foreign Affairs staffers at the Mission who tried to enquire too deeply into his work were told to 'wind their necks in' and mind their own business. On 1 May 1977 Chief Superintendent S.J. Hancock of the Special Branch was sent to understudy Fletcher before finally taking over full responsibility when Fletcher resigned from the service in the late 1970s and settled in South Africa.

During the late 1970s the Pretoria CIO station became even more important as a secret conduit for funding the Selous Scouts. Members of the Scouts were regular visitors to the Mission and many of them came specifically as couriers to carry home large sums of South African currency which were paid into the Reserve Bank and exchanged for Rhodesian dollars payable to the secret intelligence vote supplementary account in the Prime Minister's Office.

In addition to the security and intelligence postings to South Africa, the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department sent officers to Pretoria and Johannesburg. As Rhodesian morale plummeted during the late 1970s many private individuals smuggled out gold, emeralds and foreign currency bank-notes and deposited these secret hoards in South Africa. As the flight of currency from Rhodesia reached serious proportions the provisions of the Exchange Control Act were strengthened but these legal measures did not stem the flow of precious currency reserves as desperate Rhodesians sought to externalize assets in contravention of the law. Offences of this nature were reaching such epidemic proportions¹³ that the Commissioner of Police ordered the formation of a special Fraud and Economic Crime Squad commanded by Assistant Commissioner Robert Burrell. Working in close liaison with members of the South African Police at Marshall Square in Johannesburg, the Rhodesian liaison officers were able to enquire into bank accounts, Building Society accounts and other financial transactions in contravention of Rhodesian law. The Rhodesian policemen were able to obtain South African court orders to open safe-deposit boxes rented by Salisbury businessmen. Some of these boxes

contained parcels of rough and uncut emeralds illegally purchased in Rhodesia and smuggled out of the country. Ironically enough, quantities of these stones had found their way into the hands of European buyers through the medium of *mujiba* and middlemen duly instructed by guerrillas operating in the Belingwe district of Rhodesia near the world-famous Sandawana emerald mine in order to raise money for food and supplies.¹⁴

The Fraud and Economic Crime squad of the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department developed a tough reputation for ruthless efficiency. In their campaign to prevent the flight of foreign currency from Rhodesia they were prepared to investigate the activities of the lowest and the highest in the land.

During 1977 detectives of the Fraud Squad seized a South African businessman, Nicholas Classens, as he was leaving Salisbury (Harare) for Johannesburg. A search of his samsonite briefcase disclosed a secret compartment. During subsequent investigations into the man's activities it came to light that he was an agent for the South African intelligence services. In mid-1978 the Fraud Squad was responsible for busting open the largest case of top-level corruption in Rhodesian criminal history. The case involved Rhodesian officials of the Defence Procurement Committee who had systematically organized over-invoicing on vital defence purchases in Europe, thereby defrauding the exchequer of millions of dollars.

Throughout 1979 the South Africans were extremely active inside Rhodesia. Combat tracker units of the South African Police were deployed alongside regular units of the Rhodesian army and operated in the Matibi Tribal Trust Land. The presence of these forces inside Rhodesia was denied by both the Rhodesian and South African governments after *The Guardian* published a story written by the foreign correspondent, James McManus. The South Africans also operated a killer-dog unit in Rhodesia and in mid-1979 a general of the SADF visited Mtoko to inspect their operations.

Junior officers, lieutenants and captains of the SADF were posted to a number of JOCs with a specific look-and-learn brief. One of these men was stationed at Mtoko and in August 1979 his six-cylinder landrover, affectionately known as the Kalahari Ferrari, struck a landmine. A Rhodesian security forces reaction-stick sent to rescue the stricken South African was delayed after the lead vehicle, a mine-detecting Puki struck another landmine.

The further involvement of the South Africans was to culminate in the story of the March 3rd Agreement and Operation Favour. Anxious to ensure that the regime that would emerge would be favourable to South Africa, the Pretoria government committed themselves to an incredible

gamble and earmarked the expenditure of nearly R10 million during the period 1978-80. Some of the background to the involvement of the South Africans through their Department of Information is covered in a book by the former director of that department, Dr Eschell Rhoodie. The Rhodesian side of this story is narrated in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 5

The Selous Scouts

From its humble beginnings in early 1973, when the as yet un-named unit was formed in a classic pseudo-terrorist tracking and secret reconnaissance role, the Selous Scouts¹ grew into a battalion strength force, which in later years, became the executive wing of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. The Scouts were funded through the CIO's secret vote of nearly Z\$6million a year and in addition they received supplementary funds direct from the SADF Directorate of Military Intelligence. Although the unit officially fell under the command of the Rhodesian army commander, it was never really accountable and acted autonomously. The real direction came from the Special Branch officers who comprised its security and intelligence structure. – During the later years the Selous Scouts were incorporated as department Z of the Rhodesian CIO and all Special Branch officers attached to the force were officially transferred from Branch I into Branch II of the CIO. The Scouts operated with the simple credo that the ends justify the means; and, shrouded in secrecy, the unit developed a sinister reputation and to this day most of their war-time exploits remain secret. The composition of this force was closely studied by officers of the South African Defence Forces seconded to Rhodesia who are now employing their experience in South African operations in northern Namibia and Angola through the 5th Reconnaissance Commando, the South African Police security branch Crowbar unit and covert UNITA support operations. There are close tactical parallels between these contemporary operations and those of the Selous Scouts and many former Rhodesian officers have been integrated into the South African units.

In 1982, a former Rhodesian policeman, Peter Stiff, published the story of the Selous Scouts as told him by the commander of that unit, Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid Daly. It is perhaps unkind to describe the author as a panegyrist because he was after all only recording the story as related to him by the man whom most Selous Scouts affectionately referred to as Uncle Ron. The book, *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, provides the reader with a highly glorified and Eurocentric account of the Rhodesian war and the objective of this present chapter is to place that saga in a more accurate perspective.

The concept of a secret counter-insurgency unit was first mooted during 1965 by the officer commanding of the Criminal Investigation Department, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Oppie Oppenheim, who later became head of the Special Branch. He sponsored the formation of

a small team of policemen who received training in bushcraft, survival, guerrilla tactics and tracking. A young maverick in the Criminal Investigation Department, Henry Wolhuter, was chosen to head the plain-clothes contingent which was reinforced by men from the Special Air Services C Squadron. The ten-man team was first deployed into the Omayi district bordering the Lake Kariba frontier with Zambia.

Oppenheim visited his men during their course and he expressed satisfaction with their progress. He then urged a more universal adoption of his concept as a standard security force tactic when deployed against ZAPU nationalist guerrillas who had then started to cross the Zambezi river into Rhodesia. His ideas were never implemented because deeply rooted conservatism in the Army and the Police had little time for innovators.

After Oppenheim's abortive attempt the next similar suggestion came from Lieutenant Alan Savory, then a territorial force officer, who argued that the army should establish a specialist tracking unit to counter insurgents on their own ground. His ideas were accepted and for a short time he was allowed to train a group of men in the unorthodox manner. Savory also proposed that the army should emulate enemy tactics, explaining how these techniques had been usefully applied in Kenya and Malaya during the 1950s. Many of Savory's ideas were later borrowed by the Special Branch who supervised the final gestation of the Selous Scouts in the early 1970s.

Savory became an MP but continued to serve in the Rhodesian army until he came to be considered a security risk for suggesting that a solution to the guerrilla war lay in direct negotiations with the nationalists. His suggestion was regarded as treason and Ian Smith described the very notion as the most evil he had ever heard from a fellow Rhodesian. Savory later renounced his membership of the Rhodesian Front party and crossed the floor to join the parliamentary opposition. The Rhodesian Front saw to it that Savory was henceforth reviled as a traitor. Later Savory left Rhodesia to pursue his career as an ecologist and wild-life consultant. During 1978, members of the Special Branch accompanying an external Selous Scouts raid into Zambia discovered documents indicating a link between Savory and ZAPU. These documents formed the basis of a treason charge against Savory together with allegations under the Rhodesian Official Secrets Act. These charges were carefully prepared and kept in readiness should Savory dare return.

In January 1973 a number of Special Branch officers and Captain (later Major) Mike Graham of the Special Air Services embarked on the last stage of the genesis of the Selous Scouts. The name of the Selous Scouts had not yet been adopted and all operations were simply referred to as pseudo-terrorist operations, classified as Top Secret and filed under

the Special Branch reference of XYS 4949. The first operational unit was commanded by André Rabie and Alan Franklin who had with them several African volunteers from the Rhodesian African Rifles and a Shona linguist, Basil Moss, seconded from the Rhodesian Air Force security branch at New Sarum. The unit was divided into two sections of eight men and equipped with captured AK-47 rifles, standard guerrilla uniform and kitbags. The first deployments were into the Mzarabani, Kandeya and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands in north-eastern Rhodesia.

The unit was quartered in a disused farmhouse about two kilometres from the Centenary police camp. The pseudos were deployed by night and this operation was supervised by the Special Branch using civilian registered landrovers. A patrol lasted for about ten days or until their secret presence was compromised. On return to base the Special Branch co-ordinators debriefed the pseudos commander for relevant tactical information obtained under the guise of nationalist guerrillas from contacts with African villagers. Details of contact men, village cell chairmen whose duty it was to provide food and information to the guerrillas, was communicated to the Army and in the early days some guerrillas were killed as a result of these pseudo operations. But before long, villagers and guerrillas learned of these new tactics and were able to distinguish the genuine *vakomana* (guerrillas) from the *Mazkuzapu* (Selous Scouts). The pseudo groups could no longer merely present themselves at a village and expect an open welcome.

Villagers became circumspect and evolved a highly complex recognition-code which the Selous Scouts had to quickly learn from captured contact men and guerrillas. Faces became crucial and the Scouts came to learn the extreme importance of inducting captured guerrillas into their ranks in the shortest possible time. The time-span between captured and deployment was critical, for if the Scouts delayed too long then the captured guerrilla's companions would have time to warn villagers.

The technique of 'turning' or inducing a captured guerrilla to co-operate with the Scouts was achieved in many ways. Firstly he was made aware of the hopelessness of his own situation — death was the only alternative. Secondly he was put together with other 'captures' some of whom he would recognize from training camps in China, North Korea, Tanzania or Mozambique. They would explain the many benefits of working with the Scouts — these included a standard kill-bonus of \$1000. Thirdly, the African members of the Selous Scouts subjected the prospective recruit to a crash course in political re-orientation. The turning process was often achieved within twenty-four hours and many successful kills were recorded when a Selous Scouts gang moved into a village using the recent capture to authenticate them and request a guide to the nearest resident group.

Yet another explanation for their being able to achieve this change of heart and bring a captured guerrilla 'on sides' so rapidly was the fact that within the Selous Scouts Fort (headquarters) there existed a strange spirit of superficial multiracialism. The Scouts had a certain *esprit de corps* in which both White and Black soldiers intermingled, held evening *braai*, drank and sang guerrilla *chimurenga* songs. The *chimurenga* or revolutionary songs were genuine compositions. All these factors combined to place the guerrilla candidate under incredible psychological pressure and in most cases it worked quickly indeed.

As the pseudo concept proved itself highly successful the JOC at Operation Hurricane recommended that the scope of these activities be increased. A meeting was held with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it was agreed that the Army would provide additional manpower, vehicles and logistical support while the Special Branch would provide overall command, finance and a supply of captured guerrillas. The base was moved from Centenary to a farmhouse behind the Trojan Nickel mine, six kilometres from Bindura. This move also brought the unit closer to the command centre of JOC Operation Hurricane now based at the Bindura police camp.

With the move to Bindura came the official name of Selous Scouts. But in the interim period a number of incidents occurred which highlighted the deadly nature of this secretive work. A group of Scouts was mistaken for a genuine guerrilla unit by a Police Reserve Anti-Terrorist Unit (PATU). The PATU patrol, which was operating in the northern Centenary farming district, fired on the pseudos killing their section leader, André Rabie. An investigation revealed that Rabie had miscalculated his position and given wrong map co-ordinates when signalling his position to base. The PATU unit were not blamed for the killing and they were officially credited with terrorist kills. The true circumstances of Rabie's death were concealed but henceforth whenever the Scouts were deployed into a given sector it was declared a 'frozen area' and no other security force patrols were permitted into that area. Each operation sector was allocated an area number and in the years ahead it was common to see vast tracts of countryside marked with Frozen Area stickers on operational maps. The Frozen Area technique did backfire from time to time when the guerrillas discovered that they could use some of these zones as sanctuaries. The Scouts became so secretive that not only did they freeze target areas but they extended coverage to a much larger area of surrounding territory as well.

South African observers in the Rhodesian war should have learned their lesson of Frozen Areas but it would appear that they did not, for on 24 October 1980 a unit of the South African 5th Reconnaissance Commando operating as guerrillas of the South West African People's

Organization (SWAPO) in northern Namibia were fired upon by regulars of the SADF and sustained two dead.²

By March 1974 the Scouts were enjoying considerable success after adopting a change in tactics. One of their most successful operations took place near Ruwani school in the northern Kandeya Tribal Trust Land close to the Mvuradona mountains. Lying hidden in a *gomo* or kopje overlooking the school, the Scouts reported a large gathering of guerrillas attending a night-time *pungwe*.³ During the war years the guerrillas used the institution of *pungwe* as a platform for political discussion, *chimurenga* songs and general festivities.

On this occasion the Scouts signalled the 'loc-stats' (map co-ordinates) to the Fire Force commando of the Rhodesian Light Infantry based at Mount Darwin, recommending that a dawn assault be mounted. During the subsequent attack in which fifteen guerrillas were killed the Scouts remained hidden and the following evening some of them entered the village posing as stragglers requesting assistance. In the general confusion, villagers failed to exercise caution and the Scouts were led to a group of guerrillas sheltered some distance from the village school. In this manner the Scouts were able to account for several more kills and also captured three.

Meanwhile, the dead guerrillas from the original engagement were conveyed to Mount Darwin police camp and dumped on the body slab — a flat concrete apron adjacent to the Special Branch complex. The arrival of the charred — many of the bodies had been badly burned by white phosphorous grenades — and mutilated corpses suspended in nets beneath the helicopters was a welcome sight to many of the White residents of Mount Darwin village. Swarms of interested security force personnel converged on the slab to inspect and poke through the bodies of the dead. One particular macabre individual, then a member of the Criminal Investigation Department, thought it amusing to lie down among the bodies and have his photograph taken with a police polaroid camera. Another equally malevolent person reckoned that the bodies would make ideal target material for his newly acquired .357 Magnum revolver. He fired a number of rounds until the senior Special Branch officer called him off explaining the importance of identifying the bodies. The identification process took the form of fingerprinting, photographs and physical examination of any personal notebooks which often contained names and weapon serial numbers. Once this exercise was complete, all items of kit and equipment were carefully stored and later supplied to the Scouts. Weapons were sent to the police armoury at the Hard Square in Salisbury (Harare). The bodies were generally kept at the interrogation complex deep-freeze if visual identification was required. Finally disposal took place in nearby mine shafts or mass graves which were

often dug at the end of landing strips near operational headquarters.

By using an adaptation of the tactics described above a 'call-sign' of Selous Scouts commanded by Lieutenant Dale Collett was able to account for three ZANLA guerrillas at a small village near the Ruya river just north of the Chesa farms. Collett, who had previously served with the Rhodesian African Rifles before joining the Scouts, was a Shona linguist. He ordered his small group to observe a suspected village for several days before the vigil paid off. On the third evening a section of guerrillas arrived to attend a beer drink. In the small hours of the morning the Scouts moved down to the village and making contact with an elderly inebriated villager enquired which hut the guerrillas were sleeping in. The Scouts then opened fire on the hut killing three guerrillas and several civilian occupants. In the immediate confusion of the shooting, Collett and his Scouts withdrew and changed into regular security forces camouflage uniform to give the impression that the village had been raided by soldiers.

During this and similar operations European members of the Scouts disguised their appearance by the application of a thick black dye, the use of large bushy beards, and the wearing of standard guerrilla type uniforms. The normal procedure for an approach to a suspected village was for the African Scouts, accompanied by a 'capture' to approach and call for the contact man who would authenticate them as being genuine. Other members of the gang waited at the outskirts of the village and in the gloom it was virtually impossible to tell that some of the men were White. Usually the presence of a European near an African village would be detected by dogs who were sensitive to the different body odours but the combination of woodsmoke, dirt and other smells which permeated their clothing served to disturb the scent patterns.

Dale Collett was considered a successful operator but in June 1976, during an operation inside Mozambique, he was seriously wounded and later confined to a wheelchair. He returned to duty at the André Rabie Barracks at Inkomo military cantonment. The Scouts had a regimental code that no member would be pensioned out unless he requested it. It was common to find amputees and paraplegics engaged in routine office work at André Rabie and CIO headquarters.

Collett's condition did not prevent him from proceeding with his previously arranged marriage and this was solemnized on board a specially constructed raft anchored in the middle of Lake Kariba. The ceremony was conducted by the unit's chaplain the Reverend Peter Grant, father of Detective Inspector Peter Grant who was also a member of the Scouts on attachment from the Special Branch. The assembled Scouts sang a regimental *chimurenga* song while an African Scout blew

upon an *hwamanda* (ceremonial Kudu horn in Shona) in one of the most bizarre weddings ever experienced in Rhodesian history.


Evidence of guerrilla successes against the security forces was never, for obvious reasons, publicized — and particularly not in the case where an entire section of Scouts in the Mukumbura district was wiped out during 1974. The man responsible for this extraordinary feat was none other than the 'capture' who everyone thought had been turned. He was able to achieve this *coup* by taking advantage of the fact that the Scouts closely followed standard guerrilla sleeping habits of lying like sardines in a row, so that in the event of danger men could quickly and silently awake each other with the minimum of movement. When sentry duty fell to the 'capture' he waited until all six of his companions were asleep, stood up and opened fire with his RPK machine gun. Single-handed this unknown ZANLA guerrilla had accounted for the largest kill at any one time of Rhodesia soldiers. Rhodesian security force headquarters were in a quandary about how to announce the names of the dead men but overcame their dilemma by releasing names piecemeal over a period of time. The deaths were linked to on-going engagements with CTs (Communist Terrorists) and in each case headquarters juggled the figures so that the loss did not seem so great; for each dead Rhodesian they tossed in several dead Charlie Tangos as well.

Padre Grant's son Peter, the Detective Inspector in the Special Branch attached to the Scouts, thought nothing of going to his nocturnal rendezvous for a de-briefing session with an operational unit. This often involved driving through hostile country at night and on many occasions he was ambushed but always managed to escape the killing zone by firing his front and side mounted AK-47 rifles on fully automatic. Selous Scouts drove six-cylinder landrovers fitted with four AK-47 rifles rigged to a solenoid firing trigger which could be activated from the cab. The weapons carried ninety-round magazines. In addition the door panels were reinforced with armour plating.

But Grant's luck did not hold indefinitely and during 1975 he was ambushed late one night along the road from the Ruya bridge to Mount Darwin. He sustained serious injuries but managed to return to the Fort at Mount Darwin from where he was 'cashevaced' to Andrew Fleming Hospital for an emergency operation to save his life. Two months later he rejoined his unit but there were many who said he was a changed man. The harsh reality of war had been brought home.

By mid-1974 the Selous Scouts were fully constituted as an operational battalion with Captain Reid Daly — later Lieutenant-Colonel in charge. Reid Daly was later joined by another veteran of both the British and Rhodesian armies, a certain Captain Bert Sachse. Both these men were considered unorthodox and ill-suited to the restrictions of normal

Selous Scouts 'fort'



military discipline. Their wild and undisciplined nature revealed itself in 1971 when the two men booby-trapped a tin trunk belonging to a young policeman named Rob Franccesi who was then stationed at Mukumbura on border control duties. After some drinks at the Portuguese army camp, Reid Daly, Sachse and Franccesi returned to their riverside base-camp. As the Italian entered his tent the trunk blew up shredding his clothes to ribbons. The 'fragging' left Franccesi concussed but he soon recovered and was able to down a few more beers.

As the Scouts approached their full strength of around 1,000 men inclusive of regular soldiers, conscripts and captured guerrillas, the command structure and physical location of the unit's forces were as follows. The security and intelligence headquarters was situated inside the Bindura Fort, the tactical military headquarters was located inside the Fort at Inkomo Barracks near Salisbury (Harare) and in the early 1970s the training facility was to be found at Makuti. The Inkomo Barracks also sheltered the families of African members of the Selous Scouts. Operational or provincial commands were located in Forts at Mount Darwin, Bindura, Rusape, Umtali (Mutare), Chiredzi and Bulawayo.

The Selous Scouts fort was so named because of its rectangular structure. It comprised an enclosure of corrugated iron some four metres in height. Around the inside perimeter were offices, barracks, ablution blocks, detention cells, armoury, clinic and 'ops' room. The centre of the fort consisted of an asphalt quadrangle which was marked out as a volley ball pitch but normally served as a helicopter landing zone. The forts were always located adjacent to, or within the precincts of a police camp or army cantonment for reasons of external security. Access to these facilities was strictly controlled by armed gate guards who had orders to admit only Scouts or trusted Special Branch personnel. Even regular members of the police or army were not generally allowed inside.

The 'ops' room was the nerve centre controlling all operations within the province. For example, the Mount Darwin fort covered all territory in north-eastern Rhodesia and a satellite fort at Mtoko was responsible for Mtoko and Mrewa districts. All forts were linked by telephones fitted with Secraphone scrambler devices also known as speech inverters, single side band and very high frequency radios. In addition, the Scouts also maintained land-line magneto field telephones with all nearby army locations. The 'ops' room kept a 24-hour listening watch for sections operating in the field and a helicopter was usually available on immediate standby for emergency evacuations. The Bindura fort was the most sophisticated and in addition to standard communications also had direct telex links with the CIO headquarters in Salisbury, the South African Police security branch headquarters in Pretoria and the South African Directorate of Military Intelligence. Bindura functioned as the

security and intelligence headquarters for all Selous Scouts field operations under the command of assistant commissioner Mac Macguinness. The facility included a total strength of 100 men inclusive of captured guerrillas many of whom were allowed to roam freely around Bindura township when off duty. Such men had long ceased to have any *face* value and were now salaried employees of the Scouts. Bindura also served as the central paymaster for all Scouts operations in Rhodesia.

André Rabie Fort at Inkomo functioned as the military 'ops' room and Colonel Reid Daly was able to monitor all field activity throughout Rhodesia and externally. Both Bindura and André Rabie were accessible to a selected few members of the SADF and the South African Security Branch who were regularly briefed on progress and guerrilla tactics. The South Africans were bank-rolling the Scouts so had a right to monitor their investment. Mcguinness kept control over his provincial commands by appointing a number of trusted deputies who included Superintendent Keith Samler for Manicaland, Superintendent Winston Hart and Inspector George Mitchell for Mount Darwin, Detective Inspector Henry Wolhuter for Matabeleland and Captain Rob Warracker for Chiredzi. Each province had a number of Special Branch officers who were responsible for the day-to-day work of controlling groups in the field and they were known as liaison officers or simply LOs.

The liaison officers were hard pressed to keep current with the subtle changes in guerrilla recognition-codes. The early successes had been achieved because of inexperience and confusion but it was now necessary for any new guerrilla to be fully authenticated by village committees. A series of tests were applied when a new group did not have an acceptable 'face'. One such test involved the offer of *derere*, a special type of traditional Shona food which consists of okra beaten until it resembles a green slime. *Derere* is a common accompaniment to the staple diet of *sadza* (maize meal porridge) and guerrillas had secret orders to refuse the relish when it was offered. Selous Scouts, not aware of this ruse, were compromised until they discovered the secret. The question of authentication became an extremely important issue and it was often essential for the Scouts to subject themselves to mock ambushes for the benefit of villagers who needed convincing. Arrangements were carefully made with trusted members of the police or army to fire upon them. In other cases the Scouts carried out ambushes on security forces after making prior arrangements so that an impressive display could be laid on for the benefit of suspicious village contact men.

Where necessary the Scouts would resort to the public flogging of villagers who were pointed out by the *mujiba* or contact men as being 'sell-outs'. However, the only sure way to achieve acceptance was through the medium of a 'capture'. It was, therefore, of paramount im-

portance to ensure that any fresh 'capture' was immediately hooded and his identity kept concealed as he was being removed from the operational area back to the Fort. So precious were these captures that it was often necessary to remove an entire village who might have witnessed a guerrilla being taken prisoner. Often, these villagers would be removed by helicopter along with the prisoner never to be seen again.

One of the most famous of these captures was a ZANLA guerrilla named Kefas Kaseke who had been operating in the Chesa farms in the Nehanda sector. Kaseke was extremely well known in the Chesa, Chimanda and Rushinga districts. After being captured and turned, Kaseke proved himself a considerable asset to the Scouts. He became a legend within the service as he notched up kill-bonuses.⁴ Kaseke was elevated and gained the complete confidence of his employers who used him on many successful operations until he was finally compromised. During his final operation villagers were now wary and a suspicious ZANLA section commander agreed to come to a rendezvous arranged by the contact man. At the meeting place, Kaseke stepped forward leaving his companions behind him by several paces. Convinced that Kaseke was with a group of Scouts, the ZANLA commander gave the order to fire so quickly that it was only through the lightning reactions of Kaseke, who swung up his RPD machine gun firing on fully automatic, that the Scouts, many of whom sustained wounds, were able to withdraw.

It was largely the aid of a captured guerrilla named Morrison Nyathi that ensured the success of the Selous Scouts raid on the Nyadzonja camp near the Pungwe river in Mozambique. During this operation which took place in August 1976 a combined force of Scouts and Rhodesian Light Infantry soldiers killed 1,000 men and women who were taken completely unaware. It was a fact that most of those killed were unarmed when they freely approached the Selous Scouts convoy disguised as a FRELIMO contingent with Morrison Nyathi riding in the lead vehicle to authenticate.

The Selous Scouts raid on the Nyadzonja base was not the first time that they carried out extra-territorial missions for back in 1974 they undertook two kidnapping raids into Botswana, similar to the snatch of Benjamin Ramotse several years before. During March 1974, the Scouts abducted three ZAPU officials living in Francistown and took them to the Bulawayo Fort for interrogation. In October 1974, acting on information received by the provincial Special Branch officer of Matabeleland province who operated a number of top-level external sources within the Botswana government and the liberation movement, the Scouts conspired to raid Botswana once again and kidnap Ethan Dube, the ZAPU security and intelligence officer responsible for Botswana and western Rhodesia. The Special Branch learned that Dube operated a network of

agents inside Matabeleland and was busy setting up arms caches. They knew that Dube operated from an old farm cottage on the outskirts of Francistown. Chief Superintendent Macguinness sent Captain Basil Moss, Sergeant Bowerman and Lance-Corporal 'Kandi' into Botswana driving a landrover. Kandi was dropped off in the town with orders to reconnoitre the ZAPU headquarters. Late on the evening of 13 October 1974 the Scouts burst into Dube's sleeping quarters. Two of Dube's companions escaped into the night but Dube himself was bound and gagged by the abductors who used one-time plastic handcuffs and heavy-duty elastoplast.⁵

Dube was driven directly to Plumtree and thence to the Bulawayo Fort where he was first interrogated for immediate operational intelligence. He was later sent to Bindura where the inquisitors from the Terrorist Desk of Special Branch set to work extracting in-depth information which led to the uncovering of a vast number of internal agents and arms dumps.

The successful formula of this kidnapping set the scene for a far more audacious abduction nearly twelve months later when on the evening of 15 October 1975, Dr Edson Sithole, the publicity Secretary of the African National Council, and his secretary, Miss Miriam Mhlanga, were kidnapped from outside the Ambassador Hotel in central Salisbury (Harare). The circumstances of this incident highlighted the absolute authority invested in the Selous Scouts and started a storm of controversy which has not been settled to this day.

Sithole's disappearance had an interesting prelude. Sithole was a veteran nationalist and in 1974 he was released to participate in the detente exercise. He soon became prominent as a critic of the Rhodesian Front government which he accused of being insincere in its pledge to grant African majority rule. Immediately prior to his disappearance Sithole issued a press statement alleging that Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo were holding secret negotiations to the exclusion of other nationalist groups. By exposing these machinations Edson Sithole incurred the wrath of both the Rhodesian government and ZAPU.

After the breakdown of the Victoria Falls talks in August 1975 the Rhodesian government recommended that Sithole be re-detained but before this action was implemented a recommendation came from the Selous Scouts that Sithole be 'snatched and turned' in much the same manner as captured guerrillas were turned. The plan was endorsed by several senior Special Branch officers who agreed that Sithole would indeed prove a valuable source if the right inducement was offered. It was then agreed that the Scouts would kidnap Sithole and 'turn' him.

Approximately one week before 15 October a member of the Special Branch attached to the Scouts visited the Quill club, a popular meeting

place for journalists, nationalists and media people, at the Ambassador Hotel. Sithole was a known habitué of the club and his movements were closely monitored for about two weeks. The Special Branch officer responsible for this reconnaissance was unknown to the local press corps and so his visits passed without notice. At around 7 p.m. on 15 October Sithole, accompanied by Miriam Mhlanga, arrived in a BMW car. Sithole parked the car just outside the Ambassador Hotel and as he and his girlfriend alighted they were approached by two European members of the Scouts who identified themselves to Sithole as members of the Special Branch.⁶ Sithole was used to contact with the police and did not register any undue suspicion. Both he and Miss Mhlanga were escorted to a Kombi van parked close by. An African Scout climbed into the BMW and drove it away. Sithole was taken to the Fort at Inkomo and later transferred to Bindura for interrogation and possible 'turning.' The plan was to reintroduce Sithole back into society as quickly as possible but unfortunately for both Sithole and the Scouts the kidnapping had been witnessed by an outspoken and fearless critic of the Rhodesian government, Brother Arthur, Secretary General of the Roman Catholic Justice and Peace Commission.

The Selous Scouts were never able to determine exactly how Brother Arthur came to be outside the Ambassador that night. They would not believe that it was pure coincidence and suspected that someone senior in the Special Branch or the CIO had secretly tipped off the Catholics. Some Scouts even suspected that the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, known within the secret fraternity as the Bishop of Montague Avenue (the site of police general headquarters) a devout Catholic, had arranged Brother Arthur's presence that night. The fact was that Arthur was present and immediately reported the incident to journalists who filed reports that the Special Branch had arrested Sithole. The sudden glare of publicity may well have disturbed plans for Sithole because he was never seen alive again.

Several days after Sithole and Mhlanga vanished the BMW vehicle was found by police in the eastern border town of Umtali (Mutare) some 250 kilometres from the capital. The car had been abandoned to give the impression that Sithole had travelled to the border town and crossed into Mozambique on foot. The Umtali Criminal Investigation Department sent fingerprint experts to dust the car but they said that no useful prints were found.

The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission hired a private investigator giving him orders to track down Sithole's whereabouts. Before long, the investigators found an African corporal named Amos Muradzike who signed a sworn statement claiming that he had seen Sithole inside the Fort at Inkomo. Realizing that their witness was in mortal

danger, the investigators flew the corporal to Malawi. News of this development reached the Scouts who contacted their friends in the Malawian Special Branch who arrested Muradzike as an illegal immigrant to Malawi. Muradzike was never seen alive again and the African investigator who accompanied the corporal was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in his hospitalization at the Queen Elizabeth Infirmary in Blantyre.⁷ The circumstances surrounding this accident also point to official collaboration between the Malawian Special Branch and the Selous Scouts. The Rhodesian investigator's car was deliberately rammed at high speed by a car which was never identified.

Meanwhile the Justice and Peace Commission instructed the legal firm of Scanlen and Holderness to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The lawyer Anthony Eastwood produced a memorandum before a High Court judge claiming that the Special Branch or the Selous Scouts were holding Sithole in custody. The High Court rejected the application but the matter did not rest there. Wilfred Brooks, the editor of a right-wing monthly financial journal, *Property and Finance*, hated the Rhodesian Front government for his own reasons. He published a report in which he alleged that members of Special Branch II were responsible for the kidnapping. Rhodesian government officials were outraged and the Commissioner of Police received instructions from the Minister of Law and Order to prosecute Brooks for criminal libel of the Government. Detectives from the Law and Order section were sent to interview Brooks and a court date was set for 3 May 1976 but on the appointed date the Director of Public Prosecutions withdrew all the charges saying that in so doing he did not wish to indicate in any way that the State admitted the truth of the kidnapping allegations. The case was withdrawn after intense lobbying by the Special Branch and the CIO who argued that the trial and subsequent publicity would stir up a hornet's nest. They said it made better sense to shut up and say nothing; in time people would forget.

Simultaneously, the Commissioner of Police was instructed by government to intensify the official investigation. A somewhat lethargic policeman, Chief Inspector Jim Carse, was put in command of the investigation. Carse's enquiries moved at a slothful pace and on 18 October 1976 he announced to journalists that the matter was still under investigation. The provincial criminal investigation officer of the Salisbury and Mashonaland command, Bill Hobley, suspected the truth but there was little he could do. In private, Hobley expressed serious misgivings about the case to the Commissioner, Peter Allum, who was known to detest the secret dirty tricks of the Special Branch and the Scouts. The Sithole case attracted considerable publicity by virtue of the man's importance but many others died or disappeared virtually without notice,

and their names can be found only in the list of the many thousands posted as missing persons.

Nearly two years later, Josiah Chinamano, Nkomo's deputy in the ANC, claimed that he had information linking the Scouts with a political kidnapping and murder. Chinamano said that on 1 April 1978, unidentified white men were present at a police road-block on a main road some forty kilometres outside Salisbury (Harare). At 9 a.m. a vehicle driven by a ZAPU activist, Julius Tamangana, was stopped at the police check-point. He and his companions, Miss Chingwiza and Mrs Chiota, were arrested and driven away. The road block was dismantled soon after. Tamangana was never seen again but the bodies of the two women were later found dumped in the bush near the town of Sinoia (Chinhoyi). Uniformed police officers who examined the bodies found that they had been bound and gagged. Chinamano alleged that the missing person was a victim of a political hit-squad.

Political abductions were not the only allegations levelled against the Scouts for in the years ahead worse things were to come but most of them were carefully concealed from the public eye. During 1975 and 1976, regular officers of the police plain-clothes branch working in the operational areas noted that some known guerrilla contact men or collaborators began to feature as victims of supposed guerrilla executions and because this trend was generally inconsistent with the established patterns of behaviour they decided to investigate these mysterious deaths a little further. In one particular example, a known contact man residing near the Chigango grinding mill in north-eastern Rhodesia was reported bayoneted to death. Investigating detectives discovered from the villagers that a group of 'guerrillas' had assembled them to witness the execution of a 'sell-out'. As the investigating officer delved deeper into the case he discovered that the Scouts had eliminated the contact man to confuse both the guerrillas and villagers. The pattern of slayings continued for a while but the only real evidence that the Scouts had been involved came because all the killings had taken place in frozen areas.

Other circumstantial evidence also pointed to their complicity because all the cases involved the use of bayonets; firearms were not used at all. A possible explanation for this was that the police ballistics section under Chief Inspector Dave Perkins had pioneered a highly efficient system of identifying and linking spent cartridge cases to guerrilla weapons from all over the operational area. Cartridge cases from contacts were carefully recovered and sample spent cases were taken from captured weapons and sent together with covering reports giving details of time, date and place. After several years Perkins and his staff had logged thousands of individual weapons and were able to successfully trace movement patterns of guerrilla weapons. For example, a ballistics report would be able

to identify AK-47 serial No. 567789 recovered during a contact by 3 Coy 1 RAR at map reference QT 785 345 on the 23 June 1975 as having previously been used at followed by a list of all the previous incidents.

As most of the weapons used by the Scouts had been catalogued by the ballistics section it would have been difficult to use them in supposedly genuine guerrilla attacks. This problem could have been overcome by the Scouts who often captured weapons during external operations and never surrendered all of them. However, the ballistics people had a special feeling for their work and could spot inconsistencies in the use of apparently 'clean' weapons. If the Scouts had, indeed, been responsible it would have made much better sense to avoid using firearms altogether and this is probably what happened in these cases.

The Scouts were continually searching for different techniques or tactics which they could employ against the guerrillas. Their close association with captured guerrillas and analysis of enemy tactics presented them with yet another opportunity to exercise their clandestine warfare. The Scouts discovered that the guerrillas often carried radios and record-players which were used to listen to the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation news and security force communiqués and also for playing *Chimurenga* songs which had been pressed in Yugoslavia. The radios and the record players were normally supplied to the guerrillas by contact men or simply looted from rural stores. The popularity of the radios and record-players presented two separate opportunities to the Scouts.

In the first case radio receivers were fitted with a homing signal effective up to fifty kilometres. The device was so designed that it operated only when the radio was switched off which in practice meant that the signal would be most active in the small hours of the morning when the guerrillas would be sleeping. Many of these radios were supplied to guerrillas by contact men who were in the pay of the Special Branch or the Scouts. Once a radio was reported delivered the Rhodesian air force would fly night-missions over the target area until the characteristic bleeps were detected and the source of the homing signal pinpointed with a map reference. Details were then supplied to the Fire Force for a dawn raid on the suspected position.

The second type of device was far more direct in application. Radios and record-players were fitted with a compact charge of plastic explosives and rigged to a triple-switch delay mechanism. The ballistics department made sure that the bomb would not explode until the on-off switch had been operated several times. This was meant to ensure that the radio would now be in a base-camp where the kill rate would be higher. These devices were supplied directly to the guerrillas through agents but in some cases they were secretly introduced into rural stores

where the Special Branch or the Scouts substituted them for existing stocks. The exploding radios and record-players did work on a number of occasions but more often than not ordinary civilians suffered. A good example of this occurred in the Mount Darwin district near the Karanda hospital. An informer had received a battery-powered radio and record-player with orders to deliver it to a nearby guerrilla group. He kept the bomb in his house for a number of days pending the arrival of the guerrillas. But in this case the wages of war were a cruel trick on the agent, for after two days' absence from home he returned to find that his house had been blown to pieces and that his wife and children had been killed in a massive explosion.

The guerrillas were not stupid and after several explosions all radios and record-players were carefully opened and examined for signs of interference. Often the contact men were forced to stand a distance away and switch on the devices until the guerrillas were satisfied. The Scouts soon learned of the general suspicion and yet another switch in tactics in the field of the clandestine war was required.

The experience gained by the Selous Scouts in the use of the radio-bombs and exploding booby-traps was largely due to the secret work, on behalf of the Scouts, of Chief Inspector Dave Perkins who was in charge of the police ballistics section. In late 1978 Perkins resigned from the police and moved to South Africa where he was appointed to a position with the South African Arms Manufacturing Corporation (ARMSCOR) in Pretoria. In early 1979, a letter-bomb that Perkins was arming exploded killing him instantly. A member of the Selous Scouts, Detective Inspector George Mitchell, who was standing nearby sustained injuries and perforated eardrums. The involvement of the Scouts with the manufacture and deployment of letter-bombs may provide a clue linking them yet further with the death of J.Z. Moyo, a ZAPU official who was assassinated on 22 January 1977. The deadly parcel had been mailed from Botswana and lay on Moyo's desk in Lusaka, Zambia, for several days before he returned. He sat down and opened the correspondence. The bomb was contained inside a letter which Moyo was expecting and as he opened it the device exploded. The Scouts or the unknown agents had obviously been able to intercept the letter inside Botswana.

For the Selous Scouts the all-important task was to improve the kill-rate and they were not too fussy about how this was achieved. From their close study of the guerrillas and their *modus operandi* they knew that their foe was extremely dependent upon contact men for the supply of clothing, equipment, foodstuffs and other supplies inside the country. The Scouts learned that the guerrillas favoured the use of blue denim trousers and jackets and liked to wear brown bush hats with leopard-skin headbands. The guerrillas were reliant upon their contact men for the

resupply of clothing because their initial uniforms and boots simply did not last more than one operational season. The Scouts recognized an opportunity and studied the feasibility of impregnating toxins into the fabric of the clothing so that poisons would be absorbed through soft body tissue by a process of osmosis. A number of Rhodesian medical men attached to the Scouts confirmed that the toxins would be absorbed by the body where prolonged contact could be achieved. The most susceptible areas included the area around the genitals, the anal region and the armpits.

A team of three medical men were seconded from the regular Rhodesian army to the Scouts who provided them with a secret laboratory at the André Rabie barracks. Large consignments of denim clothing were purchased by the Scouts through a number of middlemen. The clothing was soaked in stainless steel vats containing a solution of the odourless and colourless poisons. Once an initial batch of poisoned uniforms had been perfected the medical men recommended that some experiments were conducted. There is no direct evidence that these trials were carried out but in 1975 an incident occurred which provides a shadowy link. A group of young Shona men were arrested at an address in Old Highfields in Salisbury (Harare) as they were preparing to leave the country for guerrilla training in Mozambique. After their arrest they were detained at the Salisbury central police station before being released into the custody of the Selous Scouts who said they needed the men for further interrogation. Again there is no real evidence of their fate but contemporary talk within Special Branch circles at the time suggested that the would-be recruits were driven by the Scouts to the Mount Darwin Fort and used as human guinea pigs. For some time the Fort at Mount Darwin had been in mothballs with only a caretaker in residence. Suddenly a team of doctors, one of whom was subsequently awarded the Independence Commemorative Decoration (ICD) for his wartime services, and some Scouts arrived at the Fort. Some days later one of the Scouts approached the local Special Branch office requesting the use of a landrover to ferry bodies for disposal in nearby mine shafts. This request was not particularly unusual but what was significant was that they declined the services of a young police patrol officer nicknamed 'Mashfords', after the well known undertakers. 'Mashfords' usually disposed of dead bodies for the Special Branch who paid him monthly beer-money in return for performing these unpleasant duties.⁸

On this occasion the Scouts said that they would carry out the disposal themselves. They also requested some white plastic body-bags. From this point there is no further direct evidence that the Mount Darwin disposals included the bodies of men who might have died as a result of experiments with poisoned clothes. Whether or not any such experiments

did actually take place is not absolutely vital to the main issue but the fact is that between 1 March 1977 and 1 September 1978 a total of sixty-seven confirmed deaths attributed to poisoned clothes were reported by ZANLA guerrillas operating over a wide range of country.

The Special Branch collected several written references — contained in the journals of captured or killed guerrillas — to deaths attributed to what was described as poisoned jeans. The deaths recorded by the guerrillas themselves would certainly not be an accurate list because in the beginning the guerrillas were not aware of the lethal nature of this invisible weapon which had been deployed against them. After exposure to the poison for a period of seven days the victim would experience symptoms which included bleeding from the nose and mouth and a rise in temperature. This caused the guerrillas to suspect that malaria or some other malady was responsible. On 9 January 1977 an entire section of eight guerrillas died at the Bverekwa kraal in the Takawira sector. The dead men were named as Marx Manesu, Chakanetsa Chatambudza, Peter Muchatipanyika, Wine Alec Mbada, Chengerai, Kurauone Hondo, Munetsi Chatambudza and Usha Muchabaiwa.⁹

Further deaths occurred on 17 April 1977 when Happy Maguta, Ronnie Hondo and Mike Muchapera died in the Nyombwe detachment area of the Nehanda sector in north-eastern Rhodesia. A further four guerrillas died on 22 May 1977 in the Mtoko detachment C area.¹⁰ The distribution of the poisoned clothes was a top-secret operation controlled by the Selous Scouts working in league with a few trusted members of the Special Branch who operated agents and informers with access to guerrilla groups. One such officer was in charge of the Terrorist Desk of the Salisbury and Mashonaland command; he controlled a network of agents who worked as bus drivers and conductors on routes to the rural areas of Rhodesia. For each confirmed kill the agents would receive Z\$1000 bonus in addition to their normal remuneration.

By September 1977 the Scouts had managed to spread the poisoned clothes beyond the north-eastern theatre of war and between 15 and 25 September 1977 a total of seven guerrillas died in the Zaka A detachment area of the Victoria (Masvingo) province. On 28 November 1977 four guerrillas, Zvabhenda Zvabhenda, Kudakwashe, Jehova and Paul Manyere,¹¹ died near Wisha village in the Gokwe Tribal Trust Land after wearing the poisoned jeans and underpants.

As Scouts received reports of these deaths they became jubilant. The inspector at the Salisbury and Mashonaland provincial command started to receive more frequent consignments of the deadly clothes. These were delivered to his offices in the police complex in Railway Avenue. The clothes were bundled inside unmarked hessian sacks and carefully stored being handed over to the agents.

A total of six ZANLA guerrillas died on 3 January 1978 in the Takawira sector detachment D and they were named as Reikai Marabena, Gwinyai Kakoka, Rexon Zindi, Grade Serengwani, Raphael Chimurenga and John Tanganyika.¹² After several months the guerrillas started to suspect that something was wrong and they adopted extreme caution when accepting supplies from their contact men and *mujiba*. Deaths were still being recorded and on 12 April 1978 Makiwa Chimurenga died in the Zaka district¹³ and a further six men died in the Bikita district. They were Tobias Chumba, Tendai Tirivanhu, Jackie Pfuti, Moses Bongozozo, and Ghost of Zolo. Later the same month two further guerrillas died at Chibi.¹⁴

During the first quarter of 1978, the officer commanding the Special Branch ordered that the poisoned clothes operation be terminated immediately. His instruction followed upon alarming and widespread reports that civilians were mysteriously falling down and dying after displaying symptoms indicative of poisoned clothes. A secret enquiry discovered that greedy agents and informers had been grossly exaggerating demand for the clothes and other supplies. Instead of handing them over to *mujiba* or guerrillas, the agents supplied the goods to rural stores where the garments were bought by villagers who later died from the exposure. The agents were apparently not aware of the poison factor or, if they were, ignored it. Reports of this nature so disturbed the Commissioner of Police that he demanded an explanation from the Special Branch commander. The operation was brought to a close and its very existence was denied by all concerned. In the face of a steadfast denial there was little the Commissioner could do. He discovered that it was extremely difficult to penetrate the veil of secrecy which surrounded the Selous Scouts and their clandestine activities.

Selous Scouts' experiments with toxins and chemical warfare extended into other fields. During 1976 a group of Scouts moved into the Ruya wild-life area near the Mozambique border. At several points along the Ruya river they introduced measured quantities of bacteriological cultures into the water. Whether any fatalities resulted from these experiments is not known but it did correspond with a reported epidemic of deaths among people living on the banks of the Ruya river in Mozambique. The deaths were officially attributed to cholera.

Shortly after these experiments a reconnaissance patrol of the Selous Scouts went to the Cochemane administrative centre in the Tete province. The Rhodesians had orders to attack a FRELIMO army post in the town because of intelligence reports that ZANLA guerrillas were using the same facilities. The Scouts noted that the town drew its water from a single reservoir. A lethal dose of poison was poured into the tanks

and CIO radio intercept reports later confirmed that 200 people had suddenly died.

A fourth tactic effectively employed by the Selous Scouts in their clandestine war involved the use of forged correspondence. Because ZANLA guerrillas operating inside Zimbabwe had no other means of communication they were often forced to send reports or instructions in a written form. A sectoral commander, for example, wishing to assemble his detachment commanders for a policy briefing would generally send out runners or *mujiba* with verbal or written instructions for a bush rendezvous.

Since the beginning of the guerrilla war in 1972 the insurgents had frequently resorted to the writing down of elaborate operational histories, the recording of names, weapon numbers and other information. Handwritten propaganda notes were often left at the scene of guerrilla attacks. The messages were couched in familiar marxist rhetoric describing the Rhodesians as the Mabhunú, a Shona word for the Boers or settler farmers. All these documents were carefully collected and sent to the Questioned Document Examiner at the Criminal Investigation Department headquarters. The handwriting experts were able to identify the authors of particular documents and, as in the case of the ballistics experts, able to trace the movements of particular guerrillas. But most of this information was purely of academic interest as it did not help the Rhodesians to kill guerrillas.

The Selous Scouts, however, found this wealth of information extremely useful in the application of the fourth tactic. They retained handwriting specialists and were successful in forging the style of some senior guerrilla commanders. During 1975 the Sectoral Political Commissar of the Nehanda sector, who was a prolific letter-writer, found himself playing into the hands of his enemies. By using samples of his script the Scouts were able to concoct a letter purporting to have been penned by the guerrilla commander addressed to his subordinate detachments calling them to an important meeting. The cunning scheme nearly paid off but for the suspicious nature of a section commander who decided to verify the written instruction. He sent a *mujiba* to reconnoitre the proposed meeting place only to discover that the Rhodesian security forces were lying in ambush in rock kopjes overlooking the killing zone of the rendezvous.

The use of the poison pen 'spoilers' by the Selous Scouts has an interesting sequel for in late 1979, after the death of the ZANLA military commander, Josiah Tongogara, in a road accident outside Chimoio in Mozambique, the CIO tried the use of the forged-letter technique to ferment dissent within ZANU. The ploy was executed by department C who arranged for a forged letter, apparently written by a number of ZANU

dissidents detained in Beira prison, to be leaked to the international press. The forged letter contained allegations that Tongogara had been assassinated for political reasons.¹⁵ The letter claimed that, because Tongogara was a potential threat to the leadership of Robert Mugabe, a decision had been taken to eliminate him to make way for Rex Nhongo. The letter failed to achieve its objectives and a post-mortem examination of Tongogara's body failed to reveal any inconsistencies with the official version of his death.

Stealth and secrecy were major keynotes in many Selous Scouts operations. These qualities were frequently employed during external undertakings and the chief exponent of these arts was Captain Christoph Schulenberg,¹⁶ who on 16 June 1978 was the recipient of Rhodesia's highest award for gallantry. In conferring upon Schulenberg the Grand Cross of Valour, the Scouts acknowledged the daring deeds of a man who became legend within the secret corridors of the Rhodesian intelligence community. Schulenberg was first awarded the Silver Cross after a string of missions behind guerrilla lines in Mozambique and Zambia. Schulenberg specialized in long-distance reconnaissance work and although he preferred to operate alone he did occasionally seek the company of a converted guerrilla. His favoured infiltration technique was the high-altitude low-opening HALO parachute jump which enabled him to glide long distances before opening his canopy at the minimum safe level. Schulenberg kept in communication using a high-powered radio transmitter and on completion of his patrol he would either walk back to the Rhodesian border or, if the circumstances demanded, request 'hot extraction' by helicopter.

After a particularly dangerous mission which had culminated in a highly hazardous helicopter evacuation the Selous Scout's planners undertook a lengthy debriefing. As usual Schulenberg was reluctant to describe events which led to the near suicidal escape finale but the converted guerrilla blurted out that he thought Schulenberg completely mad. He described how his officer had crept down on a combined ZANLA and FPLM position hoping to overhear conversation and make accurate notes. Schulenberg's presence was detected and he was forced to retreat to a nearby kopje where the 'capture' lay hidden. Flushed from the hillock, Schulenberg and the African scout ran into thicket concealing themselves from the advancing guerrilla forces. As the ZANLA men approached Schulenberg and his companion opened fire with their RPD belt-fed machine guns. They then ran from their position and after a short distance dropped to the ground feigning death. As the enemy approached the men stood up and opened fire once again. By using these tactics of running and falling the Scouts gained the temporary sanctuary of a nearby granite kopje and were able to call for an emergency uplift by

helicopter. Pilots dreaded the news that they were on stand-by duty during Schulenberg's external actions because they knew from bitter experience that the legendary Scout did not summon them merely because he was tired of 'footing' it back to the border. The helicopters invariably returned bullet-riddled. Pilots generally had no time to set their machines down and the best they could do was to lower a rope ladder and take flak from the hostile ground forces. It was a miracle that many of these helicopters returned because the main rotor blades were often badly damaged as the craft hovered low over trees.

Another fabled reconnaissance man was Captain Robert Sidney Stanley Warracker¹⁷ who was in charge of the Fort at Chiredzi. He carried out his own style of reconnaissance work by lying in the belly of Canberra jet bombers guiding the pilot over suspected ZANLA camps in Mozambique. When the aircraft were on target the pilot would commence the photographic run. During such a mission in the Gaza province of southern Mozambique, the Canberra in which Warracker was flying was hit by a SAM-7 missile and brought down. The Canberra was an excellent aircraft for long-range high-altitude aerial photography but on this occasion Warracker's luck ran out. Warracker's funeral was the occasion for the first of the three great ceremonial parades in the regimental history of the Selous Scouts. The second was on 16 June 1978 when Schulenberg received his Grand Cross of Valour from President John Wrathall and the final was on 17 February 1979 during the regiment's rededication ceremony. Each event was characterized by an assemblage of the most bizarre-looking forces ever gathered on a Rhodesian military parade. Uniformed Scouts wearing regimental brown berets with the silver Osprey insignia were flanked by formations of bearded White men dressed in dark suits and hats. Injured or disabled Scouts with crutches or in wheelchairs formed up at the rear of the parade. Reid Daly had a decided predilection for the flamboyant and his choice of regimental standard confirmed this. The regalia consisted of a wooden staff tipped with silver. The upper section was joined to a pair of magnificent kudu antelope horns with eland tails hanging from the extremities. The outstretched horns were surmounted by the silver Osprey with the inscription 'Selous Scouts' beneath. The standard bearer wore a collar of highly polished warthog tusks as added embellishment to his uniform. When not in use, the standard was stored in the Selous Scouts' church inside the Inkomo Barracks. The church had been built in the shape of a traditional African hut and was decorated with exotic timbers looted from sawmills in the Manica province of Mozambique during external raids. The chapel doors comprised lavishly carved panels from the famed Gorongosa hardwood reserves of Mozambique.

Being a Selous Scout was not all hard work and no play. Those

members of the Special Branch attached to the Scouts earned a reputation for being extremely generous when it came to flashing around money and buying drinks in the mess. Perhaps the most liberal was the popular figure of the Scouts Special Branch commander himself. Mac Macguinness¹⁸ was an extrovert by nature and his fondness for entertaining friends in lavish style became legendary within the ranks of the Rhodesian security forces who came into contact with the Scouts. He and his men were often at The Copperpot police reserve bar at the training depot or at La Bohème, Samantha's Lighthouse or Coq d'Or nightclubs. The Scouts would ensure that the liquor kept flowing and the snacks kept coming until late in the night. A single drinking session would cost several hundred dollars but this was always written off against expenses. The Scouts had a seemingly inexhaustible supply of cash which they carried around in green canvass briefcases. The regular Special Branch were governed by stricter rules of financial accountability and had to prove expenditure by the production of signed receipts from informers or agents. In 1978 the officer in charge of the Special Branch Projects Section entertained colleagues to a special Indian prawn curry which cost him nearly two hundred dollars. When he submitted his monthly expenses he was severely rebuked by his superior officer for the unnecessary extravagance. After this experience the officer concerned approached his friends in the Scouts whenever he needed extra cash with no questions asked.

Another favourite haunt of the Scouts was their home base at Bindura where they patronized the Bindura police camp mess known as The Dungeon. The drinking hole was within staggering distance of the Fort and the Scouts' accommodation in Selous Avenue. The Selous Scouts' mess was extremely popular as a venue for weekend entertainment and open-air *braai*. The interior of the house had been transformed to resemble the inside of a Roman villa cum Arabian harem. From the outside there was little to betray the presence of the Selous Scouts except for the line-up of imported motor vehicles. The house resembled standard Rhodesian rural architectural style, brick under corrugated iron, and with doors and windows protected by mosquito gauze.

In the course of their operational history the Selous Scouts were accused of many dastardly crimes but none were more vile than the two major allegations that they had massacred missionaries while masquerading as guerrillas in February 1977 and June 1978. In the final analysis it will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish exactly who was to blame. The Rhodesians accused the guerrillas who in turn claimed that the Scouts were behind the killings. Because of the ghoulish nature of these killings it is important to attempt a reconstruction of the events and enable readers to draw their own conclusions from the facts.

For many years missionaries, especially the Catholics, had worked in Rhodesia among the African people. When the war started in 1972, outlying mission stations were regularly visited by guerrillas seeking medical supplies and other forms of assistance. Such aid was willingly provided and some clerics were severely punished by the Rhodesian government as in the case of Bishop Donal Lamont.¹⁹ The balance of probabilities suggests that there were few guerrillas who genuinely wanted to harm missionaries but it must be conceded that in any conflict there will be extremists on both sides.

As an illustration of this fact it should be noted that during 1973-5 there were many reported cases of atrocities committed by guerrillas against villagers who were accused of being 'sell-outs' or Rhodesian government sympathizers. The atrocities took the form of mutilations by the removal of lips, earlobes and noses and the amputation of limbs by axing. The Special Branch established that some guerrilla commanders used such terror tactics as in the case of Kid Marongorongo and Solomon Ngoni who hacked off the legs of a man who survived his ordeal and was later able to identify the dead bodies of his tormentors in December 1974.²⁰ Another terrible incident occurred on 20 December 1976 when guerrillas massacred some twenty-seven tea estate workers in the Honde valley.²¹ But for the White community the most revolting crime was that which involved the bayonetting of a European baby girl who had been left alone in the absence of her parents. The incident became known as the killing of baby Natasha and shocked the entire Rhodesian community.

In the two years spanning 1974-5, the Special Branch received numerous reports about the brutal nature of a ZANLA guerrilla commander named Vuu. Vuu was a section commander operating in the Chimanda and Rushinga districts of north-eastern Rhodesia and tales of his misdeeds were regularly catalogued by the Rhodesians. It was clear that Vuu was a vicious sadist whose *modus operandi* included the rape and sexual torture of his female victims. His attacks employed the use of flaming brands which he thrust into the vagina after completing his sexual assaults. The police issued wanted and reward posters for this man whose rampage suddenly came to an end. The Special Branch later obtained information from a source that Vuu had been killed by a ZANLA disciplinary force acting in response to an outcry from villagers in the terrorized district.²² This evidence would tend to support the guerrilla contention that savagery was not official policy condoned by the ZANLA high command but in some cases they were powerless to prevent field commands or individual cadre from running amok and venting personal bitterness. It was also established that villagers falsely accused their neighbours of being 'sell-outs' when in reality their only crime was that

they might have been wealthier or harder working than their covetous accusers who sought to profit from the killing. In October 1976 the Rhodesian government published *Harvest of Fear*, a booklet detailing incidents of murder, mutilation and cannibalism said to have been committed by communist-armed terrorists. It was a gruesome document and its publication had been cleverly arranged to coincide with the 1976 Geneva Conference.²³

It should also be noted that many individual missionaries strongly identified themselves with the guerrilla cause and actively assisted them with supplies. District Commissioners, policemen and soldiers reported that missionaries supported the 'ters' and should be forcibly removed from operational areas and deported. White settler mistrust and hatred of missionaries had also been experienced in Mozambique where priests defied the Portuguese and supported FRELIMO.

In the case of St Paul's Musami,²⁴ the scene of a brutal massacre on 7 February 1977, it should be explained that the Rhodesian authorities were aware that ZANLA guerrillas were in contact with the mission workers. The Special Branch monitored the missionaries and some months before the killings they had intercepted a letter from an English dentist who explained to his correspondent why he supported the guerrilla cause. He wrote of how he had seen the Rhodesian security forces ill-treat villagers and of the medical treatment such victims had received at the mission clinic.

The circumstances of the massacre are that on the evening of 7 February 1977 armed men said to be ZANLA guerrillas entered the mission, lined up the European staff and gunned them down. A survivor of the massacre was Father Myerscough, described by those who knew him to be a conservative individual who had no particular brief for the guerrillas. He later described how when the firing started he had fallen to the ground and was able to feign death. The same night, five African villagers living near the mission were killed for being informers or 'sell-outs'. The St Paul's killing came as an ideal propaganda opportunity for the hard-pressed Rhodesian government. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace had in October 1976 published a litany of murder, torture, malicious injury to property, extortion and threat of bodily harm which laid the blame at the door of the Rhodesians. The publication, *Civil War in Rhodesia*, had embarrassed the Rhodesian government and news of the St Paul's incident enabled the Rhodesians to yell 'bloody murder' back. Father Myerscough, the star witness, was interviewed and told of his horrible experience. Whether he was an unwitting pawn in a fiendish and bloody chess game will never be clearly established. To the end, Myerscough remained adamant that ZANLA guerrillas were responsible.

Police detectives were rushed to the scene and spent cartridge cases they recovered were quickly matched with those found at other scenes of crime. However, this evidence alone cannot be considered conclusive for it would have been relatively easy for such weapons to have been captured and held in secret armouries for just such contingencies.

Another element which pointed to inconsistencies in the St Paul's story was that some days before the incident the district surrounding the mission had been frozen on instructions from security force headquarters. This piece of information tallied with a report later received by a Special Branch officer at Mtoko. The security policeman was told by his source that the day before the killings a group of armed men had been seen jumping from a moving truck a distance twenty-five kilometres from St Paul's Musami. Mujiba later spotted what they thought was a new guerrilla group and reported this to the resident ZANLA section who expressed surprise. This new group was never accounted for and disappeared.

The source's integrity was not questioned by the Special Branch man because the second part of the debrief dealt with the whereabouts of a guerrilla group who were reported to be based in a hill feature near Mtoko. A police reserve patrol sent to investigate the suspected presence killed two ZANLA guerrillas who were in the base-camp named by the informer who was later paid two thousand dollars as a double kill-bonus. There was no further information about the mysterious group and the end result was that there was no clear proof as to the identity of the murderers.

The second incident where the Scouts were blamed occurred on the night of 23 June 1978 at the Elim Pentecostal mission²⁵ when a force of six armed men wearing balaclavas entered the sleeping dormitory of sleeping British missionaries and their children. The Britons were told to assemble outside their quarters in the freezing air of the cold mountain night.

Earlier that same evening, the armed men had rounded up school children and staff and told them that the school must close. The armed men identified themselves as ZANLA guerrillas and two African teachers were later to testify at an official inquest held on 21 August that the alleged guerrillas had then disappeared into the thick forest surrounding the school.

At approximately 9 p.m. that evening, Ian McGarrick, a mission schoolteacher, had gone to the dormitories to investigate why the students were still noisy after lights-out. None of them made any report and it was not until six o'clock the following morning when he saw children gathering their belongings and preparing to leave the hostels that he was told of the visit the night before. Suspecting that something was horribly wrong McGarrick ran to the teachers' dormitory. As he ap-

proached he came upon a scene of sickening horror.²⁶ Thirteen people had been bayoneted, hacked and chopped to pieces in an orgy of the most grotesque proportions. Women had been sexually assaulted and the men had endured savage beatings with their hands tied behind their backs.

The Selous Scouts were again blamed and as part of the Rhodesian government's campaign to disprove these grave allegations two visitors, British Conservative parliamentarians, were taken to the Grand Reef security force base near Umtali (Mutare). At the camp, Detective Inspector Rogers displayed the bodies of two Africans, who had recently been killed in an engagement between guerrillas and the security forces. One of the deceased was identified as Luke Madjumbo and a notebook found in his possession implicated him in the Elim slaughter and with two subsequent guerrilla operations on 21 July and 1 August 1978. This was evidence enough for the visitors and they declared themselves convinced that ZANLA guerrillas had done the deed.

However, there was one fact about the Elim killings which did not fit into the established pattern. The murderers had not used firearms and had restricted themselves to axes, bayonets, knives and heavy clubs or knobkerries. There was yet another element which set one of the plain-clothes officers at Grand Reef into a reflective mood. He recalled that a force of Ugandan-trained guerrillas who were loyal to the Revd Ndabasingi Sithole had recently been deployed in the Manicaland province and he knew from his own experience of them that these men were completely ruthless and capable of anything. He had already received reports of their viciousness from villagers in the deployment zones.

Although he had no firm evidence upon which to base his misgivings, he believed there was a linkage with these cut-throats. He asked himself the question 'why?' now that he suspected who might have been responsible. He could only speculate that those responsible hoped to achieve a popular swing in world opinion in favour of the Internal Settlement partnership at the expense of the externally based Patriotic Front alliance of ZAPU and ZANU. But this reasoning still did not explain the dead guerrilla and his confessional notebook. Finally, he shrugged off further speculations. He may well have been on the right track, for the Elim incident did come at a time when top-secret plans were being prepared for Operation Favour when the Rhodesians were making desperate attempts to win support for Muzorewa and Sithole. As in the case of St Paul's there was no definite clear-cut proof that the Scouts were ever involved. The month of June 1978 was bad for missionaries — the figure of missionaries killed had risen to thirty-seven compared with seventeen in the previous year. Many of them took place in Matabeleland, apparently at the hands of ZIPRA.

The interlude covered by 1978 and 1979 when the Rhodesians embarked on the Internal Settlement were extremely hectic times for the Selous Scouts who were kept busy on external raids into Mozambique and Zambia. For an account of these operations the interested reader is directed to *Selous Scouts, Top Secret War* by Ron Reid Daly and Peter Stiff. But even as these highly publicized operations were being mounted, the army commander General Hickman decided to embark on his own espionage operations against the Selous Scouts. He was suspicious of the highly secretive and autonomous nature of their work and ordered his director of military intelligence and special investigations to place Colonel Reid Daly under surveillance and to tap his telephone lines at the Inkomo Fort. Hickman, it seems, had information that members of the Scouts were engaged in illegal poaching for ivory and rhinoceros horn, illicit dealings in emeralds and the exportation of AK-47 rifles to the lucrative American souvenir market. Hickman did not get the evidence he had hoped for and, apart from vague references to elephant hunting in the Chiredzi district by members of the Special Branch attached to the Scouts, he was disappointed.

In the meantime, Reid Daly discovered from his own sources inside the army that he was being spied upon and immediately sought to establish who had ordered the clandestine enquiry. Army HQ staffers stonewalled him and he decided to breach an open confrontation with General Hickman in the senior officers mess at King George VI Barracks. A heated exchange of words followed and this led to charges of insubordination being laid against Reid Daly who was ordered to stand before a court martial in June 1979. Reid Daly was found guilty but sentenced only to a reprimand because of the unusual circumstances. However, just before the judgement was handed down, Hickman retired from the army in a sudden move which shocked the White community. He was succeeded by General Peter Walls, the commander of combined operations.

Hickman's resignation sparked off ugly rumours and these were clearly symptomatic of the malaise which gripped the White community of the day. In August, Colonel Reid Daly resigned and was succeeded by Major Pat Armstrong who was to remain the unit's commanding officer until the final disbandment.

As a civilian, Reid Daly filed civil charges against Hickman and Bishop Muzorewa who was then prime minister of the short-lived Zimbabwe Rhodesia but these proceedings were abandoned by mutual consent in early 1980 and Reid Daly emigrated to South Africa where he was offered the command of the Transkei Defence Forces. A number of former Scouts rallied to Reid Daly's new command and by 1983 there were reports that nearly 600 Rhodesians from a variety of units had joined the South African surrogate force.

The final hours of the Selous Scouts were as sullied as they were ignominious. Many Scouts bitterly resented what they perceived as a political sell-out of the Whites in Rhodesia. In early 1980 several incidents took place which all had the clear trademark of the Selous Scouts. In mid-February a number of disgruntled Scouts embarked on a bombing campaign in Salisbury (Harare) which they hoped would be blamed on ZANLA. The blasts came in the wake of a statement by Bishop Muzorewa who accused the Patriotic Front guerrillas of having plans to convert churches into schools and military barracks and to force children over the age of seven to attend lessons in Marxist ideology. The Presbyterian church in Jameson (Samora Machel) Avenue and the Kingsmead Chapel in Borrowdale were bombed, resulting in the accidental death of two civilians. Two days later, a crude bomb consisting of two RPG-7 projectiles, some slabs of TNT explosives and detonators were found inside a green canvas haversack together with a handwritten note from guerrillas expressing their desire to destroy churches.²⁷ The makeshift bomb had been concealed at the Anglican Cathedral in Salisbury (Harare).

Several days after this find, two African members of the Scouts, Lieutenant Edward Pirigondo and Corporal Morgan Moyo,²⁸ died in a mysterious blast which completely wrecked the Renault sedan in which they were driving. The explosion occurred in the Highfields township south of the city centre of Salisbury (Harare), and it was speculated they were on their way to yet another site when fate took a hand.

Evidence that some sections of the Scouts were still active came on 22 February 1980 when a forged edition of the popular magazine *MOTO* started circulating in Salisbury. The front page carried a derisive article about Robert Mugabe and when it was discovered that bundles of the forged magazine had been distributed from unmarked vans speculation mounted that the Scouts were responsible. The Scouts had previously used these tactics during the course of Operation Favour. In 1979 they had printed forged copies of a poster which originally bore the picture of Robert Mugabe together with a message in commemoration of the Battle of Sinoia in 1966. Mugabe's photograph was substituted by that of Sithole and the text altered in an endeavour to sow confusion amongst villagers.

As public outrage mounted the police were instructed to track down the fakers. Suddenly, in the small hours of Sunday, 24 February 1980, part of the Mambo Press at Gwelo (Gweru) was destroyed in a massive explosion. Called to the scene of the blast at 3.30 a.m. Detective Section Officer Duncan Scoular of the Gwelo Criminal Investigation Department discovered the limbless torso of an African with a Tokarev 7.62 pistol lying next to it. A short distance away he found a leg and another

Russian pistol. The skull of an African was found some twenty-five metres away from the epi-centre of the blast. The details of these findings were made public at an Inquest held on 25 April at the Gwelo magistrate's Courts.²⁹ As no additional evidence could be found to identify those responsible for the bombing the official investigation was closed. The body was never identified. The incident had all the hall-marks of a Selous Scouts' operation calculated to give the impression that the *Vakomana* had blown up the press to punish MOTO for the slander of Mugabe.

When the Selous Scouts were officially disbanded its members returned to their original units. Most of them opted for the early retirement scheme and while they waited for their pension payments an awful lot of drinking was done. Drowning their sorrows, the Scouts told anyone who would listen that they were being shunned by former colleagues who they bitterly accused of grovelling before the altar of rapid promotion in a rapidly changing administration. Some Scouts accused unnamed senior officers in the Special Branch and the Central Intelligence Organization of having sold them out to the British and the guerrillas. By the second half of 1980, the majority of the former Scouts had gone.

In retrospect it may be said of the Selous Scouts that despite their many secret adventures they failed to have any meaningful impact on the outcome of the guerrilla war. It was perhaps significant that men of the calibre of Major Mike Graham of the Special Air Services who had been involved in the original formation of the Scouts back in 1973 and had been offered the deputy command of the unit had refused it in favour of his own more disciplined and professional force. During the Rhodesian bush war the SAS lost several of its operators to the Scouts but in many ways they were more suited to work with the irregulars. It was no secret that successive SAS commanders had little time for Reid Daly and his unorthodox ways. The major value of the Scouts was the service they rendered as a secret executive wing for the Special Branch and the CIO. The unit became too autocratic and independent of outside controls. It became thoroughly intoxicated with its absolute power over life and death and in many ways ran completely out of control.

The Sanctions War

It can be argued that, by declaring UDI on 11 November 1965 and isolating themselves from the outside world for the next fifteen years, the Rhodesians were forced to establish an economic infrastructure with industrial capacity unequalled elsewhere in sub-saharan Africa north of the Limpopo. This legacy is now proving a boon as Zimbabwe is increasingly recognized as the industrial power-house of the Front Line States. Carpet-baggers from Europe and the United States who flocked to Zimbabwe in 1980 were disappointed and confounded when they tried to ply their wares. UDI was the major catalyst for this remarkable economic development which is unique in the history of colonial Africa. After UDI the United Nations applied trade sanctions designed to cripple the illegal Rhodesian regime and restore legality to the British colony. The story of how the Whites were able to successfully circumvent sanctions and keep open the life line to their economy under siege is an important chapter of this book. It will provide the reader with a glimpse into the past fifteen years (1965-80) and show how, although weakened by the guerrilla war, the economy survived. This account may also provide sobering thoughts for those who seek to apply sanctions against South Africa, a country infinitely more capable of withstanding such strictures than ever Rhodesia was. Empty rhetoric and echoing demands for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa are unlikely to be heeded, most of all by those in whose name these demands are often made.

But here is the story of the sanctions war, a chapter in Zimbabwe's colonial history which merits far greater analysis and interpretation than that revealed in this narrative. It covers plot and counter-plot and tells of how the Rhodesians fuelled their desperate struggle to stave off the inevitable day of African majority rule.

The reality of the sanctions war first struck the Rhodesians in 1968 when the Special Branch arrested two prominent Whites for economic espionage. The first was Roger Nicholson, a financial journalist with *The Rhodesia Herald*, and the second was Trevor Gallagher, a lawyer and influential member of the ruling Rhodesian Front party. Both men, extremely well placed in White society, had been recruited by the British Secret Intelligence Service in 1965 to spy on Rhodesian counter-sanctions operations.

When the British withdrew their diplomatic presence in Salisbury, the resident SIS man handed the two agents over to his American CIA counterpart. During those times, all foreign missions were routinely

monitored by the E Desk of the Special Branch whose duties included counter-espionage and surveillance work. During routine duties the Special Branch discovered that the CIA resident was using a dead-letter box at the Highlands post office in Salisbury (Harare). Surveillance revealed that Roger Nicholson was making secret drops by depositing letters inside the box using his own duplicate key. Further surveillance established that Trevor Gallagher was being similarly controlled through another suburban post office. Working secretly, the Special Branch arranged to steam open the suspect letters, photograph the contents and return them to the box before the CIA resident could clear his agent's reports. Analysis of the reports showed that both spies were passing on economic information relating to the shipment of tobacco under false documents of origin. The reports also included items of gossip obtained from contacts within the Rhodesian Front and government hierarchy. In exchange for the weekly reports, the agents received regular payments and instructions for fresh assignments. The two-way clandestine traffic was carefully watched by the Special Branch before a final decision was taken to arrest the spies. Ultimately, instructions were handed down for Detective Inspector Peter Moores of the E Desk to arrest and detain the two men. A search of Nicholson's residence produced further evidence of his secret work for the Americans. Both Nicholson and Gallagher were incarcerated at the Goromonzi detention centre forty kilometres from Salisbury.¹ For the next two weeks the prisoners endured conditions of solitary confinement, inky darkness or artificial light. By depriving the men of sleep and disturbing the body metabolism the Special Branch were able to break the spies and secure confessions. Gallagher was the first to crumble but Nicholson held out for ten days before he finally submitted. Gallagher's experience turned his hair grey and the High Court judge hearing the case later commented adversely on the terrible conditions under which the men had been held. The court was told of the recruitment, the method of contact, the nature of the information supplied, and the payments which had been paid into the Chemical Bank of New York. The accused men were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment but within twelve months they were mysteriously released and deported.

Immediately after the arrest, the CIA resident, Irl Smith, was summoned to the CIO and told that his agents had been arrested but, in terms of the unwritten law of the intelligence world, he himself as a professional intelligence officer would remain untouched, protected by his diplomatic immunity. For Smith and the Americans the incident was dismissed as an embarrassing episode.

In the aftermath of the affair the Rhodesians tightened up on the potential leakage of sanctions-busting information. Tough new measures

were added to the list of Emergency Powers regulations and the task of implementing their provisions were allocated to three different government departments. The Special Branch were made responsible for all security and intelligence and the investigation of suspects. The Office of the Government Protective Security Officer (GPSO) was put in charge of physical security so as to prevent unauthorized access to factories and government offices. The Customs and General Adviser to the Prime Minister was created to forge import and export documents. It is important to examine the workings of each of these departments in more detail.

The job of the Special Branch of the Rhodesian police in the anti-sanctions game was to co-ordinate the work of the other two departments mentioned and provide support by way of investigations, forged travel documents and specialized knowledge. The Special Branch would advise Rhodesian businessmen how to legitimately obtain foreign passports by invoking little known citizenship rights. In this manner, Rhodesians were able to obtain British, Irish, French, German, Portuguese and Israeli passports in addition to South African documents.

Where necessary sanctions-busting businessmen were equipped with forged British passports made up from the hundreds confiscated from returning Africans. The pages of the confiscated passports were unstitched before being rewoven into forged covers undetectable to all but the trained eye. Using documents like these, Rhodesian businessmen travelled to Europe and the US but were careful to avoid transit through the United Kingdom.

The Special Branch were responsible for investigations into the private lives of Rhodesians working on sanctions-busting. Visitors to the country, such as journalists, particularly those from Scandinavia, were placed under surveillance. In 1973, two Swedes reporting for the Stockholm *Aftonbladet* enquired too closely into the local companies trading with Sweden in defiance of that country's adherence to the United Nations' sanctions order. The local managers of SKF, Electrolux and Atlas Copco telephoned the Special Branch and the journalists were arrested and deported.

The GPSO was headed by a former colonial civil servant, Colonel N.M.de Berdt Romily, and his offices were located in Milton Buildings adjacent to the Prime Minister's offices. Romily's brief was to watch all aspects of physical security but he soon found the business of checking up on padlocks boring and he came into conflict with the Special Branch who spent considerable time reporting on Romily whose penchant for the ladies raised eyebrows in the intelligence community. Matters were made worse by Romily's second-in-command, a South African named Jan Erasmus who was suspected of having direct links with the Bureau for State Security (BOSS). Erasmus tried to run agents in Zambia and one of

these was arrested by the Zambian Intelligence Service (ZIS) and deported. The incident soured relations between the GPSO and the Special Branch and Romily was finally asked to restrict his activities. Romily's role in the counter-sanctions business was recognized when on 11 November 1975 he was awarded the Order of the Legion of Merit for services to the Rhodesian government during sanctions.

The department of the Customs and General Adviser to the Prime Minister was established in the late 1960s specifically to ensure that import and export papers were correct and would stand scrutiny by hostile governments. A retired customs chief, Charles Cooke, was appointed to head this department.² Officers seconded to this sanctions-busting department travelled to Europe, the US and the Far East checking on local import and export regulations.

Shipments of tobacco were shipped under cover of false certificates of origin usually with the tacit approval of either the Portuguese or the South Africans. When it was impossible to use South African or Mozambiquan origins, the Rhodesians forged Brazilian or Malayan documents for their tobacco exports. The Government Printing and Stationery department dutifully complied with requests for forged papers, and rubber stamps were obtained by the Special Branch. An official of this department once boasted that he could produce customs and immigration stamps for any of a dozen countries together with all the accompanying forms.

Although the South Africans allowed their Rhodesian friends considerable latitude in their sanctions-busting work, they did draw the line when their own reputation was threatened. And so it was when in 1972 South African customs officials caught the Rhodesians stamping sides of pork with fraudulent markings of the South African Meat Board. The incident occurred inside the Cape Town refrigeration facility when a consignment of Rhodesian pork was being loaded on a vessel destined for the French island of Réunion. Infuriated, the South Africans stopped the shipment and for months afterwards there was a mysterious glut of pork on the Rhodesian market.

An extremely important facet of the Rhodesian counter-sanctions operation was the existence of tightly controlled commodity marketing boards. These parastatal institutions had been pioneered before the UDI era and during the two decades of Rhodesia's illegal independence they played a vital role in exporting dairy products, cotton, grain and beef. The development of the economy also played an important part in sustaining the Rhodesian war effort by the manufacture of a wide range of military requirements — 'rat packs', uniforms, tents, radio sets, armoured personnel carriers and weapons. A serviceable replica of the Czechoslovakian Vz 25 sub-machine gun was made and sold to White

farmers, and 82mm mortar tubes and mortar bombs were also made.

Successful though they were, the Rhodesians could not manage without essential imports. During the UDI period machinery and vital spare parts came by circuitous routes from the United Kingdom, Europe and the Far East. Eastern European countries also found markets for their heavy machines in Rhodesia but were careful to ensure that the deals were concluded via West Germany or Austria. This machinery from the East usually came in exchange for shipments of tobacco bought by Yugoslavs who had no qualms about flying to Salisbury as long as the Special Branch were on hand to ensure their passports were not stamped. Slavs were popular with immigration officers because they inevitably brought gifts of plum brandy and offered around cigarettes of heavily scented Balkan tobacco.

Two years after UDI the Rhodesians were publicly informed that their government had managed a sanctions *coup* when on 19 July 1967 Rhodesian banknotes were put into circulation by the Reserve Bank. The British had earlier prevented the Germans from sending bank notes to the illegal regime and this, as in many other cases, was the catalyst to stimulate home production. Printing presses were secretly imported from West Germany and arrived in Salisbury late one evening in May 1967. An entire section of walling behind the Reserve Bank was torn down so that cranes could position the heavy crates of machinery. Immediately after installation a gang of White artisans and bricklayers from the Public Works Department and the police Pioneers set to work cementing back the walls.

Another success story surrounded the construction of the Sable Chemical Industries plant at Que Que (Kwekwe). Plant and equipment for the nitrogenous-fertilizer factory came from diverse countries. The factory was based on the use of cheap electricity but in the years ahead the fertilizer proved extremely costly to manufacture.

The Sable *coup* was not repeated in the case of a modernization programme at the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Industry at Redcliff. In 1973, RISCO officials managed to negotiate the purchase of equipment through European machinery brokers. Because of the risks involved the brokers demanded payment on despatch of the goods. Details of the monetary transaction were routed through RISCO's bankers, Rhobank (Rhodesian Banking Corporation) where an employee named McIntosh had sight of the important documents. McIntosh photocopied the sensitive papers and sent them to a relative in Scotland for safekeeping. Unbeknown to McIntosh, the police Fraud Squad had received information that he was engaged in illegal foreign currency transactions and he was subsequently arrested.

When news of this arrest reached England, his relatives panicked and

handed the parcel of documents to journalists who exposed the whole RISCO deal. This public disclosure enabled the British government to embargo the shipment and the Rhodesians lost several million dollars in foreign exchange. For McIntosh, the disclosure of the vital sanctions-busting papers meant charges under the Sanctions Counter Espionage regulations which had been brought into effect after the Nicholson and Gallagher spy trials some five years earlier.

The Scot was convicted and sent to gaol. McIntosh proved himself a model prisoner and soon won the confidence of his warders who gave him the task of running the Prison Officers' mess account and other financial records. By co-operating with his captors McIntosh succeeded in suborning a young Englishman in the prison service. The warder was offered financial inducement to travel to Pretoria where the British Embassy officials produced an escape passport for McIntosh. Returning to Salisbury, the warder made arrangements for McIntosh to be taken from prison on the false pretext of having to appear before the Magistrate's Court to answer additional charges. This procedure was not unusual and McIntosh was checked out of Salisbury central prison in the custody of the warder. That afternoon, before lock-up, McIntosh boarded an Air Rhodesia Viscount for Malawi where he was to await a connection to London from Blantyre on the VC 10. The prison officer boarded a flight to Johannesburg and London later the afternoon. In the meantime, the prison authorities discovered what had happened and belatedly informed the Special Branch who immediately checked all departure manifests and questioned airport personnel. When it was discovered that a man fitting McIntosh's description had boarded the flight to Blantyre the Special Branch contacted the Malawi police Special Branch requesting them to hold the fugitive. As McIntosh was seated in the Chileka airport transit lounge he was approached by three Malawian police officers who arrested him as a suspected prohibited immigrant and handed him over to a Rhodesian Special Branch officer who flew to Malawi.

Back in prison McIntosh again applied his resourceful nature and again succeeded in escaping. With the aid of an accomplice he made his way to the Rhodesian border town of Umtali (Mutare), where he crossed into Mozambique and made contact with a patrol of FRELIMO soldiers. Not understanding English the Mozambicans took McIntosh to the police station at Vila de Manica. Finally, McIntosh managed to explain that he was a political refugee from the Smith regime and that he should be allowed to speak to the British consul in Beira. A phone call was put through to Beira, no mean feat in itself, but by 11 o'clock that morning the consul had still not arrived. In the meanwhile, the Rhodesian Special Branch heard about the White man being held at Vila de Manica and suspected that it might be McIntosh. Some vestiges of the old

Portuguese-Rhodesian border liaison still existed and the Rhodesians capitalized on this old arrangement. For a few cases of beer, tins of cooking oil and a handful of cash, McIntosh was exchanged after the Rhodesians explained that the man was a common criminal. At around 3 p.m. in the afternoon, the British consul blustered into the Vila de Manica police station only to discover that McIntosh was gone. The diplomat had driven the 200 kilometres from the coast to Vila de Manica at breakneck speed after finally getting the message at the Beira golf club. McIntosh's escape had been viewed by the Rhodesians as an extremely serious matter and it was considered vital that he be recaptured as an example to other would-be spies or traitors. After this second unsuccessful bid for freedom, McIntosh was held in the maximum security wing of Salisbury prison and finally freed under the special amnesty of 1979.

Not only were bullets, weapons and spare parts imported to sustain the Rhodesian war effort. In defiance of international sanctions the Rhodesians also needed to import manpower as well. In 1977-8 there was an estimated 1,500 foreigners serving in the Rhodesian armed forces. The majority were professional soldiers from the United Kingdom and the United States who came for ideological reasons or the pure love of adventure and fighting. Most of these men came as individuals but in late 1976 a force of nearly 200 former Legionnaires arrived to join the Rhodesian army.

The Frenchmen, most of whom spoke little English, were veterans of campaigns in Algeria, Vietnam and the French territory of the Afars and Issas on the Horn of Africa. The recruitment of this bizarre force represented a minor *coup* for the Rhodesian CIO officers responsible for liaison with the French intelligence service. They had discovered that the Legionnaires were being withdrawn from the newly independent Djibouti and approached the men with two-year service contracts in Rhodesia. A Frenchman then serving with 2 RR of the Rhodesian army warned against recruiting the Legionnaires but his advice was rejected. On arrival in Salisbury, the Legionnaires were signed up by Major Nick Lamprecht, the Army recruiting officer, and assigned to a special unit within the Rhodesian Light Infantry. French-speaking Rhodesians were posted to the unit for liaison, training and tactics. After a brief re-training course the French were posted *en masse* to the Rushinga district of Mount Darwin.

In 1976-7 ZANLA guerrillas operating in the Chaminuka sector comprising the Rushinga district were firmly in control of the surrounding countryside and the only safe haven for the Rhodesians was the Rushinga base-camp located on a high ridge of the same name. The Rushinga hill camp had previously been garrisoned by the South African Police who left in 1975 and then by regular Rhodesian units. The main idea behind

the deployment of the French was to free the Rhodesians for duties elsewhere in the country. The north-east, by this time, was considered lost ground with landmine incidents and ambushes daily occurrences.

The Frenchmen considered themselves hardened troops and arrived at Rushinga full of enthusiasm and vociferous determination to rid the area of the guerrillas. Astonished Rhodesian signalmen tuned to the French radio network and listened to the incessant and confusing sounds. Regular French patrols would sally forth from Rushinga in the early mornings. Open landrovers flying the *tricolore* became a common sight on the roads around Rushinga.

As the French continued their military operations stumbling through villages without yielding tangible results they, too, fell victim to the same frustrations which bedevilled other units of the Rhodesian army — frustrations aggravated by the fear of the invisible enemy manifesting itself in the sudden landmine blast or ambush. These feelings were worsened by the fact that the French could not really communicate with the local people, for it was impossible to interrogate villagers without some knowledge of English or Shona. Symptoms of these frustrations soon began to filter back to the JOC at Bindura. SITREPs were received from units which came into contact with the Frenchmen. They reported that the Legionnaires were using excessive brutality even by Rhodesian standards. Cases of rape were reported to the police at Nyamahoboko camp in the Chesa farms. Contemporary police files recorded the details of an incident where a French patrol arrived in a village to question its inhabitants about guerrillas. One of the Legionnaires seized a young woman and dragged her into the nearby thicket where she was savagely assaulted and raped. It was as if the true character of these mercenary forces was now emerging. As these incidents escalated it became obvious that the continued presence of the French would prove counter-productive and a swift decision was taken to quietly withdraw them back to Cranborne Barracks for re-training.

Some of the men who appeared suitable for continued service were integrated into the regular Army but the majority were repatriated. Some opted for civilian life in Rhodesia and found jobs in commerce. As a terrible sequel to this episode of Rhodesian desperation two former Legionnaires were sentenced to death for murder by the High Court of Zimbabwe in 1981-2. The Court was told how Gervais Henri Alfred Boutanquoi and Simon Marc Chemouil had robbed and murdered a Karoi cafe-owner, Richard Kraft. Boutanquoi had stabbed Kraft with a service dagger and then shot a German shepherd dog which had sprung to save its master's life. The two former French Legionnaires were executed on 28 April 1983 for having committed a 'heinous crime and not because they had service as mercenaries during the time of the Smith regime', explain-

ed the former Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witness Mangwende, when interviewed in Paris.

No account of the Rhodesian sanctions war would ever be complete without mention of an incredible man, Jack Mcvicar Malloch. His name became a living legend during the UDI era of Zimbabwe's history. A flying ace of the Second World War who had flown with Ian Smith, variously described as a gun runner, entrepreneur of the skies, merchant prince and sanctions-buster *par excellence*, Captain Malloch was a most extraordinary man indeed. On 15 September 1978 he was decorated with the highest civilian award, the Independence Commemorative Decoration for his outstanding service in sanctions-busting. Publicly, Captain Malloch was best known for his work in rebuilding a Mark 22 Spitfire which had been on display for twenty-six years at the main gate to the New Sarum air base. The wartime aircraft was completely rebuilt and Captain Malloch took to the air on 29 March 1980. During the filming of the story, Captain Malloch agreed to do a final sequence on 26 March 1982. Flying home after the aerial filming, the magnificent aircraft with Malloch at the controls disappeared into a cumulo-nimbus cloud-bank where a savage windshear tore the Spitfire into pieces and Malloch perished.³

Jack Malloch's career in the skyways of Africa took him to the forefront of the sanctions-busting operations. It all started in the early 1950s when Malloch started a modest charter business ferrying fresh fish and crustacea from Vilanculos in Mozambique to Salisbury. He flew an old DC3 until he could afford to buy the longer range DC7 and later a Superconstellation. In the 1960s he was flying to Malawi and by the early 1970s he was operating the newly established Air Trans Africa to the West Coast of Africa. Before long his ATA airline was regularly flying to Libreville, the capital of Gabon. The formal establishment of ATA was preceded by Malloch's operations in support of the Biafran General Ojukwu for whom he flew supplies of medicines and weapons to Enugu in the 1960s.

During a regular shuttle into Enugu, Malloch's DC7 developed engine trouble and diverted to Togo for emergency repairs. Landing in Lomé, Malloch's aircraft was impounded and he and his crew were detained for several months. The experience gained during the Biafran war stood Malloch in good stead and he achieved the respect and admiration of two important people on the West Coast; Omar Bongo of Gabon and Felix Houphouët Boigny of the Ivory Coast. As the war drew to a close in January 1970, General Ojukwu was granted political asylum in Ivory Coast. Not surprisingly, it was Captain Jack Malloch who flew Ojukwu out of Enugu at 2 a.m. on Sunday, 11 January 1970, in a Superconstellation 5N 864.

With Malloch's assistance the Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a low-key diplomatic presence in Libreville and later in Abidjan. The Rhodesian had orders to foster trade and soon plane-loads of beef, clothing, textiles, shoes and fresh produce were arriving in Libreville. During the early 1970s, a freelance journalist, John Edlin, published a report about Rhodesian beef exports to Gabon but this was officially denied by the Gabonese. In many respects the success of the Rhodesians on the West Coast heralded the later arrival of the South Africans which began under General Van den Bergh and Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa.

The Rhodesian CIO made good use of Malloch's contacts and often travelled with his aircraft to strange destinations. Such a mission took the CIO to West Africa where they secretly met with General Ojukwu who was then plotting to overthrow Major General Gowon of Nigeria. The Rhodesians said they were interested in Ojukwu's plans and agreed to provide him with covert aid. Ojukwu sent a group of men to Salisbury on board a DC7 flight from Libreville. On arrival they were taken to a secret training facility where for the following three months they were schooled by the Rhodesian SAS in the techniques of sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The objective was to equip the men for clandestine reconnaissance and guerrilla operations against the Federal Nigerian government but the proposed missions never materialized.

On a trip to South America an officer of the CIO concluded arrangements for the Rhodesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pieter Van der Byl, to make an unofficial visit to Brazil. The trip was hosted by members of the Brazilian secret police and took Van der Byl and his CIO interpreter to Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Manaus. Apart from visits to the grandiose nineteenth-century opera house in the Amazonian capital and the acquisition of clay replicas of Indian *tangas* nothing much came of the trip.

Malloch's airline, by then equipped with a long-range DC8, made a trip to Taipei and as usual was accompanied by Van der Byl and members of the CIO who came to liaise with their counterparts in the Taiwanese intelligence service. Other strange routings took the Air Trans Africa planes to Libreville with a personal gift of two trained falcons for King Hassan of Morocco. The falcons had been specially trained by officials of the Rhodesian Parks and Wild Life Department at the request of Van der Byl. Pieter Van der Byl had a specific brief from the Rhodesian Prime Minister to develop ties with any friendly country in the outside world. He was able to forge links with the Liechtenstein aristocracy and in later years married Princess Charlotte. Van der Byl invited the exiled Albanian king, Leka Zog II, to Rhodesia in 1975 for talks on possible assistance in the restoration of the lost kingdom. Zog tried to per-

suade Van der Byl to provide financial and material support in his quest to regain the throne in Tirana. Wisely the CIO told Van der Byl to send the Albanian exile back to his sanctuary in Spain.

By 1975 Air Trans Africa had registered Air Gabon Cargo under the Gabonese flag of convenience. The Company's DC8 became a veritable workhorse of the sky and was instrumental in bringing in vital cargo for the beleaguered Rhodesian economy. Twice-weekly flights left for Europe via Libreville or the Seychelles. The end destination was Amsterdam where the airline had a cargo reception office. Inquisitive journalists or government officials were shown legitimate documentation proving that the airline operated exclusively between Amsterdam and Libreville.

East coast routings generally took the DC8 to Moroni in the Comoros or to the Seychelles where a slip crew was based on two-weekly shifts to pick up the north-bound flights. The fresh crew then took the freighter to Iran which by 1975 was a regular destination for Rhodesian exporters of day-old chicks. The American Arbor Acres group built a chicken farm outside Teheran and imported all their requirements from Salisbury. Leaving Teheran the DC8 would fly to New Dehli and then to Baghdad, Paris and Amsterdam. Cargo was accepted at each airport and in this manner the airline earned valuable foreign exchange for the Rhodesians.

While the DC8 freighter was fully engaged in what became known to the Rhodesians as the meat run, the airline's smaller DC7s were deployed in a highly secret and unorthodox manner. On the morning of 23 November 1977 death and destruction rained down on the huge ZANLA guerrilla complex known as Chimoio in Mozambique. The attack started with a strike by the Rhodesian Air Force using Canberra jet bombers and Hawker-Hunters. This was followed by a ground assault of the SAS, RLI and Selous Scouts who were ferried to the killing ground in a fleet of nearly forty helicopters. This massive operation against the Chimoio complex served as a great morale booster for the Rhodesians but it did not significantly turn the tide of war and by the 1977-8 rains the nationalists had regained the offensive.

For the 1,000 men and women killed during the Chimoio raid life had started normally on 23 November. Early risers were not startled to hear the distant droning of aircraft engines. They had become accustomed to the sound of the high-flying aircraft above their camp because this had been going on for weeks. All homeward bound Air Trans Africa flights had been specifically routed over the Chimoio base in a deliberate move to lull its inhabitants into accepting the sound as routine. The ploy worked because it gave the Rhodesians the initiative to catch the guerrillas off their guard as the attackers zeroed in.

DC7 freighters were converted to paratroop carriers for the second stage of the Rhodesian military offensive against the guerrillas in

November 1977. Twenty-four hours after the Chimoio attack Rhodesian soldiers were dropped from DC7s overflying Tembue I and Tembue II in the northern Mozambique province of Tete. Unfortunately for the Rhodesians, the Tembue raids were not successful because the guerrillas had been prepared by the Chimoio assault. A number of ZANLA combatants were killed and a handful of prisoners in underground pits were released. The Rhodesians were forced to make a hurried withdrawal when reinforcements of the Mozambique FPLM rushed to the scene in Soviet-built BTR-60PA APC personnel carriers. The SAS and RLI troopers were evacuated by a DC3 from the Tembue airstrip and helicopters working through a relay station on the Serra do Comboio south of the Zambezi river. The flat-topped mountain was an ideal base for the Rhodesian Air Force which was able to establish a forward base-camp with tents, operations room, fuel re-supply and home comforts in the form of ice-cold beers.

Malloch often had to face a shortage of skilled pilots who were willing to fly the DC7 and DC8 on unscheduled and sometimes risky sectors. Being desperate for pilots on one occasion, Malloch hired a husband and wife pilot team. Unbeknown to Malloch at the time, the two pilots had a sinister background of mercenary activity in central and west Africa. Michel and Micheyle Pierre had previously been flying mercenary charters in Rwanda and Zaire. They had been involved in Katanga (later the Shaba province of Zaire) and this led to their expulsion from Rwanda. Before long the French couple secured a contract to work in the Comoros and later in Biafra. In Biafra, Rudolph Steiner offered them combat missions with the rebel airforce but the promised fighters never arrived from France. The Pierres then served with a Biafra commando unit and were issued with camouflage uniforms bearing the macabre skull-and-crossbones insignia of the mercenary forces. They came into contact with mercenaries from Rhodesia such as Major Taffy Williams and Barry St John. In December 1968 the husband and wife team joined in a search for plunder and liquor and attacked a Red Cross vehicle. News of this behaviour reached Ojuku and he ordered the expulsion of the mercenaries. Temporarily out of work, the Pierres applied to Malloch for work and because he was desperately short of pilots he agreed to hire them to operate on the Libreville DC7 shuttle.

On their first flight into Libreville the mercenaries were met by local representatives of the French External Intelligence Service SDECE stationed in Libreville. The officers told the pilots they were not welcome in Gabon or any other francophone country under French influence. The banning order was reinforced when SDECE, later re-named DGSE, agents flew to Salisbury to confer with their Rhodesian CIO counterparts. The Rhodesians enjoyed good relations with the French who had

permitted them to station a CIO man in Paris and did not wish to jeopardize the liaison and so the pilots were immediately deported from Rhodesia.

In the late 1970s Malloch's airline purchased one additional DC8 which was registered in the name of Cargoman⁴ with offices in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Malloch's achievement opened new vistas for the Rhodesians in their sanctions-busting operations and flights into the Middle East were to prove extremely important not only in monetary terms but also in the context of international support for the Rhodesian war effort. The Director of section C in the Rhodesian CIO visited Oman during 1977-8 and convinced Sultan Qabous bin Said and his intelligence advisers that the Rhodesians would benefit from the experience of the Dhofar rebellion in 1970-71. The Sultan's force, with the backing of the British Special Air Services had successfully defeated guerrillas of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during a seven-year campaign.⁵ The successful outcome of the war was largely due to the creation of a unique counter-guerrilla unit known as the *Firqa* composed of desert tribesmen and four-man SAS teams. The *Firqa* were armed and paid by the Sultan and in 1976 the last PFLO stronghold on the plateau hinterland of Oman was taken bringing the Iraqi and South Yemani insurrection to an end.

The head of section C invited the Omanis to Rhodesia for an *in loco* inspection of the Rhodesian war. During the visit the complexities of the Internal Settlement deal of March 1978 were explained and the Omani delegation returned home with details of the proposed Operation Favour surrender and safe return programme. Before long the CIO received a secret donation of nearly US\$5 million to support the amnesty campaign. The Omanis had not forgotten how in 1971 some 200 rebels had surrendered and taken advantage of the government's amnesty and cash offer of US\$100 for each AK rifle. The Omanis also recalled how these rebels had formed the nucleus of the anti-guerrilla *Firqas*.⁶

Rhodesian flights to Oman set the stage for an important sanctions-busting coup whereby the Air Force acquired a fleet of eleven Agusta Bell 205 helicopters. In July 1978 a squad of Rhodesian helicopter pilots flew to Oman on the Affretair DC8 where they were to familiarize themselves with the Agusta Bell Huey helicopters.⁷ In August 1978 the Rhodesians flew missions on the Dhofar plateau in countryside which is not unlike certain parts of Rhodesia.

The presence of the pilots did not arouse undue suspicion because they were authenticated by the special military adviser to the Sultan, Brigadier Tim Landon.⁸ Landon explained to the curious that the men were civilian pilots recruited to fly the aircraft on oil-drilling operations in Singapore. It was on this basis that Landon had negotiated the pur-

chase of the aircraft from Agusta Bell of Italy who manufacture the helicopters as licencees from the Bell Helicopter Company of Textron, Fort Worth, Texas, USA.

After the familiarization programme the aircraft were carefully dismantled, crated and flown to Salisbury on board the Cargoman DC8. News of the arrival of the Huey in Salisbury was like a shot in the arm for the Rhodesian war effort. The fantastic deal was the third and final importation of military hardware. The Rhodesians had previously imported a fleet of twelve Aeromacchi AL-60FS Trojans and later a flight of Siai Marchetti SF 260 trainers for the Thornhill aviation school.

Of all the aircraft available to the Rhodesians the helicopter was considered the most versatile, and at the outbreak of the final phase of the guerrilla war in December 1972 the Rhodesians had a fleet of nearly twenty-four Alouette Mark III helicopters originally acquired in February 1962. That the Rhodesians had been able to keep the aircraft serviceable must come as a tribute to the technicians of Seven Squadron based at the New Sarum air-base. The choppers were indispensable and provided much needed mobility in the counter-insurgency war. The Rhodesian fleet was augmented from time to time by loan aircraft from the South Africans and at the height of the war the peak strength was forty aircraft.

Rhodesian helicopter pilots were carefully trained and strict rules of discipline governed use of the aircraft on operations. Abuse of the costly machines resulted in severe reprimands or transfer to the transport squadron. In 1974 a colourful helicopter pilot went on a drinking spree at the Centenary club in north-eastern Rhodesia. After several cold beers, the pilot and his companions flew down to the Portuguese army camp at Mukumbura nearly eighty kilometres away. When news of this reached the air-vice marshall he ordered a board of enquiry and the pilot was suspended. The pilot was later reinstated to his old squadron when the shortage of experienced pilots became acute.

Careful as they were with their helicopters the Rhodesians started to lose them in a series of engagements with guerrilla forces. The awe in which helicopters had been held by the guerrillas during the early operations had largely been shattered by incredible feats of courage on the part of individual guerrilla fighters like Clever Mabonzo. Mabonzo was known to the Rhodesians as the ZANLA detachment commander for the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. His cunning and resolute nature had earned him grudging respect and for many months he had eluded Rhodesian efforts to stop him. Finally on the morning of 14 August 1974 Mabonzo's luck failed and he and a fifteen-man group were spotted by a Rhodesian reconnaissance patrol. The Fire Force from Bindura was summoned with Major E.C. 'Hamp' Adams of HQ 2 Brigade in charge. Major Adams

directed the operation from his K-Car and he ordered his men to skirmish towards the suspected guerrilla position in the Madziva Tribal Trust Land. While the ground forces were moving into position Adams ordered the K-Car gunner to lay down 20mm explosive and incendiary fire on the guerrillas now exposed in open vleiland. When it appeared to Adams that the guerrillas had been wiped out he told the pilot to put down. Unbeknown to major Adams, the guerrillas' leader, Mabonzo, was not dead and as the K-Car hovered metres from the ground he rose from the thick vleiland grass and fired his RPG-7 Bazooka. The projectile struck the helicopter amidships. Adams, the pilot and the gunner perished in a massive fireball which struck dismay into the hearts of the Rhodesians. Elated by this counter-strike, Mabonzo and some of his men fought until overwhelmed. Out of ammunition and surrounded by the bodies of his fallen comrades Mabonzo, whose right leg had been shattered, fainted from loss of blood. He recovered hours later to find himself manacled to a hospital bed and staring into the cold blue eyes of Detective Inspector David Parker of the Special Branch. Parker immediately identified him as the elusive guerrilla commander and several months later, minus his leg which had been amputated, Mabonzo was executed.⁹

Loss of precious helicopters in this way worried the Rhodesians and in 1976 the Special Branch recruited several Portuguese expatriates working in Mozambique to steal aircraft, especially helicopters and fly them to Rhodesia. In this manner the Rhodesian Air Force acquired two modern versions of the French Alouette III in exchange for cash payments of US\$50,000 each.

Helicopters were not the only aircraft acquired in this manner for in 1975 and 1976 the Rhodesians purchased stolen Briton Norman Islanders BN-2A from Mozambique. The aircraft were flown to Rhodesia by Portuguese pilots who argued that they were legitimately disposing of their own property which had merely been nationalized by the FRELIMO government. Several of the BN-2As were later deployed with 3 squadron and fitted with 7,62 machine guns and 68mm SENB air-to-ground missiles for use in the counter-insurgency war.

It was absolutely vital that the Rhodesian army and airforce be fully supplied with weapons and ammunition and that spare parts for the aircraft and vehicles be available at all times. The procurement of military hardware was undertaken by the Defence Equipment Procurement Board working in close co-operation with the Department of Customs and General Adviser to the Prime Minister, a locally registered private company which held the franchise to import helicopter spares from France and Spain, and a shipping agency. In early 1978 the officer commanding the Criminal Investigation Department Fraud Squad received

orders from the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, to conduct a secret investigation into the activities of the Procurement Board. As investigations started a senior customs officer committed suicide and suspicion pointed to the very top of White Rhodesian society.

On 20 July 1978 a group of Rhodesians were convicted by the High Court of Rhodesia during a session behind closed doors. The Court was told of how the accused had salted away millions of dollars at the expense of the taxpayer. A contemporary report in the *The Star* (Johannesburg) of 16 and 17 July 1978 mentioned that the accused men included Tim Pittard, the head of the Department of Customs and General Adviser, Rodney Simmonds, a former District Commissioner and businessman, Norman Bruce-Brand, under-secretary in the Rhodesian Ministry of Defence, and Eddie Muller of the Rennie's shipping agency.¹⁰ Although the men were heavily fined and ordered to repatriate all the stolen cash the sentence did not include terms of imprisonment because imperatives of state demanded that the work of defence procurement continue and several of the accused were virtually indispensable because they alone had the right contacts in Europe.

While the investigation was underway the Rhodesian public were shocked to learn of the sudden death of President John Wrathall. A terse communiqué announced that Wrathall had died in his sleep but this official statement did little to stem ebbing White morale and rumours that Wrathall was implicated in the defence scandal gained currency. It was even suggested that Wrathall had committed suicide unable to face the consequences. When Wrathall was found dead a government physician was called and he issued a death certificate that the deceased had died of heart attack. Members of the Salisbury medical fraternity were not altogether satisfied with this explanation and did their own checking.¹¹ No post mortem was held and the burial was quickly arranged. These facts contributed towards general belief in a suicide and tended to confirm a linkage between Wrathall and the defence scandal.

Wrathall's death had come approximately two months after he had personally decorated Captain Christoph Schulenberg of the Selous Scouts with Rhodesia's supreme award for gallantry, the Grand Cross of Valour. Exactly what was going through Wrathall's mind that morning on 17 June 1978 when he stood before the assembled Rhodesian fighting men, whether or not he understood the bitter irony of his situation will never be known. One thing was clear: Wrathall's passing sounded one more death knell in the approaching Rhodesian Götterdämmerung.

Operation Favour

On 3 March 1978 the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau signed the Internal Settlement Accord which was to endure until elections in February 1979. Both Sithole and Muzorewa had previously been vilified by the Rhodesian government but were now being promoted as representatives of moderate African opinion. Both men were to become the deuteragonists for this final scene in Rhodesia's story but, as ever, the White protagonists remained in full control.

The outcome of the Internal Settlement arrangements really hinged on whether Muzorewa and Sithole could successfully convince the guerrilla forces of the Patriotic Front to surrender. With very few exceptions, the promised surrenders never materialized and the immediate response to the amnesty call was an intensification of the insurgency war. The initiative for the Internal Settlement came from the Rhodesian Front party who were fully supported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs — the African experts. Smith had again chosen to ignore warnings from the CIO that the plan stood little real chance of success. Even though the CIO counselled against the decision there was little that it could do at this stage to change the course of events; as professionals, officers were required to support the plan as best they could.

By April 1978 it was apparent that neither Sithole nor Muzorewa stood any chance of mustering guerrilla support. For the Internal Settlement plan to work it was absolutely vital to prove to the outside world that the moderate African nationalists had some credibility and this could only be realized if significant numbers of guerrillas laid down their arms. The CIO and Special Branch officers on the national JOC and COMPS were asked to produce a scheme which would result in surrenders. The brunt of this job fell on the shoulders of Assistant Commissioner Mac Macguinness, who as commander of the Selous Scouts and Department Z of the CIO was the acknowledged expert in nationalist guerrilla tactics.

After some weeks Macguinness produced a top secret plan code-named Operation Favour. In it he outlined his ideas for the creation of frozen areas which would be cleared of regular security forces so that groups of Selous Scouts posing as guerrillas could be substituted. These fake guerrillas would convince villagers that they were ZANLA forces who had heeded the cease-fire call issued by the Internal Settlement partners and Bishop Muzorewa in particular. They would use standard guerrilla policy of holding mass meetings or *pungwe* where tribesmen were lectured and

politicized. In this manner, it was hoped, the word would spread and some genuine guerrillas would actually be duped into joining the impostors. Where necessary, hostile guerrilla groups would be attacked and killed. Captures could be programmed by the Scouts and 'turned'. To initiate the plan a force of one hundred veteran Scouts and 'captures' were to be sent into the Msana and Masembura Tribal Trust Lands south of Bindura. This area was chosen because it lay close to the Bindura Fort.

The Operation Favour presentation was hailed by the COMOPS planners who gave full authority to the Special Branch and the Selous Scouts to implement the secret strategy. Financing would be drawn from covert CIO funds which were augmented by the South African Directorate of Military Intelligence. The next stage of the scheme demanded the active co-operation of Muzorewa and Sithole who were simply told to prepare lists of districts which they believed were loyal to them. These lists were carefully scrutinized by the Special Branch who remarked that the claims of support were grossly exaggerated. However, Muzorewa had nominated Msana and Masembura and so this area was the first chosen. It was declared a 'cease-fire zone' and in the terminology of the security forces it was first called a 'circumscribed area' and later a 'proscribed area' depending upon how successful the operation went.

Having occupied Msana and Masembura with Selous Scouts, Mac Macguinness was ready to introduce the concept into the public eye. A camera team from the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation under a sympathetic reporter named Johan Meiring was brought to film a success story. Under the close supervision of the Selous Scouts liaison officer the pseudo guerrilla commander, known as comrade Max, told the reporter that he was the commander of a large force of ZANLA guerrillas which had accepted the cease-fire and now supported Bishop Muzorewa's UANC party.

The Rhodesians, psychologically unprepared by years of propaganda, were horrified when the news broke in *The Sunday Mail* of 13 August 1978. There were stupid and hysterical outbursts from Rhodesian Front politicians who had not been privy to Operation Favour. Before long, a sense of general resignation prevailed and the operation was well on its way. Many Rhodesians rationalized their initial horror as yet another symptom of the mushroom syndrome (kept in the dark and fed on bullshit). Most Rhodesians accepted that they knew little of what was really going on.

Having broken the ice with the establishment of the Msana and Masembura 'free zone', those in charge had to maintain momentum. This was done by posting Special Branch officers to liaise with the UANC and the ZANU Sithole organization. Daily prayers were held when the respective liaison officers would report progress or lack of it.

Those who were attached to Sithole's group reported that despite numerous missions into the operational areas little response had been achieved. Sithole promised that contact had been made and night after night Special Branch officers sat in Sithole's home waiting for guerrilla delegations to arrive. The officers spent many nights drinking whisky and listening to war stories recounted by veterans of the early nationalist struggle who were now Sithole loyalists and part of the cease-fire team.

As Sithole's entreaties to the guerrillas failed he pleaded with the Rhodesians to authorize the return of one hundred guerrillas who were then based in Uganda with Idi Amin's forces. His request was approved and the CIO chartered a DC-7 freighter of the Rhodesian sanctions-busting airline, Air Trans Africa, to fly to Entebbe and collect the men. Contact was made with Idi Amin and he approved because he found the continued presence of the Zimbabweans embarrassing, although they had served him well by helping his notorious State Research Bureau in its bloody craft. The experience gained by these Sithole men was to have terrible consequences during their subsequent postings in the Rhodesian operational areas. The Special Branch officer who travelled on this bizarre flight later described how the lumbering aircraft left Salisbury late in the afternoon in early April 1978 and followed a circuitous route which took them over north-western Tanzania during darkness. Flying over Lake Victoria the plane landed at Entebbe to embark a frightening band of cut-throats. The men wore a mixture of East German and Egyptian camouflage uniform and were heavily armed.

The DC-7 returned home early the following morning and arrangements were made to hurriedly transfer the men from Salisbury airport to a secret holding centre on Spurwing farm near Enkeldoorn 100 kilometres from Salisbury. At the farm Sithole, Peter Sheba and Sam Chindawa were there to welcome their comrades.

Spurwing farm was to become the major training and holding centre for pro-Sithole forces. It had been specifically chosen because it was remote from European habitation — most of the nearby farms had long since been deserted because of the war — and distant from the nearest UANC training facility. It was no secret that Muzorewa and Sithole distrusted each other as political rivals and that their respective followers would gladly have killed one another given the chance. Camp logistics, communication and security were the responsibility of a small force of Rhodesian army officers who were attached to a newly established unit known as Special Forces which had its headquarters at the King George VI Barracks in Salisbury.

Immediately after arriving at Spurwing, the Sithole men embarked on an unauthorized patrol into the Narira Tribal Trust Lands. They terrorized villagers who refused to help them find local guerrilla units. Kill-

ings, hut burnings and sexual assaults upon women followed and news soon reached the ears of a Rhodesian army patrol, who, believing they were up against genuine guerrillas moved into attack. The Rhodesian conscript soldiers opened fire on a kraal where the Sithole men were spending the night. An exchange of fire continued throughout the night. When the Sithole men realized that they were under attack by the army they attempted to communicate their real identity but matters were made worse by the downpour of heavy rain and it was not until the following morning when nearly ninety of the Spurwing raiders lay dead that order was restored. The incident provoked considerable adverse reaction among regular Rhodesian soldiers who demanded to be told what was going on. The Special Branch and members of Special Forces tried to suppress the truth but word leaked out that the 'funnies' were at Spurwing and this was confirmed when the Special Branch came to remove the bodies of the supposed guerrillas for burial at Spurwing.

Sithole and his lieutenants were immediately summoned by the Special Branch to a secret meeting at a safe house in the Avenues in Salisbury. Sithole was told in no uncertain terms to pull his men into line or suffer the consequences. Sithole was entirely dependent upon the Special Branch for his financial lifeline and failure to comply with instructions would have left him penniless. The Spurwing incident had a sequel on 24 May 1983 when villagers found a mass grave at this former ZANU-Sithole centre.

By July 1978, a strong contingent of Sithole forces was sent to the Nembudziya-Copper Queen district with orders to hold the countryside against the intruding forces of the Patriotic Front. Soon after their deployment the Sithole loyalists were attacked by ZIPRA guerrillas moving in from the Gokwe and Urungwe districts but they managed to hold together with support from the Special Forces liaison officers posted to help them.

Because Sithole had a small nucleus of trained guerrillas at his disposal, his part in the Operation Favour plan was able to gain an early footing. The Special Branch officer responsible for liaison with Bishop Muzorewa's UANC, Superintendent Geoffrey Price, reported that progress was extremely slow in that camp. From the start he experienced frustrations and setbacks. The Bishop mistakenly believed that because his original umbrella ANC had been involved in recruiting young men for the struggle in 1975-6 they would now be loyal to him alone. For a time Muzorewa and his two sons Ernest and Tendekayi were the sole members of the UANC cease-fire team. The Special Branch were forced to make the Bishop face reality and establish a workable cease-fire team which might stand a chance of success. A number of political detainees were released from prison to join the organization and they included

Stephen Parirenyatwa. On 13 April 1978 100 detainees were freed, of whom 42 went to Muzorewa, 29 to Sithole, with the remainder being held in reserve by the Special Branch for training and political orientation duties at training camps. Placed in overall command of the UANC cease-fire team was Grey Mtemasango, a veteran guerrilla who had originally been trained in Algeria in the early 1960s.

The UANC cease-fire team took its orders direct from the Special Branch. Secret meetings were held at which the UANC men received vehicles and cash and orders to make contact with ZANLA guerrillas who had apparently sent lettlars with messengers to the UANC headquarters in Salisbury. Thousands of letters, ostensibly written by guerrillas, were sent to the Bishop appealing for supplies of food, clothing, wrist-watches, liquor and cigarettes. After some time the Special Branch realized that most of these notes came from *mujiba* or simply from confidence tricksters who were busy stocking their rural shops with goods purchased with Operation Favour cash. Many of these missives called upon the Bishop to come to specific areas to address the guerrillas about the merits of the cease-fire.

In July 1978 a ZANLA detachment operating in the Mangwende Tribal Trust Land adjacent to the Macheke farming district sent notes to a store-keeper working for a wealthy farmer named Peech. This farmer, who was considered pro-African by his neighbours, reported the incident to the Special Branch at Marandellas. Peech handed over the note which asked for food and clothing to be supplied to the guerrillas and the Special Branch decided that it would be useful for the Bishop to visit the Mangwende district and address a mass rally of villagers. The UANC campaign director, Ayoub Kara, made sure that journalists were invited and later told them that several guerrillas had been among the crowd of approximately 2,000 villagers who listened to the Bishop talk about the internal settlement and the cease-fire. Several days after the meeting, Tim Peech, the old farmer's son, left home on a trip to Mrewa via the Mangwende Tribal Trust Land. He was never seen alive again and it was nearly forty-eight hours later that reports came through about a dead White man. Police investigators found that Peech had been duped into believing the Bishop's message about the cease-fire and had paid the ultimate price. Peech's vehicle had been flagged down by villagers who said that some *vakomana* (guerrillas) wanted to talk to him about the cease-fire. Hoping for a break-through, Peech drove down to a small village some distance from the main road. Stopping his vehicle he found himself surrounded by a large group of men and women who dragged him out of his vehicle. Acting on the orders of several guerrillas, Peech's hands were bound. As he tried to make a run from the crowd he was knocked to the ground where several men seized him and cut his Achilles

tendons. The helpless man was then clubbed to death with pick-handles. On learning the news, one of the Special Branch officers attached to the UANC team callously remarked that if he [Peech] couldn't take a joke he shouldn't have joined up.

As the pressure mounted on the UANC to produce some results and justify the hundreds of thousands of dollars being spent on the hopeless exercise some apparent results started to filter in. A number of 'guerrillas' were brought into Salisbury for meetings with the Special Branch at safe houses. The Special Branch guessed these men were not genuine guerrillas and soon verified this fact by questioning them about their training, *Chimurenga* names (noms-de-guerre), detachment and sectoral commanders. When they failed these tests the truth was out. The imposters admitted they were *mujiba* or guerrilla contact men who were loyal to the UANC and wanted a chance to fight ZANLA. In desperation, and against their better judgement, the Special Branch provided these *mujiba* with arms and ammunition. The plan backfired when the police at Sinoia (Chinhoyi), in the Lomagundi district, started receiving reports of gangs of armed bandits robbing and stealing in the Sipolilo district. It was clear who was responsible.

The Special Branch then decided to follow their own lines of communication and reverted to the use of established sources and agents known to have direct contact with the guerrillas. Many of these agents had supplied information resulting in confirmed kills and had been useful in channelling poisoned jeans to the guerrillas as well. Such an agent was the Revd Arthur Kanodereka of the Methodist Church. The officer 'running' the cleric had successfully used him to supply homing-device radio sets to guerrilla units in the Kandeya Tribal Trust Land of Mount Darwin. Kanodereka was in regular communication with ZANLA units and before long he, too, started receiving letters asking for supplies. The Special Branch examined these notes and started making up parcels of food and drink which Kanodereka sent out together with gifts of cash. Kanodereka told his Special Branch controllers that he would make arrangements for guerrillas to come to Salisbury and meet him at his church near the Mbare hostels. The night vigils at the church came to naught and the Special Branch started to suspect that their man was playing a double game. These fears were compounded when Kanodereka allied himself with the Revd Max Chigwida and Byron Hove to form a militant group within the UANC opposed to the Bishop. On 12 September 1978 the Bishop expelled the militants from his party and shortly afterwards Kanodereka disappeared from public view. His bullet-riddled body was found several days later at the forty-five kilometre peg on the Beatrice road. At a graveside eulogy delivered by Alec Smith, who together with Kanodereka belonged to the Moral

Rearmament Movement, the dead man was described as a fine Christian who had been dedicated to God.

As the Special Branch tried to take the initiative and make the case-fire work they left virtually no stone unturned. One line of enquiry brought them into contact with the Anglican Church and the Dean of Salisbury, John da Costa, agreed to introduce the Special Branch to Bishop Paul Burrough. A secret night-meeting was held at Bishop's Mount to which an African priest had been summoned. The Special Branch had information that a group of guerrillas was active in an area surrounding a rural Anglican mission and wanted his help in contacting them. The frightened priest explained that it would be suicidal for him to do any such thing.

By the third quarter of 1978 the Special Branch were convinced that the cease-fire operation was doomed to failure and the only alternative lay in the implementation of the second phase of Operation Favour. This aggressive phase involved the large-scale training of the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFAs) on Special Branch establishments known as *mujiba* farms. The farm concept originated in Rusape where an enterprising Special Branch officer capitalized on the known guerrilla tactic of relying on *mujiba* or 'tigers' as runners, informants and locally trained guerrilla scouts. The use of 'turned' *mujiba* was popularized in the Makoni and Chiduku Tribal Trust Lands in 1976-7 when the Special Branch discovered that nearly all able-bodied youngsters were actively helping the guerrillas. Suspected *mujiba* were secretly abducted from their villages and taken to the Rusape farm for a crash reorientation and training programme. After the training the *mujiba* was sent on patrol with a police reserve 'stick' of six men who had a special flair for this type of work and were permanently attached to the security police. Inducement for the *mujiba* 'to come on sides' (as Rhodesian slang put it) was offered in the form of a kill-bonus of a thousand dollars. Until the new recruit was blooded he was normally kept under close supervision and handcuffed to a member of the team. The success of the *mujiba* concept lay in the intimate knowledge of his home area where he invariably knew every single person right down to the colour of his vest and pants. Lying in an OP position the *mujiba* could easily distinguish between local people and newcomers. He could tell if a group of guerrillas was being fed by observing the behaviour and movements of the *chimbwido* (women assigned to help guerrillas in the rural areas).

The *mujiba* concept was quickly borrowed by other provinces and chief amongst them was the Salisbury and Mashonaland command where the task of co-ordinating operations was given to Detective Inspector Victor Opperman of the Projects Section. The section's headquarters were inside an old house at the Braeside police camp and a team of volunteer police reservists recruited for deployment with the captured

mujiba. The Projects Section's motto was 'Pachedu', a Shona word meaning 'together' and a special beermug was commissioned. The bulk of the training work was carried out on the Retreat farm just outside Bindura. This training centre was commanded by a detective inspector in the Special Branch with a staff of about fifteen regular and reservist policemen under him. The old Rhodesian-style farmhouse provided the offices and sleeping accommodation while the disused tobacco barns and outhouses were converted into barracks for the *mujiba*. The task of converting or upgrading the *mujiba* training to a full-scale security force Auxiliaries' camp was therefore relatively easy because the basic facilities were already in existence. Two additional farms, Puckridge and Champagne, were commissioned as training centres, each to accommodate between 200 and 400 men on thirty-day training cycles. Before long a similar establishment was founded at Goodhope farm near Karoi. UANC veterans were posted to these camps to bolster the morale of the recruits who were being drilled in bushcraft, weapon handling and physical training. In the beginning, the majority of the SFA recruits came from the ranks of the original *mujiba* but these were soon reinforced by urban unemployed who were recruited by fair means and foul.

UANC recruiting agents scoured the cities looking for recruits who were lured to holding centres at Tynwald farm some fifteen kilometres from Salisbury. The UANC was relatively successful in producing recruits but Sithole's recruiting agents were not so lucky. They had to contend with criminals who welcomed the opportunity to be armed and take to a life of banditry. When the first flush of recruits dried up, the UANC posed as agents for WENELA (Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) seeking recruits for the South African gold-mines. Would-be applicants found themselves being taken to UANC holding centres. These measures led to a steady fifteen per cent desertion rate but this intolerable situation was allowed to continue because recruitment was left entirely to the party which did very little screening.

Security at the SFA training camps was a constant problem and in late 1978 Bishop Muzorewa, while visiting the Retreat farm at Bindura, narrowly escaped with his life. The Bishop's vehicle passed over a landmine which was detonated by a Peugeot 504 travelling immediately behind. It was later discovered that the mine had been planted the previous night in response to guerrilla intelligence that the UANC leader was scheduled to visit the camp. This confirmed information that ZANLA had their men inside the SFA movement.

In November 1978 the SFA scheme was extended into the Midlands province and a training camp was established at an existing *mujiba* farm at Sunnymead near the town of Redcliff. It was to become the centre for the training and deployment of thousands of men into the entire province

for the next year or so. In keeping with the official policy of segregating the UANC from the ZANU-Sithole forces, the Sunnymeade or Chikunda camp was for Muzorewa men alone. Training at Sunnymeade was conducted by captured guerrillas on loan from the Scouts. These instructors had a reputation for cruel discipline said to be along the lines of their own experience from camps in Tanzania and Mozambique. It became commonplace for visitors to Sunnymeade and the other camps to see squads of recruits practising standard Warsaw Pact drill. Regular police and army officers were horrified when they saw the SFAs marching with the Eastern European goosestep and carrying AK-47 rifles. They found it detestable to watch the recruits marching up and down, singing *chimurenga* songs and saluting the party political flag rather than the familiar Green and White of the Rhodesian colours. Many of these regular officers secretly cursed the Special Branch which, they believed, was hastening the inevitable day of Black majority rule.

But success did come to some of the areas where the SFA were deployed and this forced some army and police sceptics to grudgingly admit that there was some merit in the Operation Favour scheme. The best example was that of the Urungwe district west of Karoi where a former detective inspector of the Special Branch had been given a short-term contract to run the operation. The entire Urungwe district was placed completely out of bounds to all government personnel and this included the local uniformed police and the District Commissioner who was infuriated by the move.

The majority of the villagers in the Urungwe district were Shona and ZANLA guerrillas had not yet reached the district. Ndebele-speaking ZIPRA guerrillas from the west had started to infiltrate the area and this situation was cleverly exploited. The SFAs told the villagers that they had come in the name of Bishop Muzorewa to protect them from the intruders. The plan worked for a time because ZIPRA had been guilty of killing villagers in an effort to establish their authority and this cleared the way for the Shona tribesmen to co-operate with the SFA by informing them where ZIPRA guerrillas were camped. The success was shortlived for in early 1979 ZANLA moved into the area and explained the nature of the government strategy. Similar successes were registered in the Kana Tribal Trust Land adjacent to the Nkai and Lupane districts of Matabeleland. The people of Kana were Shona who had been resettled there by government decree in the 1950s. When the SFA moved into Kana they told villagers they had come to protect them from ZIPRA who had destroyed schools, clinics and hospitals. After two months, the 200-strong force of Auxiliaries was able to re-open several schools and run a free clinic and cattle-dipping service. Some villagers co-operated

with the SFA and provided information which lead to ZIPRA guerrillas being killed in operations which were led by a regular officer of the army posted to command the SFA. But the SFA presence was not enough and by late 1979 ZIPRA had completely overrun the Kana area and firmly re-established control. There was little the SFA could do except remain in their base camps at Lutope and Kana mission.

By the beginning of 1979 the SFA forces were drawing regular pay in an effort to prevent them from robbing villagers. Until now the irregular forces had been equipped with Warsaw Pact weapons and trained in standard guerrilla tactics. In January 1979 all the forces were converted to Rhodesian security force drill and weapons; thus the AKs were replaced by FN and G3 rifles. Political officials were banned from the training camps and march-past parades were reviewed by senior Army and police officers.

The idea of an armed rabble without a regimental identity was complete anathema to the Rhodesian military establishment and it finally succeeded in bringing the SFA forces into line. The army chiefs argued that the pockets of armed men dotted around the country would have a greater chance under the banner of the Rhodesian security force. It was at this stage that the name of 'Pfumo re Vanhu' (Spear of the People) was unveiled by Psychological Operations Unit (POU) of the Rhodesian Army. Launching the scheme at a regular monthly session of the Operation Favour liaison officers in Salisbury, Major Tony Dalton, the POU commander, explained that henceforth the forces would be dressed in a special drab brown uniform and wear regimental insignia which depicted a shield and a spear. Regimental flags were unfurled over the training facilities and tens of thousands of T-shirts were issued bearing the V for victory emblem and Pfumo re Vanhu slogan. There was another reason why the Rhodesians wanted to regularize the SFA forces. In early 1979 liaison officers attached to the ZANU-Sithole area of Gokwe and Copper Queen reported that the Auxiliaries were blatantly committing atrocities and openly coercing villagers to support their political party. Worse still, there were reports that ZANU had started to cache AK-47 rifles and ammunition and then report false losses to the Rhodesians hoping for replacements. ZANU were making exaggerated claims of engagements with ZIPRA and asking for resupply of ammunition and weapons. To compound matters, the liaison officers said that the ZANU guerrillas were becoming arrogant and offensive towards them and that this behaviour was being encouraged by Sithole's party officials. Against this sinister background it was even more important to control the SFA forces and withdraw their AK-47 rifles and substitute them with standard NATO issue.

The need to withdraw these weapons and replace them with FN and G3

rifles was more acute when the South Africans reported a shortage of captured guerrilla weapons. They explained that all available resources were being diverted for operations in Angola and Namibia. The production of AK-47 rifles and RPD machine guns had not yet been perfected by the South African Arms Corporation with the result that most of these weapons still came from the Rhodesian armouries. The UANC forces exchanged their rifles without any opposition but the exercise proved more difficult with ZANU-Sithole and finally a decision was taken to leave Sithole's forces alone and slowly withdraw them from their areas and later replace them with the more controllable UANC forces.

The very nature of the Operation Favour activities made it possible for some members of the security forces to take advantage of the position in this ZANU-Sithole Gokwe and Copper Queen district. The area stretched from the Copper Queen on the Sanyati river to Lake Kariba on the Zambian border. Because the district was so remote there were still large herds of elephant and during late 1978 police reservists on radio duty at the Nembudziya base-camp in the heart of the ZANU-Sithole area reported to the Special Branch that the Special Forces personnel were hunting elephants with South African Defence Force guests. The military poachers used landrovers and helicopters to track down the herds and if reports filtered back to the rangers of the Department of Parks and Wild Life the liaison officers would explain that villagers had asked the Auxiliaries to cull worrisome rogues which had been devastating crops. Similar occurrences were reported from the south-east of Rhodesia and the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, ordered an investigation after several inspectors working with the Auxiliaries had been accused of poaching ivory. The allegations were difficult to substantiate and so no charges were pressed.

The whole SFA scheme took a bizarre turn in January 1979 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs decided to start its own private army. A force of District Assistants was recruited as the nucleus of a force which professed loyalty to the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) of Senator Chief Jeremiah Chirau. The armed men were deployed in the Zvimba Tribal Trust Land between Sinoia (Chinhoyi) and Hartley (Chegututu) but quickly disbanded after some embarrassing incidents. Members of this band beat a man to death at the Seven Mile business centre. The dead man had failed to acknowledge the authority of the District Assistants. This futile operation was typical of the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose anachronistic thinking was completely out of step with reality.

The ZUPO force was disbanded but before long another equally futile operation was mounted in the Midlands province. The POU claimed,

that with modern mind-bending methods, they could bring on sides and win the loyalty of captured ZIPRA *mujiba*.

Using hundreds of Ndebele villagers captured during martial law operations in the Nkayi, Silobela and Lupane districts, the POU proposed to 'programme' the captives and turn them into Rhodesian government supporters. Even though most of the senior officers attached to the Operation JOC headquarters at Gwelo (Gweru) considered the idea far-fetched, they were desperate and gave the project the go-ahead. Few of the POU officers had any claim to medical or psychological training — most of them were in advertizing in civilian life — and the techniques used were thoroughly unprofessional. Groups of detainees were instructed to chant pro-government songs and were subjected to lectures on the merits of the Rhodesian governmental system compared to the evils of communism and socialism. Detainees who seemed submissive were taken to be early converts and allowed freedom to move in and out of the camp. Those who refused to sing the required verses were forced into tiny cells behind the Nkai police camp and kept in darkness. At frequent intervals, high volume loudspeakers would pour pro-government slogans and chants into the concrete rooms deafening the prisoners. Those who resisted further were beaten or starved. Using these methods, the POU reckoned they could programme even the most determined. After several weeks, the POU announced that they had 'turned' several hundred men. Uncertain of these claims, the Special Branch officers in the Midlands province sent a representative to the Nkai police camp to investigate what was going on. He soon confirmed the commander's fears.

Flushed with apparent success, the POU recommended that the programmed men be trained and deployed into their home areas as a pro-government neutral force. They argued that all the SFA forces were Shona-speaking and geared to counter ZANLA guerrillas. Could not a force of Ndebele converts trained for operations against ZIPRA be included in the Operation Favour concept? Once again, the POU plan was approved although the security men expressed serious misgivings about the idea. Two hundred former ZIPRA *mujiba* were trained at a farm near the Wha Wha prison near Gwelo and issued with G3 rifles. Four weeks later they were sent to the Silobela police camp under the command of 10th Battalion. The force was deployed into an area ten kilometres from Silobela with orders to patrol for the presence of ZIPRA guerrillas. One week later it was discovered that the non-political force had deserted *en masse* to ZIPRA. The POU scheme was hastily abandoned but the tragedy of this story was revealed by the desperation of the Rhodesians who were now prepared to try virtually any plan no matter how remote the chances of success.

In March 1979 all SFA training facilities were up-graded to handle

thousands of extra men on three-week training cycles. The plan was to flood the rural areas with UANC supporters who could muster popular support for the Bishop in the forthcoming elections. With the accent on quantity rather than quality the inevitable happened and the calibre of the SFA declined rapidly. A force of nearly 600 men based at the Scorpion base near Mtoko were deployed before their G3 rifles had been sighted. Oversights of this nature were quickly overlooked by the Operation Favour planners who calculated that the sheer weight of numbers would act as an efficient counterbalance to guerrilla forces when it came to election time. The Auxiliaries and the liaison officers had clear instructions to round up villagers at election days and transport them to the polling booths.

In the wake of Bishop Muzorewa's election win in April 1979, Combined Operations was free to take action against the pro-Sithole forces who were now extracting vengeance on villagers whom they accused of having voted for Muzorewa. Complaints of assaults and murder started to stream into UANC offices in Gatooma. Arrangements were made for all the Sithole Auxiliaries to be disarmed. The instruction was heeded by all except the forces now occupying the Gokwe countryside. These men comprised the bulk of the Ugandan contingent and they were extremely suspicious of any moves to remove their weapons. The problem was approached with subterfuge and the resident liaison officer passed on word to the ZANU-Sithole Auxiliaries that they should muster on the airstrip adjacent to the camp. They were told to await the arrival of party officials. On the appointed day 200 men gathered expecting the arrival of Sithole's representatives and the regular monthly pay-packet. Unbeknown to the Auxiliaries, a strong force of 10th battalion soldiers had surrounded the airfield. The Auxiliaries approached a military vehicle which was parked on the strip and suddenly soldiers flung back the canvas and ordered the Auxiliaries to lay down their arms. As they hesitated the Rhodesians opened fire and cut them down with heavy machine guns. Troops in the stop-lines shot down those who tried to escape. A Special Branch officer who witnessed the incident described the scene as nothing but a massacre. The bodies of the dead were quickly collected and loaded on trucks for the long drive to Spurwing and burial.

The months leading to the signing of the Lancaster House agreement and the cease-fire on 18 December 1979 were marked by steadily declining morale within the SFA forces who now spent most of their time huddled in their base-camps. As the deadline for the cease-fire approached all available SFA training establishments were busy producing new recruits in a feverish move to dominate the ground with Auxiliary forces in readiness for the next elections in early 1980. A top-level meeting of the Rhodesian military establishment was held at which it was agreed

that every effort should be made to ensure that the Bishop was re-elected. It was further agreed that the only organization capable of undertaking this clandestine operation was the Special Branch team and Department Z on the Selous Scouts of the Central Intelligence Organization.

When the auxiliaries were forced to obey the cease-fire and remain in their base-camps, the task of mobilizing support for the UANC became more difficult. The only thing that the Operation Favour team could do was to finance and direct the Bishop's political campaign. Special Branch officers attached to the Operation Favour 're-elect the Bishop' campaign went on a spending spree unprecedented in the long history of the British South Africa Police. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were paid out in cash to a host of greedy officials for the purchase of vehicles and services. The POU under Major Tony Dalton spearheaded a publicity campaign and recommended an advertizing budget which proved a bonanza for the lucky agency retained to promote Bishop Muzorewa and the UANC. For several months until the elections Muzorewa's portrait and party slogans were everywhere and to the Rhodesians it seemed successful.

On the eve of the elections General Peter Walls toured operational commands and held private meetings with farmers and soldiers. He explained that in the unlikely event that the Patriotic Front parties won the elections certain contingency plans would be implemented. So emphatic was this assurance that it was generally believed that the Bishop would somehow win. Members of the Special Branch who started predicting the contrary were accused of being alarmists but when the results came through on Sunday, 3 March 1980, it was clear that ZANU-PF was in the lead. The Bishop was shocked and puzzled and so indeed were most of the White community in Rhodesia.

There is no definite evidence of these contingency plans of which general Walls spoke but some Special Branch officers were privy to an incredible plan apparently masterminded by some senior Special Branch officers and POU men. This was said to have involved the forging of a duplicate set of ballot papers, suitably marked to reflect a majority win in favour of the UANC with the balance split between ZAPU and ZANU. The plan was never implemented because the British were tipped off by some senior CIO officers who realized the inherent dangers of the crazy scheme. The CIO men knew that the results of such interference would have been violence and bloodshed and the end to any chance of a peaceful settlement. The plan was leaked to the British Secret Intelligence Service representative in Salisbury. The Rhodesians involved were confronted and warned not to interfere.

In the immediate aftermath of the elections most ordinary Rhodesians were too shocked to do anything. It was as if, finally, the long agony was

over and they could now go home. In the case of 2 Company 6 RR who had been stationed at Mtoko the collective attitude was 'fuck them all, let's go home'. The men broke camp and headed in military convoy for Bulawayo and their families. The empty camp became Assembly Point X-ray overnight. In other Rhodesian camps across the country, soldiers could be found burning their code-books or scant lists, tearing up classified documents and drinking beers.

Members of the Operation Favour team quietly shrank away slipping into the mainstream of normal duties. The Auxiliaries were disarmed and demobilized. In some instances, liaison officers and small groups of Auxiliaries went to South Africa. Any cash left in the Operation Favour operational 'kitty' was apportioned out and paid to the Auxiliaries in the form of a final *bonsela* or gratuity payment. Members of the Scouts and the RLI, which were immediately disbanded, were allocated payments from funds in the Operation Favour coffers. Golden handshakes varied from two thousand dollars per man increasing with rank held. In a final summing up of the Operation Favour, a Special Branch officer who had been involved from the beginning commented wistfully that the expenditure of nearly Z\$10 million had perfected the ultimate 'psyac job' not on the Africans but on the Rhodesians themselves.

APPENDIX I

Zanu Operational Rules and Directives

Zimbabwe African Nation Union (ZANU)
Defence Secretariat H.Q.
April, 13, 1978.
Operations Department
REF. DSO/01

OPERATIONS RULES AND DIRECTIVES:

The following operational rules and directives have been drawn up to step up our operations, maintain security and to be on the counter offensive.

A COMMAND (DISCIPLINE)

1. Obey orders in all your actions.
2. Surrender everything captured from your enemy.
3. Never take or demand anything from our oppressed masses.
4. Every comrade shall salute his commander.
5. Every comrade shall pay attention when receiving orders from his higher levels.
6. Each and every comrade shall salute one another.
7. Party slogans should be done not to form new ones.
8. Every comrade shall take all missions assigned to him thoroughly as instructed, unnecessary flexibility and cowardice are forbidden and is liable to strong punishment.

N.B.

1. Every comrade shall be honest and loyal to the Party.
2. Every captured item from the enemy is not to be used by individuals.
3. Captured materials should be accompanied by their reports and surrendered.
4. No comrade is allowed to take or demand anything from the masses by force.
5. No comrade shall ill treat the masses.

B COMMISSARIAT

1. Party structure should be known by every comrade and taught to the masses.
2. Every comrade should know the present political situation, e.g. the current treacherous talks between Smith and his puppets and the amnesty campaign.
3. All propaganda pamphlets should be collected and surrendered to the Rear.
4. Any other propaganda pamphlets by any organisation should be surrendered and countered.
5. Political consciousness of fighters should be raised.
6. It should be known to all masses that Sithole, Muzorewa and Chirau are puppets and that their aim is to hijack the Zimbabwe revolution.
7. If propaganda is too much, concentrate on listening to Radio Maputo for directives.

C SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE

1. Liberties with women is strictly forbidden.
2. Smoking dagga is strictly forbidden.
3. Beer drinking is strictly forbidden.
4. No comrade is allowed even to make love in operational areas because this will lead to many temptations.

5. If any comrade deserts from an operation zone every comrade should be informed and materials changed immediately (This refers to the need to remove the arms cache to prevent the deserter or captured guerrilla from indicating it to the SF). Reasons for this defection should be stated in the report.
6. Materials should be well hidden.
7. Wherever we base it should be noted that there is favourable terrain and the base should be thoroughly searched before entering.
8. Posts should be employed, gathering points, password and fighting plans should be known by everybody.
9. If any comrade is captured or killed a sketch diagram should be drawn to indicate where you have buried him. This is to be done by a member of the security present.
10. The sketch diagram should be attached to the report.
11. Sentry duties should be done wherever you will be.
12. Maximum security should be carried out during mass mobilisation.

D LOGISTICS & SUPPLIES

1. Care and maintenance of arms should be done and checked daily.
2. Registration of arms from light to heavy weapons should be done and sent to the Rear.
3. Records of materials used and in stock should be written and sent to the Rear.
4. Captured materials and weapons should be recorded, etc.
5. Materials should be well hidden, e.g. caves.

E MEDICINE

1. The well-being of our comrades and the masses should be preserved.
2. Medical Officers should check the health of comrades from time to time.
3. New clothes should be washed and ironed before wearing them (possibly as a counter measure to the "poisoned Jeans").
4. Sick or injured comrades going to the Rear should be accompanied by their records.

F HOW TO OPERATE:

1. Every section should do at least four operations a month and a minimum of two operations a month.
2. We should adapt the tactics of concentrating our superior force to small enemy force; e.g. we should combine our sections to attack or ambush the enemy to produce good results.
3. Ambushes and engineering operations should be intensified since the enemy is not sleeping in his camps at night.
4. Sabotage warfare should be intensified.
5. Co-ordination with neighbouring detachments and sectors should be done.

THE FOLLOWING PUNISHMENTS WILL BE GIVEN TO ANYONE WHO FAILS TO OBEY THESE RULES

Cases like smoking dagga, drinking beer and taking liberties with women — 30 cuts and will be disarmed for at least 2 to 5 days depending on the gravity of the case. If the comrade continues he will be surrendered to the Higher authorities. Criticism should be carried out for warning each other.

N.B. To help maintain discipline:

1. Every section should sit down every two weeks to sum up experience and criticising each other.

2. Detachment level shall meet every month to sum up experience and plan for the next offensive.
3. At least after every three months depending on the situation, all sections should meet and sum up experience from both angles and criticise one another for better style of work.
4. Armed struggle provides the surest solution to the political conflict in Zimbabwe.

Pamberi Ne ZANU

Pamberi NaComrade President Robert Mugabe.

Signed _____

For Rex Nhongo (C.O.P.)

Approved _____

APPENDIX II

Specifications of Rhodesian Pistol-Carbines and Submachine Guns. Illustrating the Growth of a Domestic Arms Industry during the War.

	LDP/(KOMMANDO)*	RHOGUN	R76 (M77)*	COBRA MK1/(Scorpion)*	GM 15/(GM 16)*	TS 3
Class/Type	Pistol-carbine	Submachine gun	Pistol-carbine (Carbine)	Pistol-carbine (Pistol)	SMG (Pistol-carbine)	Pistol-carbine
Cartridge	9 mm Parabellum	9 mm Parabellum	9 mm Parabellum	9 mm Parabellum	9 mm Parabellum	9 mm Parabellum
Method of Operation	Blowback	Blowback	Blowback	Delayed Blowback	Blowback	Blowback
Ready-to-fire position	Bolt open	Bolt open	Bolt open	Bolt closed	Bolt open	Bolt closed
Firing mode	Semi-automatic	Selective	Semi-automatic	Semi-automatic	Selective (Semi-automatic)	Semi-automatic
Length, butt extended	615 mm	660 mm	670 mm with short barrel (880 mm)	670 mm (N/A)	670 mm	690 mm
Length, butt folded	415 mm	457 mm	480 mm or 430 mm (N/A)	420 mm (343 mm)	440 mm	N/A
Barrel length	210 mm	254 mm	155 mm, 200 mm or 267 mm (267 mm)	254 mm (165 mm)	282 mm	216 mm
Number of lands	5 (6)	4	24	6	6	6
Direction of twist	Left	Right	Single position, 2 row	Left	Right	Right
Type of feed	2 position, 2 row	2 position, 2 row	Browning	2 position, 2 row	2 position, 2 row	2 position, 2 row
Magazine type	Uzi	Uzi	13, 20, or 30 rounds	Uzi	Czech Model 25	Czech Model 25
Magazine capacity	25 rounds	25 rounds	Protected post	25 rounds	40 rounds	40 rounds
Sight, rear	Protected post	Post	Aperture	Protected post	Protected blade	Protected blade
Sight, front	Aperture	Flip, 100mm & 200mm	502m/s with 267mm barrel	Aperture	Swivel 'V'	Aperture
Cyclic rate of fire	N/A	500-550 r.p.m.	502m/s with 267mm barrel	N/A	600-650 r.p.m. (N/A)	N/A
Muzzle velocity		381 m/s	Applied trigger	Applied trigger	Applied trigger	Applied trigger
Safety device	Applied trigger	Lowered magazine	Blued	Epoxy resin	Blued	? Blued
Finish	Blued	? Blued	Steel and plastic	Steel and rubber	Steel and GRP	Steel and wood
Materials	Steel and GRP	Steel and wood	3.0 kg (-)	2.4 kg (1.75 kg)	3.0 kg	3.5 kg
Weight unloaded	2.3 kg	2.9 kg	R. Mansfield-Scadden	P. Steele/B. Whyte	Copy of Czech Model 25	P. Steele
Designer	A. du Plessis	R. Emerson	Salisbury	Salisbury	G.M. Steele	Bulawayo
Place of manufacture	Salisbury	Bulawayo	Northwood Developments	Stellye Co.	G.M. Steele	Bulawayo
Name of manufacturer	Lacoste Engineering Co	Byo. Engineering Co.	June 1977 (May 1978)	May 1978 (-)	June 1978	October 1979
Date of release	June 1977 (c.Oct.1978)	N/A	\$230 (\$260)	\$200 (-)	Est. 2000, both types	
Retail price (Rt\$)	\$165 (\$175)	\$200 proposed	+ 2000, both types			
Numbers made	Over 10000, both types	250/month projected				

* Where specifications differ these are shown in brackets

** Data for proto-type automatic version

- At time of release, excluding sales tax


N/A Not applicable

- Data not known

DEFEND YOURSELF

WITH THE ALL RHODESIAN 9 mm L.D.P. SEMI-AUTOMATIC PISTOL


This weapon will be available February/March, 1977.
Weight 2,7 kg. Magazine 25 rounds. Price approx.
\$160 including one magazine.



To assist us in preparing a production schedule, we would like you to indicate your interest by filling in the coupon below. This is not an offer to sell as we propose these weapons will be sold through usual retail dealers and the dispatch of the coupon does not commit you in any way.

LDP (KOMMANDO) Pistol — carbine

Market research was carried out by means of this pre-production advertisement for the LDP pistol carbine. The response was overwhelming and in terms of numbers made the LDP/Kommando was easily the most successful Rhodesian pistol-carbine. (*The Rhodesian Herald*, 3.12.1976)




BULAWAYO ARMOURY

(PVT.) LTD.

142 Main Street, 14th/15th Avenues,
BULAWAYO. Phone 65779

Sole Distributors for

RHOGUN



\$20 Deposit

Secures your order for
February/March delivery

Developed over 2-year
period — Government
tested (5 000 rounds)

PRICE \$200

Weight 6½ lb. Rate of fire (fully automatic): 500 r.p.m. Classified
as one of the safest machine/carbines in the world.


DESIGNED FOR USE FROM A VEHICLE OR FOR HOME
DEFENCE.

- Ideal weapon for women or people inexperienced with weapons.


65732-Y-12

Rhogun Sub-machine Gun


Prematurely optimistic advertisement for the Rhogun — which never actually
achieved production beyond prototypes. (*The Rhodesian Herald*, 18.2.1977)




The R76 pistol-carbine and its derivative, the M77 carbine, featured a selection of
options and accessories and could be built to suit a customer's requirements.
(*The Herald*, 4.10.1979)



Cobra Pistol-carbine (Scorpion Pistol)




GM 16 Pistol-carbine (GM 15 Sub-machine Gun)



TS 3 Pistol-carbine

Vehicles




**RHODAF. 250 — Armoured Personnel Carrier Driver + 8 Seated +
1 Radio OP + Gunner. 1 x MAG IN TURRET**

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



RHODAF. 250. Tusker

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



RHODAF. 250. COMMAND VEHICLE.

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.




RHODAF. 7,5 Lad Recovery Vehicle.

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



BEDFORD. R.L. (Rearloading) 3 ton.

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.




RHODAF. 250 — 106 mm Carrier.

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



RHODAF. 250. Ambulance

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



BEDFORD. R.L. (Bearcat).

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.



RHODAF. 250. Army.

Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.

Selected Pages from B.S.A.P. 'Booklet on Terrorist Weapons and Equipment'

This booklet was printed in the early 1960s and updated by amendments and additions issued from time to time for insertion. All police stations and army units received the booklet. The pages shown here are the original illustrations but the text has been edited to incorporate amendments and additions that were issued after the original publication.



TOKAREV SELF-LOADING PISTOL

Make: Tokarev	Weight: 1.88 lbs
Country of Origin: Russia and China	Barrel length: 4.57 inches
Calibre: 7.62 m.m. short. (Type P).	Length: 7.68 inches
	Muzzle Velocity: 1378 F.P.S.

General: Both the Russian model and the Chinese copy of this weapon have been recovered in this country. The Russian model has the letters "C.C.C.P." around the star on the side stocks. The Chinese version is known in China as the Type 51.¹ The magazine capacity is 8 rounds. The magazine release catch is positioned on the near side of the grip behind the trigger guard. Both ball and tracer ammunition have been recovered with these weapons. The tracer ammunition is identified by a green tip to the bullet. The ammunition for this weapon can also be fired in the PPSH Russian sub-machine gun. In addition, ammunition for the .30 (7.62 mm.) Mauser self-loading pistol can be fired in this weapon.

1. Models with M20 stamped on the top of the slide have also been encountered and are of Chinese manufacture.




AK ASSAULT RIFLE (AVTOMAT KALASHNIKOV)

Country of Origin: Russia
Calibre: 7.62 m.m. (M. 1943 Cartridge)
Weight: 9.25 lbs
Barrel length: 16.34 inches
Length: 34.25 inches
Velocity: 2330 F.P.S.
Rate of fire: 600 R.P.M.

General: The AK assault rifle is made in two versions, one using a wooden stock and the other using a folding metal stock. Originally the AK did not have a bayonet but now has a knife type bayonet with a blade approximately 8 ins. in length. The AK replaced the SKS carbine as the principal shoulder weapon in the Soviet Army; it is frequently known as the AK 47. The weapon fires both single shot and automatic, the change lever is situated on the right hand side of the weapon. To put the weapon on safe, push the change lever up as far as it will go, for semi-automatic fire push the change lever all the way down, and for fully automatic fire the change lever is pushed to the middle position. The magazine capacity is 30 rounds.¹

1. Models with M22 stamped on the near side of the body have also been encountered and are of Chinese manufacture.



A/K/M BAYONET

This type of bayonet can only be used with the A/K/M Rifle. The scabbard is light brown in colour and is made of a plastic material. The Russian mark and date of manufacture are prominent on both the handle of the blade and the scabbard. Both bayonet and scabbard have a small adjustable strap attached.

Length: 27 cm (10¾ ins)


Length of blade: 15 cm (6 ins)

Width of blade: 4 cm (1 ⅞ ins)

Length of scabbard: 20 cm (8 ins)

Weight: 450 grams (1 lb) (approx.)

The bayonet can be used as a wire cutter by inserting the lug on the scabbard into the slot in the blade (both the lug and slot can be clearly seen in the photograph). It also shows the bayonet assembled for wire cutting.



SIMONOV AUTOMATIC CARBINE (S.K.S.)

Make: Simonov Automatic Carbine (S.K.S.)

Country of Origin: Russia

Calibre: M.1943 7.62 m.m.

Weight: 8.8 lbs


Barrel length: 20.47 inches

Length: 40.16 inches

Velocity: 2410 F.P.S.

General: This weapon is also manufactured in China and is known there as the Type 56.¹ It is a gas-operated weapon, firing the Russian M.1943 intermediate cartridge. This cartridge develops a muzzle velocity of approximately 2,411 feet per second. The magazine capacity is 10 rounds. The weapon fires single shot only and is distinguished by its folding bayonet which is situated under the barrel. Under the barrel and above the bayonet is a cleaning rod. The safety catch is situated on the trigger guard and must be down in order to fire the weapon. The butt is fitted with a butt trap, which contains a brush, jag and handle for the cleaning rod. The above photograph also shows a 10-round charge, which when loading the weapon fits into the charge guide which is situated on the bolt. Ammunition with a green tip has also been found with this weapon; this is tracer ammunition.


1. Models with M21 stamped on the near side of the body have also been encountered and are of Chinese manufacture. Models with a triangular or needle type of bayonet have also been recovered.



SHPAGIN SUB-MACHINE GUN M.1941 (PPSH)

Country of Origin: Russia
Calibre: 7.62 m.m. short (Type P)
Drum Weight: 11.99 lbs (Weapon with loaded drum attached)
Box Weight: 9.26 lbs (Weapon with loaded Magazine attached)
Barrel Length: 10.63 inches
Length: 33.15 inches
Velocity: 1640 F.P.S.
Rate of Fire: 700/900 R.P.M.


General: The PPSH — 41 is a high rate of fire weapon that can be fired either automatic or semi-automatic. The change lever for selecting the type of fire is located on the trigger guard: for automatic it is pushed forward and for semi-automatic it is pushed to the rear. The barrel jacket which extends beyond the muzzle acts as a muzzle brake and compensator. Either a drum magazine, which holds 71 rounds, or a curved box magazine, which holds 35 rounds, may be used with the Russian manufactured weapon. The Chinese are also manufacturing this weapon but their model only takes the curved box magazine.



LANCHESTER SUB-MACHINE GUN

Make: Lanchester
Country of Origin: Great Britain
Calibre: 9 m.m.
Weight: 9.62 lbs
Barrel Length: 7.9 inches
Length: 33.5 inches
Velocity: 1280 F.P.S.
Rate of Fire: 575/600 R.P.M.

General: This weapon was manufactured by the Sterling Engineering Co. It is a British adaptation of the old original German Bergmann machine pistol. It was originally issued as a Navy weapon. Magazines recovered for this weapon have all been of 50 rounds capacity; the weapon will also take a 32-round magazine. The safety device is situated on the off side of the body and consists of a notch for the bolt handle.



THOMPSON SUB-MACHINE GUN

Make: Auto Ordnance Co., Ltd.

Country of Origin: United States of America

Calibre: .45 ins.

Weight: 10.45 lbs


Barrel Length: 10.5 inches

Length: 32 inches

Velocity: 920 F.P.S.

Rate of Fire: 700 R.P.M.

General: Two models of this weapon have been found in this country: the M.I., which has a floating firing pin; and the M.I.A.I., which has a solid firing pin. Both take the straight box magazine which holds 30 rounds; also, a straight 20-round box magazine may be encountered. Thompson sub-machine guns taking the drum magazine have not been found in this country. The weapon fires both single shot and fully automatic. When the weapon is cocked, the fire control lever positioned on the left side above the pistol grip may be pushed to either single or auto. Also on the left side above the pistol grip is the thumb safety. The weapon must be cocked before either of these two levers can be set.



7.62 m.m. DEGTYAREV LIGHT MACHINE GUN (D.P.)

Country of Origin: Russia

Calibre: 7.62 m.m. Fires M 1908/rifle, carbine and machine gun ammunition. Rimmed.

Length: 50 ins.

Barrel Length: 23.8 inches

Weight: (with loaded magazine): 26.23 lbs.

Weight: (gun only): 20.1 lbs.

Velocity: 2756 F.P.S.


Rate of Fire: 500-600 R.P.M.

General: The Degtyarev L.M.G. was designed in 1926-27 and was the standard Soviet Light Machine Gun, until replaced by the R.P.D. A modernised version, designated D.P.M. was introduced in 1944, with prominent recognition features such as the pistol grip, the shape of the butt and the spring housing behind the receiver.

The D.P. fires automatic only and the safety device is a squeezer type which is positioned at the rear of the trigger guard. The safety device is automatically "OFF" when the firer's fingers tighten around the grip.

The weapon is fed from a drum magazine (10 1/2 in. diameter) which contains 47 rounds of ammunition. The magazine is positioned on top of the receiver. To unload the weapon, pull back on the backsight protector blades, then lift off the magazine. To clear the action, pull back the cocking handle on the right hand side of the weapon.

A haversack, designed to carry three magazines and manufactured of coarse canvas has been found.



40 M/M INFANTRY ANTI-TANK LAUNCHER R.P.G.2

Country of Origin: Russia

Calibre of tube: 1.58 ins.

Calibre of projectile: 3.2 ins.

Length of tube: 47 ins.

Weight of launcher: 6.23 lbs.

Weight of projectile: 3.3 lbs.

Muzzle velocity: 276 feet per sec.

Effective range: 165 yards.

Penetration: 6 to 7 ins. (Armour Plate)

General: The R.P.G.2 is a recoil-less anti-tank launcher patterned after the German World War II Panzerfaust, and is a very light, portable and effective short range weapon.

The above photograph also shows two projectiles, the top projectile which is coloured khaki is of Chinese manufacture, the back cap which screws on the projectile behind the fins has been removed.

The projectile shown at the bottom of the photograph is dark green in colour and is also of Chinese manufacture. The back cap is in position at the rear of the projectile. This cap has to be removed before firing.

Between the two projectiles is also shown the propellant charge which is screwed onto the base of the projectile after first having removed the back cap.

Models with Rocket Launcher 40 mm-M7 stamped on the near side of the pistol grip have also been encountered and are of Chinese manufacture.

R.P.G. 7 ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER

Country of Origin: Russia and Rumania

(i) Launcher:

Calibre: 40 mm (1½ ins)

Length: 953 mm (37½ ins)

Weight without Optical Sighting Device: 5,96 kg (13 lbs)

Weight of the Optical Sighting Device: 0,52 kg (1¼ lbs)

Total Weight (without ammunition): 6,48 kg (13½ lbs)

(ii) Projectile:

Weight of the Projectile: 1880 grams (3½ lbs)

Weight of the Propellant Charge: 375 grams (12 oz)

Weight of the ammunition ready for firing: 2255 grams (4½ lbs)

Length of Projectile: 627 mm (24½ ins)

Length of Projectile with propellant: 915 mm (36 ins)

Ignition of the Warhead — Top Sensitized (Piezoelectric element).


Penetration: 330 mm (13 ins) (approx)

General: The R.P.G. 7 is a recoilless, shoulder fired, muzzle loaded, reloadable anti-tank rocket launcher and is patterned after the R.P.G. 2 Rocket Launcher.

Numerous improvements have been incorporated, the centre section of the tube has been enlarged to provide greater thrust for the projectile and a large funnel shaped deflector has been located at the rear end of the tube.


In addition to the normal "Flip Type" iron sights an optic sight may be mounted on the barrel by means of a dovetail guide. These sights are normally used, whereas the hinged sights are used as emergency sights. The essential components of the Optical Sight are:

- (i) An optical system with a 2,5 magnification.
- (ii) An adjustable graticule up to 500 metres with a lead grid and distance estimating aid.
- (iii) A temperature compensation.
- (iv) A graticule illumination.



Photograph 1.

Shows the Launcher with the Optic Sight fitted. Also shown in the photograph is a web pouch which carries such accessories as amber and blue filters, spare bulbs, a combination tool and extension cable which is presumably used to link up the optic sight with some power source other than the two pen-light batteries which are normally used.



Photograph 2.

Shows two rockets of Russian manufacture, one rocket has the plastic cover positioned at the end of the rocket motor and the other having the propellant charge screwed into position.



Photograph 3.

Shows the green canvas carrying pack which can accommodate three Rockets and three propellants. When closed the contents are extremely well protected from the elements.

ROCKETS — General:

R.P.G. 7 Rockets are packed in a wooden box measuring 775 x 450 x 1247 mm. The outside of the box is painted dark grey-green, the inscription is in black and the inside of the box is stained red-brown.

The tip of each projectile, which contains the current generating piezoelectric element and the top fuse, is protected by a green cardboard cartridge approximately 18 mm long. The nozzle ring of the auxiliary propelling device (rocket motor) and the connection of the propellant charge with the percussion cap at the end of the shell are

protected by paper wraps, the latter being provided with an additional plastic cover.

Six projectiles and six propellant charges (in packs of three) are contained in each box.

The whole package has been dipped in wax as a protection against moisture. Under the packing paper is a plastic bag which contains the propellant charges with cardboard cartridges.



STICK GRENADE (COMMUNIST CHINA)

Overall length: 203 mm's.

Body length: 64 mm's.

Body diameter: 46 mm's.

Body type: Cast-iron, painted black.

Overall weight: 553, 392 grams.


Weight of filling: 26,081 grams.

Type of filling: T.N.T.

Effective Fragmentation Radius: 10 metres.

Stick grenades, as shown in the above photograph, and which have been recovered in Zimbabwe, have all been of Communist Chinese manufacture, and have borne the following markings on the stick: "374-68-650."

A black, cast-iron, non-serrated body is positioned at one end of the wooden stick, and at the other end is a screw cap, which when removed, reveals a paper covering. When this paper seal is broken a silver ring, to which is attached a small length of cord, can be seen. When the ring is pulled, the delay element of the friction fuse within the body is ignited. After a delay period ranging from 2,5 to 5 seconds the main charge is detonated.



CHINESE 60 mm MORTAR

The 60 mm Mortar when used in the normal role is fitted with a bipod and base plate. Only barrels have been recovered in this country. The barrel is fitted with a fixed firing pin.

Weight of barrel: 5 kg (10½ lbs)

Length of barrel: 62 cm (24½ ins)

Normal Range: 370 m (400 yds)

Maximum Range: 1425 m (1560 yds)

Most of the 60 mm Mortars found in this country have been of Chinese manufacture, the barrel number is stamped on the base of the tube and the Arsenal Mark E.1 67 in a small circle is stamped in the same place.

One tube of North Vietnamese manufacture has been found and the main difference is as follows:-

1. Light green in colour.
2. Barrel four inches longer.
3. A wider white line down the length of the barrel.
4. The letters at the base of the tube are more pronounced, and are marked MB-60 mm and M57 followed by barrel serial number.



60 mm MORTAR BOMBS

Two types of Mortar Bombs have been recovered. Both types have been fitted with impact fuses. The bombs are khaki in colour and have a cast iron body loaded with AMATOL.

Photograph shows the two different bombs. On the right can be seen a bomb with it's 4 secondary charges. With this bomb the secondary charges are small bags which fit under the wire clips between the fins. a maximum of five such small bags are packed with each bomb.

When fired with the primary charge, a range of up to approximately 370 m (400 yds) is obtained. Increased ranges are obtained by attaching secondary charges, up to a maximum of 5.

Maximum Range: 1425 m (1 560 yds) (approx.)

Weight: 1 © kg (3,3 lbs)

Length: 23 cm (9 ins)

These bombs come in a white cylindrical plastic container which includes the secondary charges.

All bombs so far recovered in this country have been of Chinese manufacture.

ANTI VEHICLE MINE T.M.H./T.M. 46

Material: Metal.

Diameter: 30.5 cm. (12 ins. approx)

Height: 11.4 cm (4½" approx)

Weight: 9.00 kg. (approx) (20 lbs. approx)

Explosive Weight: 5.6 kg. (12½ lbs. approx)

Ignitor: MV 5


Operating Weight: 200 kg. (400 lbs. approx.)

The majority of these mines recovered in Zimbabwe have been of Chinese manufacture, unlike the Russian manufacture mines they bear no identification marks.

The T.M.H. 46 Mine has an Anti-Handling device built into the base of the Mine, the T.M. 46 Mine does not have the Anti-Handling Device. Models of this Mine have also been found with the Anti-Handling Device "WELL" present but no threaded washer to take the device.

Externally the Chinese and Russian Mines are almost identical, except the Russian Mines are marked T.M. 46 or T.M.H. 46 in black paint on the side of the Mine; also they are marked T.M. 46 or T.M.H. 46 in 'HEIGHT RELIEF' on the base of the Mine; included also on the base of the Mine is the Code Number of the factory that manufactured the Mine.

The photograph shows the MUV 2 Ignitor with the Percussion Cap Detonator screwed into the Mechanism.



TMD — B: WOODEN BOX MINE

Origin: Russian.

Dimensions: 31.8 cm. x 29.3 cm. x 12.8 cm.




Weight: 10-13 lbs.) These weights may vary as they are subject to local manufacturing conditions.

Ignitor: MV 5 (With MD 2 Detonator).

Load: 400 lbs. approx.

The TMD — B is a wooden box mine of nailed, glued or dovetailed construction. In the first photograph the mine is shown with the top down and locked. On the plank above the numerals can be seen two square saw cuts approximately 3.9 cm. in from the ends of the mine. These saw cuts run the width of the mine and when a load of approximately 400 lbs. is exerted onto the top of the mine, the top breaks at the saw cuts and pressure is then brought to bear on the ignitor which then detonates the mine.

The second photograph shows the locking strip swung out and the centre hinged batten raised. On the inside of the centre batten can be seen a



'dished' out wooden block which rests slightly above the ignitor when it is in position. Therefore it follows that regardless of wherever the top of the mine collapses pressure will still be applied to the ignitor. A wooden transit plug which serves to keep dirt out of the detonator well has been removed and is shown on the left of the photograph. The MV 5 ignitor and the detonator (MD 2) are shown on the right of the photograph.

The third photograph shows the MV 5 ignitor in position in the mine.



A.K. MAGAZINE CARRIER

This is a khaki canvas bandoleer of Communist Chinese manufacture, measuring 22,22 cms. x 18,41 cms. x 8,24 cms. It has five compartments, each accommodating one A.K. magazine.

A small pouch has been fitted to each side of the carrier, which would appear to be used for 7,62 mm. M1943 ammunition in twenty round packets.

Belt loops and an adjustable shoulder strap, are stitched to the back of the bandoleer.


Soldiers armed with A.K.'s can each carry five extra loaded magazines and an additional forty loose rounds, using this type of bandoleer.



UNIFORMS

The photograph above depicts two types of uniforms found in the possession of ZIPRA groups. The uniform on the left consists of drab olive green trousers, with side, thigh and hip pockets an off-white baseball cap and canvas spats. Some terrorists were also equipped with tunics of the same drab olive green material, with two breast pockets, two side pockets and secured in the front by a zip fastener.


The uniform on the right is manufactured from a poor quality khaki material and the pockets and front of the tunic are secured by plain brass buttons. The hat, of a jungle type design, is manufactured from the same material as the uniform.



BOOTS

Brown leather ski boots used by certain ZIPRA groups during Operation GRANITE.

They are laced through metal loops as shown in the above photograph. The soles are of composite rubber set in a close mesh pattern.



This type of boots was worn by ZIPRA and clearly shows the sole pattern. The inscription at the instep reads "Status Sport, Oil Resistant".

PONCHOS

A number of captured ZIPRA have been in possession of ponchos manufactured in light waterproof canvas. The garments are jungle green in colour with toggle fastenings down the front and eyelets at the bottom corners. Side pockets with toggle fastenings are also fitted.

The capes were worn as a form of camouflage in the manner shown in the photograph.




CAMOUFLAGED HIDEOUTS LUPANE DISTRICT

Photographs show the well concealed camouflaged hideouts during operation "Vermin" in the Lupane District between 21st and 27th November, 1966.



"OPERATION VERMIN"



View of one of the concealed holes after roof covering removed.




Trap door to the concealed camouflaged underground hideouts.

“OPERATION VERMIN”



View of one of the camouflaged holes after roof covering removed.



Shows the construction of the roof of the round camouflaged underground hideout.

“OPERATION VERMIN” — ARMS CACHES



Arms cache as found in Lupane District during “Operation Vermin” 21st to 27th November, 1966.

One of the arms caches consisted of a large square tin sunk in concrete.



The second arms cache consisted of a buried forty-four gallon petrol drum. Photograph shows the drum and contents.

ZIMBABWE MEDICAL AID (Z.I.M.A.)



Our ref:
Your ref:

ZIMA NEWS

January 1977

Napalm bombs used in Mozambique; medical deprivation by Smith on border areas; supplies needed more than ever.

News of suffering and appalling injury without any real medical support continues to pour in from the Zimbabwe refugee camps, particularly in Mozambique, but also, more recently, from Botswana. Worse still, the Rhodesian forces have withdrawn medicines and medical equipment from civilian posts in the operational areas within Rhodesia itself to a depth of 70 to 80 km from the border. Only severely restricted medical supplies are available further within the country to the ordinary African people.

In a letter of December 18 to ZIMA a doctor with the guerilla forces tells how Smith has been using napalm bombs for the past 2½ months in the aircraft attacks across the Mozambique border, almost unreported in the Western press. The terrifying torture of burns from napalm bombs will be only too clear to those with memories of the U.S. use of napalm in the Vietnam war. The medical problems of the many thousands of Zimbabweans in refugee camps without facilities or adequate sanitation are difficult enough; but since the Nyadzonya massacre of at least 700 refugees last August and the continuous killer raids by regime troops across the border since then, the few nurses and even fewer doctors in the camps have been swamped. Medical supplies are quite inadequate to cope.

The additional toll following napalm burns amounts to a war of genocide waged by Smith against indigenous Zimbabwean peoples.

In this country ZIMA continues its efforts to raise medical supplies for all displaced Zimbabweans. A consignment of medical supplies, drawn up by a doctor from ZIMA, was sent using other funds of £2,000 last November. In the three months since launching, its own funds have just topped £1,000, but of course much more is needed to make even a partial contribution to the support of the refugees and the liberation struggle for Zimbabwe.

With contributions to ZIMA and for more information send to:

Dr. J. K. Cruickshank
ZIMA Publicity Secretary
84 Tindal Street
Balsall Heath
Birmingham B12 9QS

CHAPTER 1

1. *[The] Rhod [esia] Herald*, 17 Sept. 1962
2. *Ibid.*, 27 Nov. 1962. See the novel by J.G. Davis entitled *Hold My Hand I'm Dying* (London, Michael Joseph, 1967) inspired by this incident.
3. *Rhod. Herald*, 18 Aug. and 8 Sept. 1962.
4. T.B. Manyonga, S. Mabika, M.V. Ncube and N. Ndukwana were among the early ZAPU guerrillas trained and infiltrated in 1963-4.
5. Emmerson Mnangagwa, now Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (formerly Minister of State in charge of Security) was arrested in 1964 for blowing up the railway line near Fort Victoria (Masvingo) He served nearly ten years in prison before being released in 1974 during the detente exercise.
6. In the 1960s the CID Sabotage Squad enjoyed considerable success in infiltrating informers into the nationalist movement. In one case a detective sergeant went to China for training and on crossing with his group into Rhodesia he reported their presence to the police. For this bravery he was secretly decorated by the Commissioner of Police.
7. Inspectors Binns and Freeman were named, during the late 1960s, in a list of 100 Rhodesian government officials whom the nationalists wanted dead.
8. *Outpost* (July 1969), XLVII, vii, 54.
9. A chief superintendent in the Special Branch ordered the false report but the junior officer responsible for the routine surveillance of the British refused to sign the report because it appeared that the superintendent had personal motives for attempting to create the false suspicion.
10. Ammunition box was known in Shona as *makasha* for *caixa* being Portuguese for box or *cache*.
11. *Rhod. Herald*, 25 May 1923: a human sacrifice was offered to the rain goddess by Chief Chigango who was then convicted of murder. The sentence was commuted to ten years and in 1924 the old Chief was released because of ill-health. It was coincidence that the 1924/5 rains were the best in living memory. The importance of the shrine at Chigango and the traditional beliefs of the Korekore were not fully appreciated by government administrators.
12. Chaminuka was a famed prophet of the mid-nineteenth century who purportedly predicted the coming of White men and the railways.
13. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace: notes on investigations into the incidents 1976: "From a Diary kept at Mukumbura Protected Village"

CHAPTER 2

1. A nationalist guerrilla leader to be accused of being an armchair fighter was James Chikerema, whose fondness for 'chicken in the basket' at Lusaka's elite Ridgeway Hotel earned him this reputation during the early 1970s.
2. The Rhodesian CIO obtained complete passenger lists, naming the guerrillas, from agents then employed by the Mozambique airline.
3. Evidence of the KGB involvement with ZAPU's National Security Organization was reported at the trial of Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku charged in 1983 with soliciting KGB support for the overthrow of the Zimbabwean government. The state case rested on a letter addressed to the then KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, and routed via Comrade Maxim, the KGB resident in Lusaka responsible for ZIPRA

liaison. The case failed but the men were detained in terms of Zimbabwe's emergency powers; see *Herald*, 8 Feb. 1983.

4. R. Reid Daly, *Selous Scouts, Top Secret War* (Alberton, Galago Press, 1983), for details of Schulenberg's reconnaissance prior to the Zambian raid.

CHAPTER 3

1. Official programme, Government Printers, Salisbury, August, 1965.
2. *Rhod. Herald*, 17 Feb. 1971; *The Guardian*, 18 Feb. 1971.
3. Outpost (Dec. 1968), XLVI, xii, 28.
4. Operação nó Gordão (Operation Gordian Knot) launched in May 1970, involved the deployment of 30,000 soldiers and 20 aircraft in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique. It succeeded in retarding FRELIMO progress only until December the same year.
5. Many Centenary tobacco farmers operated their own aircraft and weekend flights to Beira on the Mozambique coast were not uncommon.
6. A. Hastings, *Massacre in Mozambique. Wiriya* (London, Search Press, 1974) contains a full account of the incidents in the Mukumbura district and also of the massacre at Wiriya near Tete by the Portuguese army.
7. Flight Lieutenant B.C. Weinman and Senior Aircraftsman P.R. Durrell were among the dead in these incidents.
8. See J. Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (London, André Deutsch) 1978 for more details on the CIA-supported operations in Angola.
9. Ibid.
10. The Rhodesians attempted to jam the nightly transmissions from Maputo but the extremely powerful signal reached its target.
11. The success of this clandestine radio service later inspired the Voice of the Black Cockerel, a pro-UNITA service beamed into Angola from South Africa from late 1979 onwards.
12. Glides of up to 80 kilometres have been recorded in these free-fall, high-altitude parachute drops into hostile country, prior to low-altitude canopy release. Infiltrations of this nature are extremely difficult to detect and were frequently used by the SAS on missions into Mozambique.
13. *Domingo*, 6 Mar. 1983. Lieutenant Gingles had earlier served with the Selous Scouts before joining the SADF at Phalaborwa in the north-eastern Transvaal.
14. Brian Davison, general manager of Beattie Transport Services (Private) Limited, was captured and held by the MNR for twenty four hours and then released unharmed; see interview in *The Financial Gazette*, 23 Mar. 1984.

CHAPTER 4

1. The South African Police (SAP) in Rhodesia were allocated the code-name 'Pilgrim' for use as their radio recognition call-sign. In much the same manner as the Army was known as Crusader, the Police as Bailiff and the Special Branch as Acorn.
2. S.G. Ndlovu, *Zimbabwe: Some Facts about Its Liberation Struggle* (n.d. ZAPU 1973); *The Guardian*, 24 Aug. 1967.
3. Inspector Phillips was later decorated with the Police Medal for Gallantry.
4. The Police Act (No. 64 of 1964), Section 10 reads: 'the Governor, at the request of any country may employ the Force in the carrying out of Police duties in any country'. This permitted the BSAP to be deployed in Operation Sunrise during the Nyasaland emergency in March 1959. The SAP had similar legislation.

5. *Rhod. Herald*, 6 Apr. 1968.
6. G-Cars (code-name for SAP helicopters); Z-Cars (code-name for Rhodesian helicopters); K-Car (code-name for helicopter fitted with a 20mm cannon or a 303 Browning machine-gun); Kiviet (code-name for the South African Air Force single-engined Cessna 182).
7. *Rhod. Herald*, 6 Mar. 1968.
8. Ndlovu, *Zimbabwe and Some Facts about Its Liberation Struggle*.
9. *Rhod. Herald*, 9 Jun. 1968.
10. Possibly identical to Brigadier G.J. Joubert, SAP headquarters in Pretoria. I. Wilkins and J.M. Strydom, *The Super-Afrikaners* (Johannesburg, J. Ball, 1978).
11. International Commission of Justice, *Racial Discrimination and Repression in Southern Rhodesia* (Geneva, The Commission, 1976), 79. The official Rhodesian police papers on this incident were destroyed in 1980.
12. *Rhod. Herald*, 24 Dec. 1975.
13. D. Caute, *Under the Skin, the Death of White Rhodesia* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1983), 265.
14. In the late 1970s shop keepers at the South African border town of Messina openly displayed signs reading 'best Rhodesian emeralds purchased for cash'. Emeralds were not considered as precious stones in South Africa.

CHAPTER 5

1. Selous Scouts, named after Frederick Courtney Selous, hunter and scout, hired by Cecil Rhodes to guide the Pioneer Column which occupied Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in 1890.
2. *IDAF Bulletin* (April 1981), II.
3. H. Ellert, *The Material Culture of Zimbabwe* (Harare, Longmans, 1984), 59 for details of *pungwe* and its significance during the guerrilla war 1972-80.
4. The Special Branch adopted a policy of paying Z\$1,000 as a bonus to agents and informers for every confirmed kill. Such payments were later made to regular members of the security forces as well despite official opposition to the scheme.
5. Reid Daly, *Selous Scouts*, 117-19, for further details of this incident.
6. See Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice in Rhodesia, *Civil War in Rhodesia* (London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1976), 50, for details.
7. Ibid.
8. It should be explained that throughout the war it was policy to dump bodies of guerrillas, *mujiba* and civilians killed in 'cross-fire' into mine shafts or to bury them in unmarked mass graves. In most cases large pits were dug at the end of airstrips into which the bodies were thrown, soaked in petrol and set ablaze. White plastic body bags were occasionally used but this depended on the number involved. The niceties of respect for the dead were not observed and there was disregard for the feelings of relatives of the deceased. This will explain why there is such a compelling need in the post-independence era for the families of persons killed in the war to locate and identify the remains. In keeping with Shona traditions it is extremely important to perform a symbolic re-burial ceremony known as *Kurova Guva* and *Kugadzira* (literally to re-bury or make good the wrong). In these ceremonies the relatives of the deceased must transport soil from the known or suspected burial back to his or her home village so that the ancestral spirits are appeased. Such ceremonies are usually performed in September or October and traditional beer is brewed and cattle may be slaughtered for the *bira* ceremony. It is also pertinent to note that the Rhodesian security forces, in all official communiqués, reports and documents referred to 'resting places' and

- 'feeding points' (places where guerrillas had either spent the night or eaten) as if describing the activities of animals and not human beings at all.
9. Zimbabwe, *The Fallen Heroes of Zimbabwe* (Harare, Prime Minister's Office, 1983) contains thousands of names of guerrillas killed in the conflict, including some 69 persons whose death is attributed to poisoned clothes.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Ibid.
 12. Ibid.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Ibid.
 15. P.L. Moorcraft and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia, 1965-1980* (Marshalltown, Sygma Collins, 1982), 220.
 16. *Rhod. Herald*, 16 July 1978.
 17. Reid Daly, *Selous Scouts*.
 18. *Caute, Under the Skin*, 267 for details of an interview between Macguinness and a Rhodesian defence attorney who visited the Bindura Fort where he found the Selous Scouts commander busy 'turning ters' and with his pockets full of cash.
 19. D. Lamont, *Speech from the Dock* (Leigh-on-Sea, K. Meyhew, 1977).
 20. *The African Times*, 4 Dec. 1974.
 21. Rhodesia, *Harvest of Fear* (Salisbury, Ministry of Information, Immigration and Tourism, 1976). This was published in English, Shona and Ndebele.
 22. See Ibid.; Appendix I ZANU Operational Rules and Directives.
 23. Rhodesia, *Harvest of Fear*
 24. *Rhod. Herald*, 8 Feb. 1977.
 25. *Sunday Mail*, 23 June 1978.
 26. Ibid.
 27. *Rhod. Herald*, 16 Feb. 1980.
 28. Possibly identical to Cpl Chilondo Martin and Pvt Rangarirayi, holders of the Silver Cross of Rhodesia and members of the Selous Scouts.
 29. Inquest at the Magistrate's Court, Gwelo, 25 April 1980.

CHAPTER 6

1. The Goromonzi complex was originally built at the request of the Special Branch so that they could accommodate security prisoners under conditions of maximum secrecy. The facility was normally kept in mothballs until the Special Branch required it for interrogation. When the Special Branch had people detained they provided supervisory staff to watch and feed the prisoners. This task was not left to the ordinary police because of previous experience where sympathetic African policemen had smuggled messages or actually helped prisoners to escape. Another major reason for the construction of Goromonzi was the escape of the ZANU guerrilla Felix Santana from Concession police camp where he had been detained after capture during the Crocodile Gang operations.
2. C.H.V. Cooke (CLM Rhodesia 11.11.75); he later resigned from the department and was succeeded by Tim Pittard.
3. *Zimbabwe Output* (July 1984), 47.
4. *Herald*, 21 Dec. 1979.
5. T. Geraghty, *Who Dares Wins. The Story of the SAS* (Fontana, 1983), 137-61.
6. Ibid.
7. The Helicopter has a maximum speed of 110 knots and a range of 400 nautical miles with an uplift capacity of 10 armed men. It is equipped with twin Browning .303

- machine guns or a single 20 mm cannon in the classic K-Car configuration.
8. Brigadier Tim Landon and the Rhodesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, P.K. Van der Byl, were long-standing friends.
 9. On 18 September 1983, a small bridge in the Madziva district was named after Clever Mabonzo.
 10. *The Star* Johannesburg, 16 Jul. 1978; *The Rand Daily Mail*, 17 July. 1978 for details of the accused men. Rhodesian censors forbade any mention of the trial in the local newspapers thereby fuelling speculation and rumours about the scandal.
 11. Possible suicide as the explanation for Wrathall's demise was confirmed to the writer in 1983 by a doctor who was working at the Andrew Fleming hospital in 1978.

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